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Abstract 
 
Although there is quite a rich literature relating to competitive innovation there is 
relatively little relating to technological collaboration. However, ignoring 
collaborative possibilities may result in overestimation of the importance of self-
innovation. This thesis is therefore mainly concerned with the determinants of 
collaboration in innovation, taking both a theoretical and an empirical approach. 
The empirics relate to the manufacturing industry in a Chinese region. The 
thesis is particularly innovative in emphasising how collaboration costs will be 
shared when collaboration occurs. 
We provide a game theoretic exploration of the decisions of firms on 
whether to compete or collaborate in the generation and adoption of a 
sequence of new technologies. Different from the models proposed by Vickers, 
who concentrates upon process innovation and a two-strategy (innovation or do 
nothing) set, our game theory model emphasises product innovation and either 
a three-strategy set (innovation, collaboration, and do nothing), or a four-
strategy set (innovation, collaboration, imitation and do nothing). In particular, 
MATLAB programming is employed for generating the equilibrium solution for 
each strategy set. We found that the relationship between imitation and 
collaboration and collaboration cost is not univariate. It depends upon the 
market type and various market characteristics, such as technology gap, 
technology level, the product substitution index, transaction costs and the 
discount rate of price sensitiveness. The results also show that the elasticity of 
collaboration opportunity with respect to transaction costs in a persistent 
dominance market is much greater than in an action reaction market. 
 10 
By using data on manufacturing in a Chinese region from 2005 to 2007, 
derived from the China Innovation Survey and the Annual Corporate Financial 
Survey, we empirically explored innovation and collaboration patterns. Three 
factors, innovative ability, absorptive capacity, and catching up capacity were 
proposed to positively affect both innovation and collaboration. This led to six 
hypotheses, which were tested using a number of econometric models 
encompassing selection bias, timing, and dynamics issues. The major finding 
from the empirical models suggests that innovative ability, absorptive capacity 
and catching up capacity all impact significantly and positively on collaboration, 
whilst innovation is positively related only to absorptive capacity. Also, we found 
that collaboration cost may increase with R&D, employees‘ education, the 
technology gap and collaboration cost in previous periods, but decrease with 
transaction cost, patents held, the technology level and perceived price. 
The thesis makes three contributions. Theoretically, our game theory 
model not only extends the understanding of the impacts of collaboration 
possibilities and collaboration cost in dynamic game theory, but also clarifies the 
impacts of transaction costs and imitation (and thus intellectual property rights 
(IPR)) on the outcome. Empirically, by introducing new data our work is the first 
to investigate collaboration patterns and collaboration cost sharing strategies in 
a mid-income level developing country. Last but not least, using MATLAB 
animation programming to simplify the calculation process of the game theory 
equilibrium may be considered as a methodological contribution. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation and Concepts 
 
As Solow (1956) identified, the main driver of economic growth is improvements 
in technology. This has led to a long-running and extensive interest in the study 
of innovation and related topics. One issue is whether firms may prefer to 
innovate alone or to collaborate in the innovative process with others (be it with 
other horizontally or vertically related firms, or unrelated firms, or even public 
bodies). To date, there has been little agreement on when collaboration might 
be optimal especially in the case of product (as opposed to process innovation). 
In today‘s highly competitive environment where innovation is critical 
(Andersson & Kaplan, 2004), to some extent it may be the best strategy for 
firms to collaborate with rivals to, for example, share the cost burden of product 
development. Such arguments imply that collaboration may be an important 
strategy as firms compete in technology. Ignoring the possibility of collaboration 
could result in an overestimation of the importance of other determinants of 
innovation, such as R&D (Love & Roper, 1999). There are thus good reasons 
for looking again at collaboration in technology development. 
This research has two main components. The first is a theoretical 
component in which game theoretic models are employed to analyse when and 
where firms might collaborate and how the costs of collaboration may be 
shared. This is innovative in a number of ways as we detail below. The second 
component is empirical and explores patterns of innovation and collaboration in 
the manufacturing industry in a Chinese district. This is also innovative in that to 
 12 
the best of our knowledge such sample data has not been previously explored, 
and thus what we deduce about patterns of innovation and collaboration and 
their determinants in this example are new to the literature. 
The determinants of whether and when firms collaborate has been a 
controversial and disputed subject even within the limited field of collaboration 
research. The main suggestion in the literature is that collaboration may bring 
firms higher profits/welfare (Seade, 1980; Motta, 1992; Rosenkranz, 1995). On 
the other hand, some scholars believe that the driving force behind 
collaboration is the impact upon the extent of product sales (Buckley & Casson, 
1996) and generating global sustainable competitive advantage (Zhang et al., 
2007; Feng & Chen, 2004).  
However, if collaboration is always a better strategy, then one cannot 
explain why firms do not always choose collaboration. As Xu and Zhang (2008) 
found in a study of 541 Chinese publicly traded companies from 2000 to 2005, 
firms sometimes prefer innovating independently rather than collaborating. This 
leads us to ask: under what conditions will firms collaborate and under what 
conditions will they not? We are particularly interested in mapping those forces 
that condition collaboration in order to illustrate incentives to collaborate. 
The work of Gan et al (2002) is also relevant. In their empirical analysis, 
they examined the different profit rates from two strategies, being an upstream 
supplier or being a horizontal competitor. Similarly, in order to understand why 
and when firms collaborate, we explore whether the payoffs to collaboration and 
innovation strategies differ.  
The purpose of this thesis therefore, is to examine the determinants of 
innovation and collaboration by firms facing a sequence of potential new 
 13 
technologies that they may generate and/or adopt. In addition we also wish to 
explore how the costs of innovation under collaboration are shared between the 
collaborators when collaboration occurs.  
Throughout this research the term collaboration is taken as involving 
‗strategic alliances‘, although sometimes the label ‗collective integration‘ may be 
used. Parkhe (1991, 1993) suggests that a strategic alliance refers to ‘relatively 
enduring interfirm cooperative arrangements’, which allow firms to serve their 
individual needs by utilising mutual resources. But this definition does not 
distinguish collaboration from cooperation. As collaboration and cooperation are 
similar or synonymous concepts, this may cause confusion. Therefore, by 
following the alternative definition of collaboration suggested by Polenske 
(2004), collaborative relationships in our thesis are defined to ‘include direct 
participation by two or more actors in designing, producing and /or marketing a 
product’, whilst cooperation relationships are defined as when ‘two or more 
actors agree through formal or informal arrangements to share information, 
support managerial and technical training, supply capital, and/ or provide 
market information’. 
This definition allows us to further distinguish collaboration from joint 
ventures, which normally refer to investment alliances rather than the alliances 
in generating and introducing new technology. In general, collaboration may be 
considered as one particular form of joint venture. In some literatures, 
collaboration is regarded as one kind of knowledge sharing joint venture, which 
may be configured in many different ways and associated with different kinds of 
behaviours. As Buckley and Casson (1996) suggest in their internalisation 
theory model, the typology of joint ventures may be classified into three kinds: 
 14 
technology sharing, marketing sharing, and both. Only pure technology sharing 
joint ventures may be recognised as R&D collaboration. However, the idea of a 
‗knowledge shared kind of joint venture‘ may not be accepted by others. Luo 
(1997) for instance, divides joint ventures into two categories using either 
operation-related criteria or cooperation-related criteria, suggesting that along 
with operation-related criteria which cover the strategic traits of partners, 
including absorptive capacity, market position and the degree of product 
differentiation, collaboration, together with organisational form and size, may be 
seen as components of cooperation-related criteria.  
In our work we concentrate upon (i) technological collaboration between 
firms in the same product market in our game theory modelling, and (ii) 
technological collaboration more generally, encompassing that between firms, 
institutions, universities, and even government, in our empirical analysis. 
 
1.2 Overview 
The main areas where this study will particularly contribute are: 
To extend the existing theoretical academic literature on innovation 
games by taking collaboration and imitation into account, and showing the 
influences on the outcomes of dynamic games brought about by allowing 
collaboration and imitation;  
To concentrate upon the determinants of both collaboration and 
innovation patterns more generally, emphasising product rather than process 
innovation;  
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To explore the determinants of collaboration and the sharing of 
collaboration costs by designing and using a set of MATLAB animation 
programmes; 
To use panel data upon Chinese manufacturing firms from 2005 to 
2007 to explore whether innovative ability, absorptive capacity, and catching 
up capacity significantly influence firms‘ innovative (or collaborative) 
decisions;  
To illustrate the policy implications at both firm and national levels on 
the basis of the empirical results. 
In outline, Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature on collaboration and 
related topics. This chapter can be roughly divided into two parts. The first part 
explores the literature regarding firm strategies under technological competition, 
such as self-innovation and imitation. The drawbacks of undertaking such 
analysis without considering collaboration possibilities are particularly 
mentioned. The second part describes the limited existing research on 
collaboration compared to the analysis of competitive strategies and introduces 
relevant theories, such as Intellectual Property Rights theory, transaction cost 
theory, and strategic management theory. In particular, we consider the 
classification of different types of collaboration and the distinction between 
collaboration and joint ventures. We also explore the possible impacts of 
collaboration on innovation and product market competition. 
Chapter 3 addresses a game theory model inspired by Vickers (1986). It 
begins by expanding Vickers‘ game theoretic two goods, two players model 
where firms may either self-innovate or not innovate by adding collaboration 
and imitation options and exploring product innovation rather than process 
 16 
innovation. The conditions that have to be met for firms to collaborate in three-
strategy set, (collaboration, innovation, do nothing) and four-strategy set 
(collaboration, innovation, imitation, do nothing) worlds are discussed 
separately. We then propose as an example, a model inspired by Shaked & 
Sutton (2007), and Matsubayashi (2007) to investigate further the conditions 
under which collaboration will occur under each of the strategy sets. Since a 
number of market parameters have non-constant impacts on collaboration costs 
and the incentives to collaborate, the analysis is pursued by the use of a 
number of dynamic and 3-D graphics generated by programming a MATLAB 
animation. Further predictions are then generated by observing equilibrium 
changes illustrated in the MATLAB graphics. 
Chapter 4 introduces our data related to Nan Chang in China and comes 
from the ‗China Innovation Survey‘ and the ‗Annual Corporate Financial Survey‘ 
from 2005 to 2007. We explain the reason why we chose Nan Chang as the 
object of our empirical studies, and the way we cooperated with the data owner, 
the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC). In the initial analysis of the 
nature of the sample and panel characteristics, we compare major economic 
indicators between Nan Chang, Jiang Xi and China as a whole to illustrate the 
relevance of the sample.  
We argue that because of data limitations, it will be impossible to directly 
empirically test the game theory predictions of Chapter 3. Therefore, we 
propose in Chapter 4 (and further develop in Chapter 5) a series of relationships 
whereby innovation, collaboration and cost sharing are related to firms‘ 
innovative ability, absorptive capacity, and catching up capacity. In order to 
allow us to test relevant hypotheses, we then go on to define an array of 
 17 
relevant indicators. After first exploring the distribution of collaboration and 
innovation in the data, we look at sample characteristics including differences in 
patterns by ownership and regions. 
Chapter 5 uses the Chinese manufacturing industry data to 
econometrically explore a number of testable hypotheses on the determinants 
of innovation, collaboration and collaboration cost shares. As the estimates 
could be biased if we ignore sample selection effects, we first employ the 
general Heckman model and Heckman Probit sample selection models, 
separately. As no selection bias was found, we then propose using Probit 
models for regressing relating to the binary variables, innovation and 
collaboration, whilst employing OLS, fixed effect and random effect models for 
collaboration cost estimation. Finally, we extend the empirical analysis by taking 
time dummies and one period lagged dependent variables into account to 
investigate timing and dynamics issues. The results indicate that (aside from 
any dynamic influence), all three factors, innovative ability, absorptive capacity, 
and catching up capacity are positively related to collaboration, whilst only 
absorptive capacity is positively related to innovation (including both self-
innovation and collaborative innovation). We also found that collaboration cost 
may be positively influenced by R&D, employees‘ education, the technology 
gap, and collaboration costs in previous periods, but negatively affected by 
transaction costs, patents held, the technology level and perceived price. 
Chapter 6 extracts the significant findings from each chapter illustrating 
the linkages. Contributions upon three categories are discussed. In addition we 
also consider some of the limitations of our research and provide some 
recommendations for future research. 
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2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The idea that technological advance plays a major role in the determination of 
advances in economic prosperity is now widely accepted in both academic and 
policy arenas (Love & Roper, 2004). The main objective of this thesis is to 
examine the nature and determinants of firms‘ optimal innovation strategies in 
product markets on which they compete via product enhancement or 
innovation, and to pursue the implications for firm‘s performance and economic 
welfare. There are two main emphases in the research. The first is an emphasis 
upon collaboration between firms. The second emphasis is on the Chinese 
manufacturing sector as the main empirical test bed. The latter choice is largely 
conditioned by a dearth of studies of such issues in developing countries. The 
former choice is a natural extension to existing literatures 
Most prior theoretical work (and especially the creative destruction 
approach, Schumpeter, 1934), allowed firms to face three main innovatory 
options -  doing nothing, innovating (being first) or imitating (not being first) (as 
illustrated on the left hand side of Figure 2.1 below). A first objective in this 
literature survey is to review matters relating to the choice between these three 
options and to illustrate the difference in their impact.  
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Figure 2.1 Innovation Strategies 
 
 
 
There is however an alternative strategy to competition which we label 
collaboration. This we define more precisely below but may encompass a 
number of activities from joint research ventures and joint product development 
through to licensing and other related activities.  In terms of a decision tree (see 
the right hand side of Figure 2.1) one may consider that there is a high level 
strategy choice that a firm needs to make (between competition and 
collaboration) prior to deciding whether to innovate, imitate or do nothing. It is 
this alternative higher level strategy choice that this thesis is mainly directed to 
explore. 
In the sections that follow we first explore the traditional literature that 
assumes competition in innovation with some emphasis upon Schumpeterian 
models and empirical findings in a Chinese context, and then explore (Section 
2.2.2) the relationship between innovation and imitation before considering the 
impact of the degree of competition upon innovation (Section 2.2.3) 
Section 2.3 introduces the alternative firm strategy choice, collaboration. 
In particular, section 2.3.1 examines cooperation effects in competitive 
environments. Section 2.3.2 discusses different approaches to definitions of 
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collaboration. Section 2.3.3 discusses the difference between collaboration and 
joint ventures. Section 2.3.4 addresses various incentives to collaboration and 
non-collaboration by using game theoretic and other approaches.  Section 
2.3.5, section 2.3.6 and section 2.3.7 respectively explore the impact on 
decisions to collaborate of intellectual property rights, transaction costs, and 
strategic management issues. Sections 2.3.8 and 2.3.9 discuss the connection 
between collaboration and product market competition and collaboration and 
innovation respectively.  
Finally Section 2.4 draws conclusions from the literature review on the 
determinants of research collaboration, initially in general terms and then in 
terms of the Chinese experience. This provides the introduction to the following 
chapters that address the deficiencies in our knowledge thus noted.  
 
2.2 Strategies Assuming Competition 
2.2.1 Introduction: The Determinants of Innovation Activity  
 
There is now a huge literature upon innovation, both theoretical and empirical. It 
is beyond the scope of this thesis to review all such literature. The reader is 
instead referred to the recent Handbooks by Stoneman (1995) or Hall & 
Rosenberg (2010). Instead we undertake a much less ambitious task in this sub 
section. First we introduce the idea of creative destruction as a useful basis for 
some later ideas and then we provide an overview of empirical findings relative 
to China, these being much less easily accessible. 
The concept of the ‗process of creative destruction‘ introduced by 
Schumpeter (1934) has played an important role in the literature on the 
economics of innovation.  In the context of a product market in which firms 
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compete, it is argued that firms earn returns to innovative activity by creating a 
temporary monopoly from which monopoly profits may be earned. The firm 
however, only enjoys temporary monopoly power as a result of innovation 
because its monopoly can be overturned by a later inventive challenger. The 
incumbent can only enjoy the monopoly benefit until a newer innovation comes 
along. After that, the profits will be captured by other innovators. Although later 
innovators build upon the basis of the previous innovation, they do not 
compensate the previous innovator. In other words, the market has neither 
memory nor spillover effects.  
The value of being the incumbent firm will be lower the greater the 
number of future innovations that may be made. Also, under additional 
conditions, the value of being a challenger will increase with the number of 
potential future innovations. As a consequence of these two results, both the 
incumbent and challengers alike will invest less in the current innovation when a 
greater number of future innovations are anticipated. 
In a Schumpeterian framework, the relationship between the amounts of 
research undertaken to produce innovations in two successive periods can be 
modelled as deterministic. Aghion & Howitt (1992) build a model in which each 
innovation creates a cross sectional monopoly in the production of intermediate 
goods. They then suggest that a foreseen increase in research in the next 
period discourages research during the current period: by raising future wages 
and hence reducing the flow of profits to be captured from the next innovation; 
and by raising the rate of creative destruction next period and hence shortening 
the expected lifetime of the monopoly to be enjoyed by the next innovator. One 
equilibrium in their model, labelled ―two-cycle‖, defines a perfect foresight 
 22 
equilibrium in period two. ‘In a real two-cycle, the prospect of high research in 
odd intervals discourages research in even intervals, and the prospect of low 
research in even intervals stimulates research in odd intervals’ (as illustrated in 
Table 2.1). This model appears to be a clear modern interpretation of 
Schumpeter‘s ideas.  
 
Table 2.1 The Two Cycle Model 
 
Odd interval Even interval Odd interval Even interval ….. 
High Research Discourage  
research 
High Research Discourage 
    research 
…… 
Stimulate 
  Research 
Low  
Research 
Stimulate  
Research 
Low  
Research 
….. 
 
Although very little empirical work directly relates to this Schumpeterian 
framework it is useful to here introduce some empirical findings upon the 
determinants of innovative activity. We concentrate upon findings relating to 
China, for these are less easily accessible than many others and are particularly 
relevant to this thesis. 
Tu and Yi (2008) studied China‘s self-innovation capability by addressing 
the causality between self-innovation and its determinants. They first employed 
factor analysis to clarify groups with different innovation capabilities across 31 
regions in China. Then they illustrated a multi-regression model by assuming 
four innovation determinants, the R&D level, human resource (HR) input, net 
import-export revenue, and foreign direct investment (FDI). Chinese industry 
panel data from 1996-2005 are used. In their findings, we notice that the first 
three of the four determinants could significantly stimulate self-innovation. 
However, the last determinant in their model, FDI, has a negative impact.  
As current Chinese policy is to make a transition from a centrally-planned 
economy to a free enterprise economy (Mehta et al, 2006; Yergin & Stanislaw, 
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2002), FDI plays an important role as a means to inject foreign capital and ideas 
into the country. On the other hand learning orientation and ‗learning-how-to-
learn‘ are especially strong in China. It is thus particularly important for China to 
understand whether FDI can directly stimulate the amount of innovation, or 
whether FDI can influence innovation through knowledge sharing. Thus in 
addition to looking at other possible innovation determinants, such as R&D, it is 
of particular interest in the Chinese context to explore literatures relating to FDI 
and innovation.  
Similarly to the work of Tu and Yi (2008), non-positive links between FDI 
and innovation capability can also be found in other work. Zhang (2008) 
examined the impact of FDI on the self-innovation capability of Chinese home 
manufacturing. He used panel data models (both fixed effect and random effect 
models) with Chinese data encompassing 28 major industries from 1999 to 
2003. He found that in traditional industries, only factor endowment and 
technical opportunity have a significant impact, whilst FDI, payoff ability, 
government funding and the degree of market competition do not affect 
innovation capability. In particular, in high-tech industry, the only significant 
determinant is technical opportunity. On the other hand, FDI has a positive 
impact on self-innovation and spillover effects, although such impact mainly 
comes via the demand side of innovation capability. 
In contrast, some other studies show evidence of the ambiguous 
relationship between FDI and spillover effects e.g. Chen (2006). Instead of 
focusing on the spillover effect of intra technology diffusion, Chen (2006) 
examined the vertical spillover effect of inter-technology diffusion. Differentiation 
models and a dynamic GMM method with 7 years of panel data at the industry 
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level (including 24 Chinese manufacturing industries) are used. The author 
looked at the change in revenue value added and used the FDI proportion as 
the spillover index. He suggests that there is a strong U shaped relationship 
between the FDI level and the spillover effect. In particular, a significant 
backward inter-diffusion spillover effect was found, which suggests that state 
owned firms may benefit from technology generation by offering intermediate 
products to firms with external ownership (Guo & Zhang, 2008). This does not 
necessarily imply that firms with external ownership seldom innovate. Rather, 
Love and Roper (1999) suggest that it is because many externally-owned 
establishments are presumably branch plants, dependent on inputs from 
elsewhere. Lastly, there is no significant positive impact of R&D on productivity 
and the spillover effect. 
In a different vein, Ping (2007) analyses the FDI spillover effect on 
Chinese firms, using an OLS model and cross sectional data to prove that 
ownership plays an important role. Only FDI from Hong Kong, Macau and 
Taiwan has an explicit positive spillover effect, whist other FDI from foreign 
owned firms has no significant impact. Interestingly, he finds that the innovation 
capability and activity of Chinese local firms even decreased after foreign FDI‘s 
entry. This finding is slightly different from that in previous studies. 
However, other recent empirical studies about the impact of FDI on 
innovation capability illustrate that a positive relationship may exist. Girma et al. 
(2008) employed data from China‘s Annual Reports of Industrial Enterprise 
Statistics from 1999 to 2005 (including more than 200 thousand domestic firms) 
to test if FDI and foreign capital play a significant role in innovation activity. The 
Tobit regression result shows that, both foreign capital and FDI are positively 
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associated with innovation activity. The reason for this phenomenon could be 
explained by two aspects: on the one hand, FDI could impact on innovation 
directly because inward FDI may loosen financial constraints, which allows firms 
to purchase or update new technology easily; on the other hand, FDI may 
positively influence spillover effects and consequently indirectly impact on 
innovation.  
Girma & Gong (2008), also argue that domestic firms, which have been 
injected with knowledge by FDI from technologically advanced firms, are also 
more able to engage in innovation activities. However, it seems that such a 
relationship depends upon ownership as well. For Chinese state owned 
enterprises (SOEs), which monopolise financial resources, a negative 
relationship between inward FDI in the sector and innovation may be found 
(Girma et al, 2006; 2009). 
All such findings are relevant to the wider picture of innovation in 
Chinese manufacturing. They do not however, nor does the Schumpeter 
approach, consider whether it is better, under a competitive strategy, for firms to 
lead in innovation or imitate rivals. It is to this question that we now turn. 
2.2.2 Innovation and Imitation 
 
There is ample evidence that firms imitate and copy the innovations of others. 
For example Tilton (1971) found that the time lag between the initial discovery 
of semiconductor innovations by American firms and the first commercial 
production by Japanese firms averaged just 1 year. Mansfield et al (1981) found 
that 60 per cent of the patented innovations they studied were imitated within 4 
years. As there have been no systematic empirical studies of the speed at 
which various kinds of technological information leak out to rival firms, Mansfield 
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(1985) also filled this gap after his investigation of 100 American firms and 
found that the leak out speed of new processes and new products differ. 
Process developments tend to leak out more slowly than product developments 
in practically all industries. But the difference, on the average, is less than 6 
months.  
These results have important implications not only for incentives to 
innovation, but also for helping us to understand the imitation effect on 
economic growth. Our particular interest however is in the determinants of the 
incentives to lead or follow.   
In a dynamic equilibrium model of product innovation (generated from an 
innovation growth model by Grossman & Helpman, 1991c), Segerstrom (1991) 
found that the model had a steady-state equilibrium in which the rate of 
economic growth is constant over time. In this steady-state equilibrium, ‘firms 
engage in both costly innovative and costly imitative activities, although not in 
the same industry at the same time’. It seems to be more profitable to imitate 
with a single leader and more profitable to innovate with two leaders. 
Segerstrom (1991) also gives us a connection between innovation and 
imitation. He claims that ‘increases in government subsidy to innovation 
unambiguously increases the steady-state intensity of imitative effort in each 
industry in which firms engage in imitative R&D; and increases in the 
government subsidy to imitation increases the intensity of innovative effort in 
each industry in which firms engage in innovative R&D’. In other words, 
‘cheaper innovation implies a faster rate of imitation, whilst cheaper imitation 
implies a faster rate of innovation’. 
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Liu and Shi (2007) build a game-theory model based on the Romer‘s 
leader-follower perspective which offers an alternative way to reveal the link 
between innovation and imitation. They deduce that innovation is linked 
negatively with its cost, but positively with labour input; whilst imitation is linked 
positively with innovation costs, but negatively with labour input. 
Sun and Cui (2007) believe that when there are technical and cost 
differences, a Nash equilibrium solution may involve the technology leading firm 
engaging in innovation, and the technology follower engaging in imitation. In 
contrast, when there are no technical and cost differences, it is an optimal 
gambling strategy for both firms to choose innovation at the same time. 
However, as the authors state in their conclusion, in terms of gaining higher 
welfare and profit, collaboration or joint venture may be alternative effective 
strategy for firms. 
However, other scholars disagree. By building a two-player game 
theoretic model, Peng and Li, (2008) conclude that imitation is always the 
dominant strategy for both firms in a strategy set with only innovation and 
imitation options. 
Such literature as this suggests that there may be optimal strategies that 
involve some firms imitating rather than leading. We do not however have any 
specific empirical evidence relating to China upon this. We thus turn to consider 
the largest body of literature relating to behaviour when firms compete in 
innovation – that which relates to the impact of the degree of product market 
competition. 
 
  
 28 
2.2.3 Traditional Strategies: The Impact of Competition 
 
Schumpeter (1934) suggested that there should be a negative relationship 
between competition and innovation.  This prediction has been subject to much 
further study and there is a rich array of industrial organisation theory and 
empirics that addresses the issue. Much, but by no means of all of this work 
predicts that innovation should decline as the degree of product market 
competition increases (at least up to some limit).  
We cannot possibly summarise all this work here, so once again the 
reader is referred to Hall et al (2010). Considering some of the more recent 
work, however Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith and Howitt (2005) developed an 
extension to the work of Aghion, Harris, and Vickers (1997) and Aghion, Harris, 
Howitt, and Vickers (2001). They continue to assume that both current 
technological leaders and followers in any industry can innovate, and the 
innovation type is step-by-step, implying the two firms are in a neck-and-neck 
relationship. However, although Schumpeter claimed that the incentive to 
innovation comes from becoming an incumbent firm in a competitive market 
with monopoly profit (whilst other followers in that industry gain nothing or even 
lose part of their pre innovation profit), Aghion et al (2005) suggest that such 
innovation incentives should not depend so much upon post-innovation rents, 
but upon the differences between post-innovation and pre-innovation rents of 
incumbent firms. In other words, more competition may increase the 
incremental profits from innovating, and of course, encourage R&D 
investments. This effect is called an ‗escaping competition‘ effect.  One may 
note that greater competition may still reduce innovation incentives for laggards, 
which may be called a ‗Schumpeterian‘ effect. Both the escaping competition 
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effect and Schumpeterian effect jointly influence the balance of the 
competition—innovation relationship over time to time.  
Overall therefore the outcome is driven by the strength of each effect 
when competition changes from low to high. This observation leads to the main 
conclusion: the relationship between competition and innovation is nonlinear 
and in fact is an inverted-U shape. More specifically, when the competition 
intensity is high, the extent of innovation would be high in neck and neck 
sectors, called ‘leveled’ sectors where both firms stay at same technology level, 
whilst the intensity of innovation activities will be low in leader-follower sectors, 
called ‘unleveled’ sector, where a technology gap between the two firms is 
maintained. Overall it means that the escaping competition effect is more likely 
to dominate the Schumpeterian effect and firms prefer faster innovation with 
increasing competition when the competition intensity is low. On the other hand, 
when competition is high, the industry will spend most of the time in the 
unleveled state where the Schumpeterian effect is at work on the laggard, while 
the leader never innovates. In other words, the Schumpeterian effect is more 
likely to dominate and the incentive of innovation declines with increasing 
competition. 
Reinganum (1985) however draws some different conclusions on the 
relationship between innovation and competition. Extending previous 
contributions assuming a single innovation and outsider followers (competitors), 
Reinganum (1985) allowed for multiple innovations and inside challengers. She 
generated a fully optimizing behavioural model based upon the Schumpeterian 
‗Creative Destruction‘ process and obtained a stable equilibrium, within which 
are included predictions on the relationship of investment (on innovative R&D) 
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and competition. As investment in R&D is vital to the size of innovation, 
deductions from such connections found in the Nash equilibrium of her model 
may be useful for figuring out the relationship between competition and 
innovation. She suggested that the investment rate of challengers increases 
with an increase in the discount rate, the value of being the incumbent next 
period, and the number of firms in the industry. The investment rate of each 
challenger decreases in response to an increase in the profit associated with 
the current innovation or the value of being a challenger next period and vice 
versa. The incumbent‘s rate of investment increases with an increase in the 
discount rate, the value of being the incumbent next period, and the number of 
firms in the industry. The incumbent‘s rate of investment decreases in response 
to an increase in the flow revenue associated with the current innovation or an 
increase in the value to being a challenger in the next stage. Since this model is 
based on the flow cost model of Lee and Wilde (1980), it is not surprising that 
she concludes that an increase in the number of firms (challengers) leads to an 
increase in the rate of expenditure for each firm, and the aggregate rate of 
investment. Therefore, the faster the pace of innovative activity (the average 
time between innovations is shorter which some articles call innovation 
frequency); the greater is the number of challengers, i.e., the more 
competitions.  
Vickers (1986) further investigated Reinganum‘s idea (1985) of a 
relationship between innovator and follower by proposing a bidding patent race 
in a duopoly market. He assumed both players face a sequence of opportunities 
to innovate. In particular, any innovation, with inviolable IPR, will be granted to 
the player who offers the highest bids. The author divides the resulting markets 
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into two groups. One is a persistent dominance market, suggesting that the 
same player is the winner in each round. The other is an action reaction market, 
indicating a leapfrogging outcome in which the winner in the current round will 
be the loser in next round. After analysing a simple duopoly model illustrated 
with homogeneous products, Vickers claims that a highly competitive product 
market results in persistent dominance, whilst Cournot behaviour leads to action 
reaction. This model, however, has some clear drawbacks. One is that the 
innovations he proposes are process innovations that emphasise the cost 
efficiency effect with product innovations put on one side. Another shortcoming 
is that he assumes that players may innovate or not innovate and ignores other 
possibilities, such as imitation, or collaboration. This limits the credibility of this 
work.  
As stated above there is a huge theoretical literature that is still not 
conclusive. Similarly, there is a very large empirical literature upon the 
competition-innovation relationship. There is however only limited empirical 
research on the Chinese context. However, Girma et al. (2006) explored the 
impact of FDI on innovation via the degree of competition as an intermediary. 
They explore the innovation performance of Chinese State Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) from 1999-2005 via a lagged FDI term.  They found an inverted-U 
shape relationship. The result shows that FDI in laggard SOEs normally 
diminishes innovation activity, whilst SOEs with a small technology gap may be 
stimulated when there is increased FDI.  
 
2.3 Alternative Strategy, Collaboration 
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2.3.1 Competition vs. Collaboration  
 
From the above section, it is clear that, starting with Schumpeter‘s idea of 
creative destruction, research has proceeded using many different models and 
various data sets to address the main issue. Recent work however has 
concentrated on one sub-branch of the decision tree (Figure 2.1) allowing for 
example neck-and-neck duopoly, costly entry, and decreasing returns to scale. 
And this issue seems to have been well researched. Much less studied however 
has been a consideration of what will happen if firms instead of pursuing a 
competition strategy pursue a collaboration strategy. This is the area to which 
this research is mainly directed.  
Studies by Gans et al (2002) confirm the importance of this interest. They 
examine whether the returns to innovation are earned through product market 
competition or through cooperation with established firms (through licensing, 
alliances, or acquisition). The panel data they used comes from the 
biotechnology industry. This industry is a high-tech one and depends heavily 
upon technology replacement and patent protection. They examined different 
profit rates from two alternative firm strategies, being an upstream supplier of 
technology and being a horizontal innovation oriented competitor. They 
conclude that the returns to such firm strategies depend upon control over 
intellectual property rights (IPR), transaction costs and sunk costs associated 
with product market entry. This inspires us to consider that we should take 
collaboration into account when we study firms‘ innovation strategies. 
The traditional analysis of innovation has focused on the Schumpeterian 
hypothesis of a positive link between market power and innovation. That 
approach leads to a further investigation of the impact of market power and firm 
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size on R&D and innovation. Indeed, much previous literature finds that there is 
a positive relationship between firms‘ sizes and innovation. However, the 
weakness of the empirical evidence for the Schumpeterian hypothesis raises 
some doubt on the validity of this linear view of innovation process. To solve 
this problem, Pennings and Harianto (1992) claim that self-technology 
accumulation and networking may play an important role when firms innovate. 
They examined a sample of US commercial banks during the period 1977-1987, 
some of which were engaged in a new technology: home banking. The authors 
used an event-study approach to show that firms with intensive networking may 
behave actively on innovation with their strategic partners. 
Similar views are supported by later studies. Love & Roper (1999) also 
suggest that we need to take collaboration (networking) and technology 
diffusion (transfer) into account when discussing innovation. They extend the 
standard Schumpeterian explanation of firms‘ innovative activity to do so. Using 
a unique dataset re UK manufacturing plants they conclude that technology 
transfer and networking are crucially important substitutes for R&D in the 
innovation process rather than complementary inputs. Failure to consider them 
may lead to an overestimation of the effect of R&D on firm performance. On the 
other hand, the finding suggests that the market power could reduce networking 
intensity, which contrasts with the idea of Schumpeterian competition. Lastly 
they find that firm size exhibits no influence on the intensity of R&D or 
technology transfer, but is positively linked with networking. 
In fact, according to the supply pattern hypotheses suggested by 
Andersson & Kaplan (2004), firms have two basic sources of capability 
acquisition. Supply can come from either internal sources (in-house innovation 
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and cloning-replication) or external sources (collaboration, firm purchasing and 
cloning-imitation, with cloning-emulation taking a middle form). However, in 
today‘s highly competitive environment, a business‘s ability to keep up with 
technological progress and to continuously innovate, which is the so-called 
internal source, is critical for its survival and growth. However, because of the 
constraints of limited resources, it is increasingly difficult for firms to develop 
new technologies entirely on their own (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994). Therefore, 
collaboration is an alternative way to meet the growing demand for industrial 
innovation in the global market place, although in particular cases, internal 
capability acquisition is still emphasised as important, if it is possible 
(Andersson & Kaplan, 2004). 
Specifically, in economic environments such as high-tech industry, where 
development and growth closely relate to intellectual property rights, firms face 
high relative investment costs when they innovate. Therefore, in the case of 
strong competition and anti-trust policy, when firms intend to develop and 
introduce new products, they may choose an alternative strategy to competing 
to win the competition race, i.e. they may choose to collaborate. Nueno and 
Oosterveld (1988) argue for example that the cost minimising firm could be a 
hybrid organisations undertaking for example cooperation on technologies via 
strategic alliances.  
Empirical evidence in the Chinese context on collaboration is limited. 
One noticeable piece is by Xu and Zhang (2008) who examine the impact of 
state shares on innovation and performance in China by using both OLS and 
logistic models. The authors investigated 541 publicly traded companies in five 
high-tech industries during the period from 2000 to 2005. The result shows that, 
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to achieve a better performance, firms with state shares prefer process 
innovation rather than product innovation, and interestingly, they prefer 
innovating independently rather than collaboratively.  
These literatures naturally lead us to a question: is it really true and 
possible that the firm to obtain more innovation rents when it collaborates with 
others rather than innovating and imitating independently? To answer this 
question, we have to make clear what incentives push firms to collaborate and 
of what factors firms are aware when collaboration fails. Prior to discussing 
relevant literatures it is however first useful to define and classify collaboration. 
 
2.3.2 The Definition and Classification of Collaboration 
 
There are alternative labels for the activity of technological collaboration. 
Various terms such as collective integration, collaboration, and strategic 
alliances have all been used. Building upon the definition by Aderson and Narus 
(1990) that cooperation is ‘similar or complementary coordinated actions taken 
by firms in interdependent relationships to achieve mutual outcomes with 
expected reciprocation over time’ (Mehta et al, 2006), Parkhe (1991, 1993) 
suggests that a strategic alliance refers to ‘relatively enduring interfirm 
cooperative arrangements’, which allows firms to fully utilise mutual resource 
while serving individual goals to each sponsor. Man & Duysters (2005) 
alternatively describe a strategic alliance as cooperative agreements in which 
two or more separate organisations team up in order to share reciprocal inputs 
while maintaining their own identities.  
References in the literature to strategic alliance are seldom found before 
the 1980s. The period of strong growth of strategic alliances starts at the end of 
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the last century and coincides with faster world technological change. Many 
firms began after the 1980‘s to undertake their innovation projects through new 
forms of cooperation, such as joint ventures, collaboration and various other 
types of joint development agreements. But after a growing number of alliances 
in the post 1980s, scholars seemed to realise that strategic alliances cannot 
solve all problems. In particular, it was noted that the success rate of alliances 
is still at a low level (about 50% or even less). However, a further increase in 
competitive pressure and the rising costs of R&D accelerated the formation of 
strategic technology once again in the mid-1990s. ‗Today, alliances have 
become an important vehicle for keeping up with turbulent technological 
change, even though average alliance success rates remained poor’ (Man & 
Duysters, 2005). 
Corporate inter-firm alliances may also be defined as ‘collaboration 
between independent firms over a given economic space and time for the 
attainment of mutually defined goals’ (Glaister & Buckley, 1992). ‘The existing 
literature has classified alliances primarily on the basis of their governance 
structures’ (Yoshino & Rangan, 1995). Two main categories are popular, equity 
and non-equity alliances. ‘Alliances have also been classified in terms of 
geographic and political scope, named as domestic and international alliances’ 
(Adobor, 2006). Although classifications of alliances can be useful, existing 
classifications may not match well with the reality of collective firms. Adobor 
(2006) includes other forms or sources of cooperative strategies and presents 
four different forms of alliances:  
a). The first type of alliance involves spontaneous emergence, and in 
such alliances cooperation (labelled as tacit (Axelrod, 1984)) is informal with 
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no explicit agreement governing the relationship. A spontaneous form of 
inter-firm collaboration may emerge as result of natural but informal 
connection. Several factors may explain such an alliance:  
‘First, geographic boundedeness increases the frequency of social 
interaction, including trust building; Second, common perception of threats or 
a realisation of shared interests can lead to the rise of spontaneous 
cooperation, although in some cases, it may take a third party to help… Wine 
production in France may be an example of a case where a common 
perception of shared threats and shared social norms may explain the 
emergence of cooperation.’  
 
Abraham & Fombrun (1994) discuss the idea that widely shared 
organisational-related beliefs across organisations (macro cultures) could 
also encourage cooperation. Alliances associated with spontaneous forms 
are more likely to be informal and non-equity based than alliances formed 
formally or those formed with the assistance of third parties. 
b). The second type of alliance is individual firm initiated alliance 
forms, initiated by two independent firms, which are perhaps the most 
common types of cooperative strategy discussed in the literature. Such 
alliances range from domestic to international. A number of factors may lead 
to these forms of alliance. First, firms may initiate an alliance because they 
see a mutual benefit from the relationship. Second, a cooperative strategy as 
a strategic choice may be used to share the cost of new product 
development or as a way of gaining access to both domestic and 
international markets. Thirdly, in some cases, alliances may be a way of 
collectively dealing with some structural change in the industry. Finally, firms 
may be using alliances to project an image of legitimacy in their industry.  
Two important features emerge within such initiated alliances. One is 
that there is no third party involvement. The other is that trust plays a 
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significant role in such practices. As the only actors involved in the 
cooperation, the organisation form of alliance may only depend on the 
partners, who decide what contractual form they think will best serve their 
interests. One factor which could determine the choice of organisational form 
is the relative dominance of each firm (Adobor 2006).   
c). The third type of alliance is cooperation facilitated by the presence 
of a third party or a convenor (Adobor 2006). It is likely that most convenor-
facilitated forms of collaboration will bring together multiple partners, and so 
the dominant organizing form should be network forms. Over time, the parties 
in a network may come to realise their interdependence and every party will 
realise where exactly they fit in the network.  
d). The third party facilitator may be a government body, especially in 
non-market economies, which leads to the fourth type of alliance, where the 
active participation of government as third parties encourages or discourages 
alliances. Jaslow (1983) argues that most Chinese and East European 
alliances involve some government control in one form or another. Alliances 
that fall into this category are mainly joint ventures. 
Collaboration and cooperation are alternative forms of interactions 
between alliance partners but the apparent similarity between the two may be 
part of the reason why many scholars treat the two concepts as synonymous. 
But Polenske (2004) holds that the concept of alliance seems too big a topic to 
successfully analyse. Therefore, he offered an alternative definition of 
collaboration. In his article, collaborative relationships are defined to ‘include 
direct participation by two or more actors in designing, producing and /or 
marketing a product’, whilst cooperation relationships are defined as when ‘two 
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or more actors agree through formal or informal arrangements to share 
information, support managerial and technical training, supply capital, and/ or 
provide market information’. This generates a further criterion through which to 
test the relationship between collective alliances (including cooperation and 
collaboration) and competition. For example, those collaborative arrangements 
that require firms to perform in teams or to form partnerships usually take far 
longer to build than those cooperative ones that may just require firms to assist 
each other intentionally.  
‘Collaborative arrangements often lead to internal economies of scale, 
affecting the position of the firm on its long-run, average cost curve. In other 
words, by entering into a collaborative agreement, firms may expect to move to 
a lower position on their long-run, average cost curve’ (Polenske, 2004). In 
contrast to collaborative agreements, cooperative arrangements often lead to 
‘external economies of scale, affecting the overall position and shape of the cost 
curve’, helping a firm to reduce the average cost of producing at all scales of 
production. Firms frequently use these arrangements to lower their transaction 
costs. A cooperative arrangement differs from a collaborative one in that in the 
former firms may exchange information about research and development and 
product and process engineering, but each firm continues to work separately 
from the other. 
2.3.3 Collaboration vs. Joint Ventures 
In general, collaboration is regarded as one particular form of knowledge 
sharing joint venture, which may be configured in many different ways and 
associated with different kinds of behaviours. Buckley and Casson (1996) 
explored the strategic choice between joint ventures, licensing agreements and 
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mergers using internalisation theory. In the model, they focused on a 
representative equity-based joint venture between two private firms. The 
knowledge provided by a firm may relate to a technology, or to market 
conditions. According to each firm‘s nature, both market expertise and 
technology could be shared. They classify the typology of joint ventures into 
three kinds, technology shared, marketing shared and both. Only the pure 
technology shared joint venture is defined as R&D collaboration. In the end, 
they claimed that ‘if the market size is very small and the pace of technological 
change in the global economy (volatility) very high, then the null strategy will be 
chosen. As the market size increases and/or volatility falls, licensing is preferred 
instead’. Collaboration is preferred when either market size or volatility are both 
low.  
Zhang et al. (2007) also investigated the relationship between R&D 
intensity and international joint ventures (IJV). Data came from China‘s Third 
Industrial Census conducted in 1996, which included almost all the Chinese 
major industries. However, the authors only chose data from three industries, 
where the high-tech firms are mainly located. These included the electric 
machinery industry, the electronics and communication industry and the office 
equipment industry. Using regression analysis, the authors of paper conclude 
that R&D intensity has a positive relationship with IJV performance when the 
IJVs have an export market focus, but not when the IJVs have a local market 
focus. Specifically, results suggest that while IJVs with a local market focus may 
invest more in R&D activities, they are less able to benefit from R&D than are 
IJVs with an export market focus. However, as the balance of knowledge in 
IJVs involving developing countries and developed countries is very uneven 
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between the partners it might be that the joint ventures of this kind are more 
akin to market access arrangements rather than technology development. 
Specifically, the advanced technology firm contributes state of the art innovation 
to his partner, whilst his partner opens access to the local market. As a reward, 
the technology supplier may even get majority ownership of the IJVs (Li, 2001; 
Liang et al, 2001). This leads us to hypothesise that the type of IJV covered in 
Zhang‘s article may best be classified as the license-spread type in Buckley and 
Casson‘s (1996) theory. 
But slightly different to Zhang et al. (2007), Chen et al. (1999) suggest 
that joint ventures have no significant impact on innovation capability and that 
joint ventures influence a society‘s average technology level mainly through 
economies of scale rather than via upgrading technology generation. 
In contrast, Luo (1997) advocates that IJVs may be divided into two 
groups according to the partner‘s selection criteria in the formation of the IJV: 
operation-related criteria or cooperation-related criterion. The first covers the 
strategic traits of partners, including absorptive capacity, market position and 
the degree of product differentiation, whilst the latter criteria concerns 
organisational traits, including collaboration, organisational form and size. 
Without strategic traits IJVs tend to be unstable, while without organisational 
traits IJVs tend to be unprofitable. In particular, by employing cross sectional 
data re Jiangsu Province in China from 1988 to 1991, the author reveals a 
significant positive relationship between collaboration and IJV performance 
such as growth in return on investment, local sales, export revenue and 
reduction in operational risk. 
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2.3.4 Why Collaborate in Innovation? 
Given that there are many ways in which firms may collaborate in technology 
development, the next issue is to ask why firms may wish to collaborate in this 
way. Shaked and Sutton (1987) argued in an early paper that non-cooperative 
games may have collusion as a preferred outcome with firms preferring to 
collaborate rather than compete. This however still leaves open the question of 
what circumstance encourage firms to collaborate and what circumstances 
discourage them. Is it always best to collaborate whatever the circumstance? It 
is useful to separate out the literature into two parts: (i) first that which explains 
collaboration as the result of the solution to a game theoretic model; and (ii) 
other approaches. 
 
2.3.4.1 Game Theoretic Approaches 
 
There is a rich array of literatures involving game theoretic models of the 
relationship between innovation and imitation. Assuming Cournot or Bertrand 
equilibrium, one can examine with such models firms‘ best responses to 
changes in any factor of the game. Most models, especially early models, did 
not allow for collaboration but concentrated upon determining producers‘ 
optimal price-output strategy, technology differentiation, or best technology 
adoption time. We have discussed these above. Here we are more interested in 
such models that allow for collaboration. 
Pepall (1997) investigates imitative competition in a two-stage game 
within a vertically product differentiated market. Two players enter the market 
sequentially. At the first stage, the leader chooses whether to enter the new 
market and incur a certain sunk cost. At the second stage, the follower decides 
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how closely he copies the technology from his leader. Obviously, this results in 
an advantage for the follower, as its costs are lower the more closely it copies 
the innovator‘s product. But against the advantage is the drawback that the 
more similar their products are, the more intense is the degree of competition. 
Producers need to determine their best strategies according to this trade-off 
between imitation and differentiation. The author allows for the possibility of 
collusion after taking a strict patent policy into account. The paper finally 
suggests that all firms‘ strategies relate closely with consumers‘ income 
distribution. In particular, there is more incentive for the late entrant to imitate in 
a market that is wealthier and for income distributions that are either relatively 
poor and heterogeneous or relatively rich and homogeneous. A policy of tight 
patent law protects the innovator‘s profitability effectively rather than a policy of 
cooperative alliance. However, the author does not explicitly differentiate 
between collusion and collaboration. Moreover, it also seems that by 
maximizing industry payoff, both firms behave to jointly monopolise not only the 
latest technology, but also the whole market, which may be in breach of 
antitrust laws. 
Another model is introduced by Greenlee & Cassiman (1999), who 
extend the model of d‘Aspremont & Jacquemin (1988) to examine research joint 
ventures and collusion. As a first step, they investigate a bench mark model 
where firms collude in the competitive output market. In the following section, 
the firms are allowed to cooperate on either R&D level or output level or even 
both by forming a joint venture organisation. The conclusion suggests that the 
research joint venture may be only acceptable when the spillover effect is very 
large, whilst output collusion improves the profitability for all parties only when 
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allowing a high possibility of spillover and inexpensive cost reductions. There 
are still limitations. Firstly, the technology they explored is for cost reducing 
purposes, indicating that R&D in these models must refer to process innovation. 
They also assume that only a single homogenous good is available. In addition, 
product market collusion is against antitrust law and will face serious penalties 
in most economies (Brod & Shivakumar, 1997). All these problems should be 
more appropriately addressed. 
It is of course apparent that antitrust laws consider collaboration in 
innovation and product market collusion as quite different. Technology 
cooperation is generally permitted by law, because, unlike market collusion that 
may undermine competition, the partners who cooperate in research will still be 
competitive in markets, and the level of social welfare will not be reduced by 
such behaviour. Moreover, as Baumol (1992) suggests, collusion may be worse 
than just reducing welfare, because collusion may generate waste that 
monopoly could avoid, while an unstable price cartel may carry heavy 
constriction and monitoring costs. In fact, antitrust enforcement generally 
distinguishes between ‗good cooperation‘ and ‗evil cooperation‘ according to the 
purpose of cooperation. If the aim of cooperation is to attempt to drive others 
out of the business by using, for instance, ‗price fixing‘ (Baumol, 1992), in order 
to establish monopoly power, such cooperation is forbidden. However, if the 
nature of cooperation is not ‗predatory‘ but just leads to a price war so that firms 
compete by supplying cheaper or better quality products, then the cooperation 
is allowed. Thus, compared with collusion on output levels, cooperation on 
technology levels must be desirable (Samuelson, 1987).  
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Giannakas and Fulton (2005) develop a sequential three stage game-
theoretic model of heterogeneous producers to examine price behaviour, 
market and welfare effects of cooperative involvement in process innovation 
activity in the agricultural sector. Their result shows that cooperative alliances 
could increase the arrival rate of innovations while reducing the price of 
agricultural inputs and the degree of product differentiation. Also, they find that 
cooperation does not decrease competitive capability. 
Wang et al. (2005) explore the conditions encouraging resource sharing 
and maintaining collaboration in inter-organisational collaborative knowledge 
creation. They found the condition for the leader to collaborate is that its 
proportion of the marginal gain must be bigger than the unit investment 
elasticity, whilst followers are always willing to collaborate. 
In contrast to leader‘s hesitation, Jiao (2007) suggested a different 
outcome. He employs both a cooperation game theoretical model and a case 
study to analyse spillover effects on collaboration in two, or more than two, 
player markets. Different from other previous simple game theory assumptions, 
the author addresses the heterogeneity of individual firm‘s natures, including 
their capability to raise funds, their technology and their market experience. The 
study shows that the technologically advanced firm always has an incentive to 
collaborate. But if the technology leader cannot make positive profit under self-
innovation, the technology follower, his partner, may take the majority of the 
payoff under collaboration.  
Similar deductions regarding the positive relationship between spillovers 
and collaboration may be found in the work by Cassiman & Veugelers (2002). 
They divide spillovers into two groups. One is the incoming spillover measuring 
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the technology knowledge leaked from other firms, and the other is 
appropriability, reflecting the capability to capture innovation returns. By either 
investing in ‗absorbing capacity‘ or trading knowledge with partners, firms 
should maximise the incoming spillover to increase the rate of technology 
invention. By using empirical data on Belgium, they found greater incoming 
spillover leads to a greater probability of collaboration, whilst higher 
appropriability results in a higher probability of vertical cooperation. 
However, some scholars believe that regardless of technology 
advantage, both players must prefer collaboration under some circumstances. 
Tan (2007) discussed the spillover effect when a firm collaborates in a two 
stage-two firm game theoretical model. He claims that since collaboration 
significantly reduces the cost of adopting new technology, firms always have a 
greater incentive to collaborate than compete. In particular, when the product 
substitution index is relative small, the possibility of collaboration may increase. 
As a result, collaboration may take the place of self-innovation as the firms‘ best 
strategy. Similarly, by building a game theoretical model, Gao and Pan (2007) 
reach a conclusion that firms in high-tech industry must prefer collaboration 
when players reach a Stackleberg equilibrium, although they do not take 
imitation costs into account. 
Motta (1992) presents a partial equilibrium model with vertical product 
differentiation. Cournot competition and quality determined by R&D cost are 
assumed. He found that cooperative agreements had a positive effect on the 
amount of R&D undertaken, quality, output, welfare and potential entry. Very 
few firms choose not to collaborate only if the market is large and spillovers are 
not large. 
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Rosenkranz (1995) analysed a two stage, two player non-cooperative 
game, with vertical product differentiation. Firms determine both the date and 
the quality of their innovation. After the maximization of each firms‘ payoff, it is 
shown that at equilibrium, firms will enter the market sequentially. Also, there 
always exists a possibility of forming research joint ventures (RJVs) in R&D 
intensive markets, even in the absence of spillover effects and with stochastic 
R&D outcomes. This is because under competition, firms‘ expected payoff is 
normally lower than under collaboration. Binding contracts over innovation 
dates, quality or even side payments and splitting the post collaboration payoff, 
reduce uncertainty for at least one player. This then benefits both partners. 
However, this may lead to decreased social welfare and R&D underinvestment, 
and as such collaboration may not be desirable. But legal restrictions (such as 
on simultaneous entry) may increase the attractiveness of collaboration.  
To the best our knowledge, there is currently no effective game theoretic 
model available which addresses at the same time both product innovation and 
collaboration and imitation in a dynamic market. As mentioned above, some 
literature focuses on the effect of both collaboration and imitation on process 
innovation, but ignores their influence on product innovation; whilst some work 
considers vertical product innovation but neglects collaboration and imitation. In 
addition, very little research explores the details of cost sharing under 
collaboration, whereas the optimal equilibrium cost sharing plan between 
partners, in particular, how the firm with the low technology level behaves is an 
important issue. These two problems are both explicitly explored in the game 
theory model developed below (Chapter 3).  Using the predictions generated 
from that game theory model as a guide, the determinants of collaboration and 
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collaboration cost in China are then further investigated empirically (in Section 
5). 
 
2.3.4.2 Other Approaches 
 
The recent introduction of the idea of ‗open innovation‘ may provide some 
insight into collaboration. Chesbrough (2003) defines the term, open innovation 
as ‘a paradigm that assumes that firms can and should use external ideas as 
well as internal ideas, and internal and external paths to market, as the firms 
look to advance their technology’. Since no one firm could possess all know-
how, information and resources (Cassiman et al, 2009; Hamel & Prahalad, 
1994), open innovation allows firms to acquire complementary resources or 
technologies which do not have to cross firm boundaries (through channels, 
such as licensing, R&D collaboration and company acquisition, Cassiman & 
Veugelers, 2006; Li, 2010). A skeptic may argue that choosing an open 
innovation strategy is merely a greedy way to embrace critical knowledge 
owned by others without giving up one‘s own. Others, however, may argue that 
such open collaboration is a wise way to test product compatibility with those of 
other firms, even when these firms are rivals (Hall & Rosenberg, 2010). For 
instance, it is crucial for pharmaceutical firms that the drug they invent works 
well with drugs produced by other firms. Similar cases may also be widely 
observed in the engineering or software industries. Open code (David & Ray, 
2006) in the software industry, created among programmers to improve 
programming and accelerate software design, is another example, and 
considered as a typical collaborative effort.  
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Matsubayashi (2007) studies an instance of price and quality competition 
in the Japanese internet market. By observing ‗perceived price‘ as the 
determinant of consumers purchase decisions in a two stage, two goods game, 
the author compares the payoffs to firms of two alternative strategies: product 
differentiation or vertical integration with a complementary firm. Compared to 
the vertical integration models of Economides (1999) with dual monopolists, 
here the model assumes the existence of three firms, two players downstream 
and one complementary monopolist supplier. The results show that vertical 
integration always has a positive effect compared with competition on firms‘ 
profit and consumers‘ welfare. A virtue of this model is that it distinguishes 
consumer characteristics from market differentiation preferences which is rare 
in the literature. However, a basic assumption in his model is that firms‘ natures 
at the beginning point are symmetric and homogeneous which limits the 
relevance of the conclusions.  
This idea of a positive relationship between collaboration and firms‘ 
welfare (profits) is widely supported by many scholars (Baumol, 1992; Side, 
1980; d‘Aspremont & Jacquemin, 1988; Teece, 1986; Luo, 1997). The result 
shows that the necessary condition for firms‘ switching from competition to 
collaboration is a resultant growth in ‗post-alliance payoffs‘ (Parkhe, 1993). 
Apart from maximizing net profit being one driving force, another important 
factor, as Rosenkranz (1995) mentioned, is reducing the cost of or risk attached 
to technological change (Baumol, 1992; Cassiman & Veugelers, 2002; Bellais & 
Guichard, 2006; Cassiman et al, 2009; Luo, 1997; Pennings & Harianto, 1992). 
In particular, when a firm attempts to reach out into unfamiliar industry, how to 
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choose a partner to cope with costly development of technology intensive 
products becomes a trigger problem (Brockhoff, 1992). 
Pisano (1990) provides an example of a case of collaboration for the 
purpose of cost saving. A pharmaceutical firm with a good reputation intends to 
introduce a technology intensive related medicine on to the market. He may 
either choose in-house innovation, so called vertically integration, or procure the 
R&D service from another biotechnology firm. If choosing in-house innovation, 
the firm could obviously capture the payoffs once the medicine is successfully 
commercialised. However, from the respect of product innovation cost, if the 
firm allows collaboration, the other firm may do the R&D more effectively at less 
cost, in which case, collaboration may be preferred to doing the R&D himself. 
Even though the case Pisano addressed in fact looks more like R&D 
outsourcing, it still inspires us that for some firms, their strategic preference may 
be significantly altered because of potential cost saving. 
Contractor (1985) suggests that a joint venture firm could smooth out 
cash flow and diminish risk by three channels: sharing of equity and rent of 
parental firms, licensing agreements, and trade with parental firms. The first 
channel, sharing equity and rent of parental firms is particularly important. The 
problem is that most of the rents from technology transfer that are captured by 
the joint venture, are generated by either creating revenues from the 
introduction of new or improved technology, or reducing cost by importing a 
more efficient production process with knowledge intensive technology. This in 
fact includes all impacts that both product innovation and process innovation 
can make. Moreover, the author claims that in the joint venture organisation, the 
higher the rent desired by the technology leader, the greater proportion of 
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cooperation cost that may be paid by the technology follower. To some extent, 
this deduction indicates that when a firm has to share technology information 
with a more advanced rival, it is probably difficult to make its voice heard. 
Brod and Shivakumar (1997) also emphasised the choice of 
collaboration in terms of risk reduction. By extending the two stage game theory 
model of d‘Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), they not only allow product 
differentiation among a number of firms, but also offer a comprehensive welfare 
comparison. Their analysis makes two points. First, because of the sharing of 
collaboration cost and uncertainty, regardless of the firms‘ performance in the 
product market, cooperative R&D is always better than non-cooperative R&D. 
Second, firms that cooperate on output levels as well as on the R&D level could 
capture greater payoffs than those that cooperate on R&D alone, even though 
such activity may be prohibited by antitrust law.  
Moreover, it seems that whether firms collaborate is also related to the 
scale of product sales (Li, 2010). Buckley and Casson (1996) suggested that 
globalisation is relevant to the joint venture ownership of production. With global 
markets and updating production facilities in mind, a firm is always trying to 
participate in a lower transport cost game to maximise the opportunity for 
exploiting economies of scale in production. This requires an ideal geographical 
distribution of its demand, which may lead to technological collaboration 
between a leading firm and a local firm. As high-tech firms may make a series 
of market-access alliances with firms in different localities, this gives the high-
tech firms more experiences in joint ventures. In particular, the greater the fixed 
costs of R&D, and the greater the economies of scale in production, the more 
important is the marketing synthesis in achieving the critical level of global 
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sales. Global sustainable competitive advantage as a reason for collaboration is 
also stressed by Zhang et al (2007) and Feng & Chen (2004). Chen (2007) has 
also emphasised that that R&D investment in overseas subsidiaries can help 
multinational corporations (MNCs) exploit their firm-specific resources to suit 
local markets better. 
Love & Roper (2004) argue that the aim of collaboration may differ 
according to market type and institutional and social norms. After analysing the 
data obtained from the Product Development Survey (1991 to 1993), it is 
argued that the reason German plants collaborate is for cost sharing and risk 
reduction, whilst most UK firms choose collaboration in order to achieve an 
acceleration of innovation development. That is probably because compared 
with the UK market, the German institutional context allows German innovation 
to focus more on diversified quality production and incremental customisation 
rather than radical and sporadic innovation with a relatively opportunistic 
approach.   
Similarly recent organisation studies (e.g. Gao & Pan, 2007) suggest that 
the incentives to collaborate may be affected by different management 
mechanisms. They argue that trust mechanisms, knowledge-sharing 
mechanisms, group technology diffusion mechanisms, communication 
mechanisms and group reputation mechanisms will all impact significantly upon 
the extent of collaboration. Hill (1990) also emphasises the importance of trust. 
Despite finding that, in game theoretic models, collaboration is often preferred 
to competition, difficulties in building trust and reputation may well deter 
collaboration. Highly uncertain outcomes, or the paradox when opportunistic 
rent obtained from the current period outweighs the future payoff from 
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collaboration, may also result in cooperation instability (Parkhe, 1993). The 
most common factor affecting the stability of collaboration is payoff revaluation.  
As Hennart (1991) suggested, if firms realise their patterns of payoff may 
change, then the decision to collaborate may be reconsidered. Parkhe (1993) 
used a prisoner‘s dilemma game to explain this. In a game, two players who are 
suspected to have committed a serious crime, are questioned separately 
without knowing the other‘s decision. If the suspect comes to value the payoff of 
cooperation more than squealing because of his reputation, he may choose 
mutual cooperation rather than unilateral defection, thus turning the game into a 
Stag Hunt. Or, if the suspect believes that mutual cooperation would weaken his 
competitive position in the future, he would probably reckon on a higher payoff 
from mutual defection, leading the game to Deadlock. 
Parkhe (1993) also argues that the shadow of the future may affect the 
stability of collaboration, with claims that future payoffs casts a shadow back to 
the present. If defection occurs, the other player may take retaliatory action. A 
‗Tit for Tat‘ strategy, on one hand, forces players to move rationally and 
carefully taking initial steps with great caution. However, on the other hand, it 
also results in a possibility that once collaboration collapses, the organisation 
rarely reverts to its original status. It is suggested, the greater is the degree of 
cooperation between firms, the longer will be the shadow of the future. Since 
frequent interactions, high transparency, and long-time horizons may help 
cooperation to be more stable, this consequently makes the nexus between 
present and future decisions even closer. Parkhe thus suggests that the longer 
two players collaborate, the longer the shadow of the future. But that deduction 
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is only for a market with perfect information, where cheating could be observed 
without a time lag. 
Last but not least, latest research reveals that reasons beyond market 
characteristics could also influence the decision to become involved in strategic 
alliance. Krucken et al (2007), for instance, examines technology transfer in 
Germany and US in respect of the growth of emerging innovations. They 
discusses the two country case by respectively employing three different 
models, the information and documentation model, the cooperation model and 
the blurring of boundaries model. Interestingly, they observed a phenomenon 
that the innovation network (collaboration) embedded in university-industry 
relationship is significantly more visible in Germany than US. One possible 
explanation is that in Germany, European Community research funding, may 
well encourage firms to participate in networks with firms in other European 
countries. Another possibility is the cultural tradition of collaboration in Germany 
is relatively more encouraging. 
Empirically, even though we notice that collaboration has been more 
studied in the literature over the past two decades, there are still many 
examples of firms that prefer not to collaborate, or where firms attempted to 
collaborate but have finally failed to do so (Brod & Shivakumar, 1997). 
Moreover, it seems that, even in situations where firms capture high payoffs to 
collaboration, some of the technology alliances still do not last long. Empirical 
evidence shows that up to 70% of collaborations collapse (Parkhe, 1993; 
Geringer & Hebert, 1991; Man & Duysters, 2005) and two thirds of all alliances 
experience severe leadership and finance problems in the early stages of 
collaboration (Bronder & Pritzl, 1992).  
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2.3.5 Collaboration and Intellectual Property Rights 
As is obvious, technological knowledge may have to be (must be) shared during 
the collaboration process i.e. there must be technology transfer (not only from 
one party to others, but also probably from scientific research to applied 
technology in practice). This creates particular problems in collaboration, 
(Fiedler & Welpe, 2010; Gans & Stern, 2003; Hung & Chu, 2006). On one hand, 
the innovators are attracted by the specific rewards to be derived from jointly 
developed technology, whilst on the other hand, they also have severe 
concerns about ‗free rides‘, or misappropriation of knowledge by collaborators 
(Samuelson, 1987). As Schroder (2005) claimed, there is no doubt that free 
rides on the inventions of others  must happen in a market without proper 
intellectual property rights (IPR) protection - the only question is when. 
Intellectual property rights protection is defined by the US Congress as 
the means to ‘promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for 
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
writings and discoveries’. The range of IPR protection in fact is very broad, 
including ‘anything under the sun that is made by man’ (David & Ray, 2006). In 
practice, such protection normally is operated by intellectual property laws, 
including the laws of patents, copyright and trademarks or service marks 
(Samuelson, 1987). They are respectively focusing on different fields or 
purposes, which cover areas from manufacturing, to culture, to commercial 
trade (Brown, 1997). In manufacturing, for instance, the intellectual property law 
(patents) protects the inventor or creator of new technology against free riders 
who would reduce the return to innovation and discourage its development.  
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Some researchers (Teece, 1988; Cassiman & Veugelers, 2002) observe 
one important reason why firms that are technologically first are not real winners 
is that they could not commercialise the innovation successfully because their 
IPR is weak. They refer to this phenomenon as weak appropriability, indicating 
limited efficacy of the legal mechanisms of protection. If IPR is not fully 
protected, plenty of patents may be ‗invented around‘ at lower cost. There will 
then be doubts as to whether the monopoly rents from innovation may fully be 
obtained.  
Teece (1986) further explains the failure of innovation commercialisation 
by the impact of complementary assets. He argues that when IPR is weak, the 
role of ownership of complementary assets played in innovation may be even 
greater than the development of intellectual property. Losing control of certain 
complementary assets may result in profits flowing from innovator to imitator 
and consequently making the innovation fail. Therefore, control of the co-
specialised assets appears vital for survival in the long run in a market with 
weak appropriability. 
In fact, according to the data from Intellectual Property Section of United 
States Department of Justice, the annual loss from IPR infringement suffered by 
U.S. firms from mid 1980s to 2005 has increased from 60 billion to 250 billion 
dollars (Helpman, 1993; http://www.cybercrime.gov, 2011). And that figure has 
been widely agreed to have considerably increased by now. In particular, it is 
believed that about 5% to 7% of world trade is in counterfeit goods, 
representing about $512 billion of global sales. Besides, the loss suffered from 
infringement not only covers counterfeit goods, but also includes products in 
violation of patented technology, copyrights, or trademarks. The report shows 
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that infringement of copyright alone causes up to $35 billion losses to U.S. 
companies in 2005. This severe situation may justify further IPR protection. 
A common argument about IPR is that tighter IPR may discourage 
innovation by some parties. Some research suggests that tighter IPR can only 
benefit large firms with monopoly power in developed countries. Since the 
amount of technology transfer reduces significantly as IPR tightens, the players 
in developing countries, such as India or Brazil may suffer from tighter IPR 
(Helpman, 1993). He claimed that whether tighter IPR encourages net welfare 
for all depends upon the degree of imitation. Since tighter IPR shifts product 
lines from developing countries/ firms to developed countries/ firms, in the face 
of tighter IPR, demand must diminish in developing countries/ firms, whilst 
growing in developed countries/ firms. In contrast, shifting the production line 
will also mean moving production to a higher expenditure region with higher 
labor cost and higher operational cost. This conflict leads to a greater product 
price, which may reduce demand in both regions/ firms. Thus, to sum up, strict 
IPR must discourage innovations in developing countries/ firms, whilst the effect 
of tighter IPR in developed countries/ firms depends on the trade-off between 
those two points mentioned above. In particular, the negative effect caused by 
tighter IPR is maximized in a region with a higher imitation rate. If that happens, 
the developed countries/ firms may benefit more from receiving additional rent 
from developing countries/ firms rather than loss of profit by lifting product price. 
Therefore in general, the developed countries/ firms must prefer tighter IPR 
whilst the developing countries/ firms prefer looser IPR. 
Meanwhile, it is clear that even when tighter IPR is provided, there still 
exists uncertainty and ambiguity of value capture and value estimation on 
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invention during the process of technology transfer (Fiedler & Welpe, 2010). For 
example, the problem that firms rarely obtain all the returns from innovation 
exists even in the US market, which is commonly recognised as the strongest 
economy in the world (Bellais & Guichard, 2006). However, it could be argued 
that regardless of the strength of IPR protection, technology may gradually flow 
from the inventor to his rivals through use of the same upstream suppliers 
(Design News, 2004). 
Moreover, it seems that the effectiveness of IPR also varies with the 
nature of research. Bellais & Guichard (2006) investigated the spin-off 
experience in UK technology transferred from defence to the civil sector. They 
found the interest in commercialising defence innovation from lab to market is 
not strong, even though proper IPR protection has been granted. 
Spillovers, as another example, may be generated through formal or 
informal channels from various types of alliance, such as collaboration, 
cooperation, outsourcing or joint venture. As Greenlee & Cassiman (1999) 
state, ‘the fruits of R&D are a public good’, indicating that the spillover effects 
stimulate the availability of invented knowledge. Collaboration on R&D may 
actually relax the problem of public goods and lead to higher spillover effects, 
Collaboration may thus exacerbate the free rider problem, Some people claim 
however, that collaboration helps to better utilise the IPR protection and to 
increase the capability to capture the rents of invention, by internalising the 
externalities or improving the appropriability of R&D (Greenlee & Cassiman, 
1999; Brod & Shivakumar, 1997; Kogut, 1988).  
Most people believe that it is IPR that makes technology transfer 
possible (Bellais & Guichard, 2006). Love & Roper (2004) advocate that to cope 
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with the problem of leaking knowledge in a market with weak appropriability, 
firms could either collaborate or subcontract to better protect the IPR. Pepall 
(1997) investigates imitative competition in a two-stage game in a vertically 
product differentiated market. The author also detects the possibility of collusion 
after taking tight patent policy into account. The result indicates that tighter IPR 
protects the innovator‘s profitability more effectively than a policy of cooperative 
alliance. The problem in this work, however, is that the author did not explicitly 
distinguish between collaboration on technology and cooperation on product 
output, leaving confusion and debate regarding the impact of IPR on strategic 
alliances.  
Gans et al. (2002) suggest that, instead of competition, more efficient 
cooperation may be achieved by firms in a market with strong IPR, low 
transaction cost and potential partners with complementary resources. Since 
the tight patent protection lowers the possibility of a free ride using or producing 
the technology, and complementary resources offer a higher chance to exploit 
the know-how owned by other firms, they found, regardless of the firm size, that 
the inventor controlling IPR always prefers to pursue a cooperative strategy 
when commercialising the technology.  
Similar conclusions are reached by Schroder (2005) who believes the 
IPR works on collaboration indirectly through transaction cost. Tighter IPR 
ensures a lower transaction cost, which consequently increases the firms‘ 
payoff post collaboration. Thus, stronger IPR stimulates the collaborative 
incentives and increases the possibility of success in collaboration by avoiding 
external predation. Employing Belgian manufacturing data from the Community 
Innovation Survey in 1993, Cassiman & Veugelers (2006) also suggest that 
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tighter IPR may push firms to buy technology though external R&D instead of 
making  it by internal R&D.  
The latest empirical research by Fiedler & Welpe (2010) suggests that 
the relationship between IPR and collaboration depends on firm size. By 
employing survey data on the German nanotechnology industry from 2005 to 
2006, they examined if IPR, transaction cost and complementary resources play 
an important role when firms cooperate. The result shows that for small and 
medium firms (SME) the positive influence of low transaction cost and 
complementary resources confirm the conventional ideas that both factors may 
stimulate cooperation incentives, whilst for the large firms, interestingly, both 
IPR and complementary resources have negative impacts on the cooperation 
decision. This is probably because firstly, larger firms own richer know-how and 
greater resources, and have less need to ‗seek around‘ as much as SMEs. 
Secondly, with the emerging nature of the nanotechnology industry there are 
many unknown players and undefined applications and it may be difficult to 
locate a particular partner. 
We have very little information upon the importance of IPR on 
collaborative agreements in China. In fact in most developing countries, the 
enforcement of IPR may be particularly difficult. With limited education, 
infringement is sometimes not even assumed prohibited. In China, for instance, 
the record shows that the first IPR training centre was not established until 
1996, almost 14 years after the Chinese intellectual property laws were drafted 
(http://en.wikipedia.org, 2011). If there is weak IPR protection, the design of the 
contract which guarantees the sharing of payoffs from collaboration seems 
particularly crucial (Bellais & Guichard, 2006). This will obviously impact upon 
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factors relating to the formation of an alliance, such as negotiation, 
communication, bargaining and evaluation of the expected technology. 
 
2.3.6 Collaboration and Transaction Costs 
Transaction cost theory emerged in the 1980s as an alternative means of 
analysing firm level strategy in the process of technology transfer in terms of 
cost. According to Winebrake (1992) and Bellais & Guichard (2006), technology 
transfer can be defined as ‘the process by which technology, knowledge, and/ 
or information developed in one organization, one area, or for one purpose is 
applied and utilised in another organization, in another area, or for other 
purpose’. Following the influential research on transaction costs in organisations 
by Williamson (1985), Hill (1990) clearly suggests the idea of transaction cost in 
his work: ‘The cost of negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing a contingent claims 
contract to ensure against opportunism are called transaction cost’. He claims 
that due to the existence of opportunism inherent in technology transfer, 
transaction costs reach their lowest level only when players cooperate and fully 
trust each other. Consequently, firm-level payoffs are maximized only when 
firms transfer technology via collaboration rather than via the market. Then, 
even if a market reaches a competitive equilibrium, for those players who are 
not currently cooperative, there is an incentive in the long run to cooperate. That 
is because first, the market has a self-selection mechanism to remove most 
opportunism and, second, the nature of the transfer mechanism requires 
complementary complex and substantial modifications for better 
commercialising technology. In particular, for technology transfer from basic 
research to a customer aimed markets (Bellais & Guichard, 2006), in-depth ‗co-
development‘ is necessary. Therefore, in the long run, technological 
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cooperation may come to dominate the market. As transaction costs reduce 
opportunism, most researchers suggest a negative relationship between 
transaction cost and the success of collaboration. That is to say, the higher is 
transaction cost the lower will be the success of, or the fewer collaborations 
there will be.  
Brockhoff (1992) investigates 385 of the largest firms in Germany by 
questionnaire regarding various aspects of R&D cooperation. In a sample of 
135 firms which eventually responded as collaborating, 60 firms explicitly 
agreed that high cost of negotiations and transactions is disadvantageous to 
R&D cooperation. In addition using a Chi-square test, a correlation between a 
low level of collaboration success and high transaction cost frequency was 
found. In particular, if firms were forced to collaborate in R&D by government (or 
other unforeseen reasons) it led to less success and higher transaction cost. 
Yet opportunism is almost inevitable (Brockhoff, 1992). Since 
opportunism is human nature (Parkhe, 1993), there is no perfect way to avoid it. 
Thus monitoring partner‘s behaviour may use up some of the potential payoffs 
to collaboration. However, a possible way to reduce transaction cost is by 
building or improving trust within strategic alliance organisations.  
Generally speaking, trust would be related to past experience, reward 
incentive structures and reliance upon third parties. Firstly, the more information 
of past experience players have, the more chance there is to better understand 
mutual needs and instantly adjust in response to partners‘ action (Ford, 1980; 
White, 2005). The information of past experience not only means the 
collaboration experience with firm itself, but also includes collaboration 
reputation with other firms (Bolton et al, 2005). In particular, in some industries, 
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heavy investment with higher exit barriers and greater dependence may imply a 
relatively long-term commitment (Heide & John, 1990; Mehta et al, 2006). The 
feedback of such long-term commitment will then help to better understand 
partners‘ real needs through strategic alliance. This point of view is also 
supported by Brockhoff (1992), who believes that the experience of R&D 
cooperation between universities/ research institutions and private firms may 
significantly reduce uncertainty in the technology transfer.  
Secondly, stimulation of expected rewards, provides the player with more 
effective safeguards, which allows the agreement to be fulfilled (Pearce, 1997), 
and to cope with perceived opportunistic behaviour.  
Last but not least, increasing the closeness of the relationship may also 
stimulate the growth of trust. This idea was similar to what was mentioned by 
Mehta et al (2006) who suggested that building trust looks like making friends. 
On one hand, we intend to trust an old friend, whilst on the other hand, we are 
also likely to believe a close friend. As a result, to avoid being unilaterally 
abandoned by alliance partners, investing in high sunk cost non-recoverable 
assets is a wise choice, for this commitment closely binds partners on a shared 
goal and the value of non-recoverable assets would significantly reduce if the 
strategic alliance collapsed.  Such non-recoverable assets may also be labelled 
as complementary assets or specialized assets in the literature. Teece (1988) 
suggests that since the specialized assets are not easily available in an 
industry, they become critically important in appropriating monopoly rents from 
innovation. In particular, when a regime of weak appropriability applies, the 
irreversibility of complementary assets is relatively even more vital than being 
the first to introduce the technology. To some extent, it looks more like a 
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gamble, however, that is indeed an effective way to increase trust and diminish 
opportunism (Smith & Aldrich, 1991). 
However, Pearce (1997) also suggests that to reduce opportunism, firms‘ 
focus on post-collaboration alone is just not enough. In particular, he instead 
believes that the major component of transaction cost is bargaining cost or the 
cost of negotiating through the technology transfer. The bargaining cost he 
defined is the cost that leads to an agreement to form an alliance. All this could 
only occur before the formation of alliance. Once the collaboration is 
established, the organisation would not be affected by the bargaining cost 
anymore. The overall level of uncertainty in the ex (pre)-collaboration period 
may be caused by imperfect communication, lack of trust, difficulty in verifying 
collaboration performance or resource (including technology resource and 
human resource) distribution, and conflicts of specific contract terms. In 
particular, the bargaining cost will be influenced by the political environment 
within the Top Management Team (TMT) and could dramatically determine the 
realisation of the goals in (post) ex-collaboration period. 
Transaction costs help to reduce uncertainty in both the pre-collaboration 
period and the post-collaboration period. The only question is how to balance 
the transaction cost over the technological life cycle. As the transaction cost 
occurring pre-collaboration mainly concerns the negotiation between partners to 
commit resources, some people suggest it may involve higher uncertainty than 
transaction cost incurred monitoring defection or protecting joint patents post-
collaboration (Bronder & Pritzl, 1992). Yet empirical studies show that in some 
cases, transaction cost is at a higher level in both early and late stages, but at a 
lower level in the intermediate stage, which indicates a U shape relationship 
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between the transaction cost and technology transfer uncertainty (Brockhoff, 
1992). 
 
2.3.7 Collaboration and Strategic Management 
Strategic management theory deals with a set of leadership centred activities 
that enhance firms‘ performance via detection and evaluation of its internal and 
external resources (Siegel & Tuckel, 1985). It was initially developed from 
strategic planning which mainly concerns the activities associated with the 
collection and utilisation of external environmental information. Instead of 
continuity in the environment in strategic planning, strategic management 
assumes the likelihood of discontinuity and surprise (Klay, 1991). The 
evaluation and control of the information gathered from rivals or related 
industries and the success of its on-going projects is crucially important in 
strategic management. Feedbacks from the analysis of market situations allow 
the leaders of organisations to decide whether the implementation of current 
strategy is adequate and whether/when to replace it by a new strategy. This 
may result from the need to meet different market circumstances (Ansoff, 1984), 
which may be caused by introduction of new technology, new rival, new product 
or new policy (Lamb, 1984). This indicates that the optimal strategy may 
constantly vary from time to time. As addressed by Klay (1991), ‘Success is 
defined as the implementation of adequate strategy, not the development of 
perfect strategy’. 
A model presented by Johnson et al (2008) gives us an answer on how 
to evaluate the adequacy of implementation of a strategy. In their research, they 
listed three key success criteria, suitability, feasibility and acceptability, 
explaining the three questions respectively as ‗would it work?‘, ‗can it be made 
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to work?‘ and ‗will it work?‘. By using their classification, we look at the literature 
on strategic management to see how collaboration might occur in firms. 
The first criterion, suitability, describes whether the strategy is 
economically reasonable in terms of environment and capabilities. Bronder & 
Pritzl (1992) believe increasing competition and technology breakthroughs 
result in collaboration, which may allow the firm to better adapt in global 
markets. As firms are no longer an integrated unit of value chains, forming a 
network associated with operative cooperation and technology collaboration 
might be a wise choice. The European aerospace alliance, Airbus, formed in 
1965, is a typical example of core competencies integration by European civil 
aircraft companies in order to compete against their common rivals, the 
American market leader, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas. Another example of a 
strategic alliance may be found between drug companies, Bayer Health Care 
AG and Millennium Pharmaceuticals in the biotech industry (Ziegelbauer & 
Farquhar, 2004). The goal of their collaboration is to beat other common rivals 
on time scale so that they could be first to patent partial DNA sequences and 
dominate the access to potential drugs discoveries. The area of cooperation/ 
collaboration does not only cover collaboration in technology, but also includes 
product development, service and operation management. The main purpose of 
the alliance therefore is to jointly compete with the dominant firms and greatly 
expand market share. 
Besides, collaboration may also lead to greater mutual learning capability 
and continuous adaption (Parkhe, 1991; Bronder & Pritzl, 1992; Hult & Ferrell, 
1997). Here, the term ‗learning‘ may be read as defined by Cohen and Levinthal 
(1990) as ‘the ability to recognize the value of new external knowledge, 
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assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends’. In an article discussing the 
existence of a common European approach to management and knowledge 
transfer between collaborative companies, Lubatkin & Floyd (1997) claim that 
the firm leaders and middle managers must be familiar with know-what, know-
how and know-why about the strategy they are going to launch. Indeed, pre-
scanning of market position may help them to satisfy the three criteria listed 
above, but mutual learning seems to offer a better opportunity that greatly 
improves understanding. A similar conclusion, that learning orientation is one of 
key factors of successful collaboration, may be obtained from Mehta et al 
(2006), who investigated determinants of strategic alliances in international 
distribution channels. By employing manufacturing data from the US, Finland, 
China and Poland, their empirical results show that a partner with learning 
orientation is more likely to lead in a successful collaboration in the long run. 
We have to note that different from other financial or physical resources, 
knowledge tends to be duplicable. On one hand, knowledge could transfer from 
donor to recipient, but on the other hand, the transformation itself does not 
diminish the amount of knowledge held by the donor. As addressed by 
Carayannis et al (2000), knowledge sharing might be considered as a positive-
sum game. Moreover, Carayannis (1994) also advocates that learning at the 
level of organisational structure may lead to more radical innovation, called ‘the 
cone of strategic technological hyperlearning’. This ‗learning-how-to-learn‘ effect 
reveals that knowledge sharing between firms may enhance their common 
knowledge and make it transferrable to some other specific valuable projects. 
Evidence supports the view that in the long term, the exchange of expertise and 
knowledge between partners may greatly enhance exploitation of opportunities 
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in the market. Programmes such as EUREKA or HDTV supported by the 
European Community are a good example that firms have start to combine their 
know-how and to stimulate complementary competencies.  
The second criterion, feasibility, actually concerns whether the resources 
required to implement the strategy are available. To answer this question in the 
case of collaboration, we may divide the problem into two parts: whether the 
strategy of collaboration can obtain resources which may not be available in the 
absence of collaboration; and is collaboration a comparatively cost effective 
strategy? 
Some literature on strategic management answers the former conjecture 
positively, (the so called obstacles related to resource approach, see 
Cassimann & Veugelers, 2002; Barge-Gil, 2010). Bronder & Pritzl (1992) claim 
that apart from market potential and human potential, finance potential is also 
important. Collaborating firms could enhance their competitive advantages by 
gaining access to extra external finance support (Leonard-Barton, 1995). In 
recent years, consideration of university-industry or government-industry or 
even firm-to-state organisation also supports the idea that collaboration is an 
effective way to achieve complementary resources. In addition, diversified 
complementary resources from collaboration may form ‗social capital‘ as a basis 
for market success. Fuller-Love & Cooper (1996), for instance, show that 
cooperation among different health care providers on IT resources may 
significantly increase competitiveness of hospitals and patient care. Carayannis 
et al (2000), focused on collaboration in form of government-university-industry 
(GUI) in the US, Germany and France. Their results show government, 
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universities and industry may respectively supply adequate resources, such as 
policy, intelligence and funding to members of the organisation alliance. 
However, other research tends to emphasis the costs of collaborative 
research. Narula (2004) claims that developing new technology internally is too 
expensive and collaboration might be more cost effective. Case studies by 
Fuller-Love & Cooper (1996) suggest that collaboration may enhance the cost 
efficiency of research by providing rapid and better management information. 
The last criterion, acceptability, concerns the expectation of success in 
strategy and how feedback is to be identified by the firm‘s leaders, 
stakeholders, employees and customers. This question mainly concerns three 
aspects: Firstly, in terms of firm‘s leader and stakeholders, whether the 
corresponding return and the risk of failure (including product failure, market 
failure and management failure) might increase after adopting the collaboration 
strategy; secondly, in terms of firm‘s leader and stakeholders, whether the 
administrative heritage will significantly change and whether it has unique 
preferences over firm‘s collaborating; and thirdly, in terms of firm‘s employees 
and customers, whether the firm‘s culture will change and whether that change 
actually fits. 
As there is already a rich array of literature about the first sub question, 
regarding the return and risk when firms involve themselves in collaboration 
(section 2.3.4), to avoid unnecessary duplication, we only consider the latter two 
concerns. The second sub question concerns whether collaboration interacts 
with the administrative heritage in firms, which, in fact, naturally leads us to 
another issue, how to select the right collaborative partner. Employing case 
studies of German and French companies, Lubatkin & Floyd (1997) analysed 
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whether the form of collaboration varies across national boundaries. Their 
results reveal that managers from French companies prefer to collaborate with 
firms having a strong concept of management, whilst the managers from 
German companies like to work in a team with a comparatively loose 
management heritage. The reason why greater acceptance of power distance 
may affect managers‘ preferences in collaboration may be explained by the 
argument that, since everyone has a rightful place, firms with a French pyramid 
management structural heritage are easy to control, whilst German firms 
blurring the distinction between managers and workers may reflect and improve 
workers feedback rapidly and efficiently (Laurent, 1983). Therefore, when firms 
collaborate, French style firms like to collaborate with French style firms, whilst 
German style firms prefer German style firms. As White & Lui (2005) 
addressed, ‘lack of willingness to adapt to each other’s work styles will be 
correlated with managers reporting greater time and effort to work with an 
alliance partner’. Therefore, to collaborate with similar management concepts 
helps firms to lower the transaction cost and continue the previous 
administrative heritage, which results in higher acceptability of new partner and 
greater success rate of collaboration. 
The last criterion of concern, acceptability, i.e. whether the post 
collaboration culture fits, actually reflects another side of the partner selection 
problem from the view of employees and customers. Bronder & Pritzl (1992) 
suggest that the partner selection issue may be influenced by seven 
orientations, environmental orientation, international orientation, customer 
orientation, technology orientation, innovation orientation, cost orientation, 
quality orientation and employee orientation. Instead of a unique influence, 
 71 
these orientations may jointly affect the way one partner learns from another, 
even though the main purpose of collaboration is focused on technology 
development. On the other hand, as the workload grows after signing a 
collaboration contract, cultural conflicts are bound to increase over time. To 
cope with this problem, some commentators believe face to face meetings to be 
effective (Ziegelbauer & Farquhar, 2004), whilst others suggest that increasing 
the time scale of collaboration may greatly help (Brockhoff, 1992). Additionally, 
in recent years, people have preferred to distinguish this problem according to 
the types and intensity of cultural conflicts. Carayannis et al (2000), for instance, 
advocate that light culture conflicts may not always have a negative effect but 
may even stimulate collaboration. But, if the intensity of conflict between 
different cultures increases above a certain level, it may alter the strategic 
preference and result in the failure of collaboration. However, no matter how 
partners tackle the cultural conflicts arising from collaboration, the outcomes 
when different culture meet must be one of following possibilities: cultural 
pluralism, cultural assimilation, cultural transfer and cultural resistance (Buono 
& Bowditch, 1989; Bronder & Pritzl, 1992). 
To summarise, apparently, the success of collaboration in the strategic 
management literature must involve the three criteria listed above, but the 
orientation firms choose may vary from case to case. Bronder & Pritzl (1992), 
for instance, suggest the motives for collaboration depends upon market type. 
In emerging markets, firms emphasise factor suitability and gaining access to 
core competencies, whilst in well-developed industries, firms prefer to succeed 
through finding better feasibility, focusing on the cost effective objective. Similar 
deductions may be found from Mehta et al (2006) who claimed that, different 
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from the experience in developed countries, suitability seems to be especially 
important in developing countries. Strong relationships could be observed 
between learning orientation and cooperation in Chinese data. In contrast, 
Lubatkin & Floyd (1997) advocate that firms with a strong concept of heritage 
may be more market and differentiation oriented, whilst firms with a relatively 
loose heritage are more operationally and technically orientated. Similar 
deductions could also be drawn from Ziegelbauer and Farquhar (2004) who 
claimed that collaboration is more likely to succeed when key executives are 
committed to work closely with scientists, research management and other 
parties. 
 
2.3.8 Collaboration and Product Market Competition 
Is there any connection between research collaboration and product market 
competition? Do collaboration and/ or cooperation help a firm attain a 
competitive advantage over other firms? How do these relationships constrain 
or enhance local, national and global networks of firms? As collaboration and 
competition occupy two sub-branches in the strategic map respectively, these 
questions are crucial for generating a firm decision equilibrium model. 
Snidal (1986) suggested that numbers per se should not necessarily 
reduce cooperation, because of shared risk with a popular project. But on the 
other hand, a rich array of scholars holds the opposite view on this issue. 
Polenske (2004) tried to answer the above questions by distinguishing 
definitions of collaboration and cooperation and building three different models 
labelled: the Italian model, the Japanese model and the Global model. He found 
close linkages among cooperation, collaboration and competition (3C), and 
suggested successful strategies for different industrial organisations. However, 
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he did not indicate any positive or negative effects between the 3C. In his 
paper, the best strategy for small firms that innovate is to choose cooperation of 
the Italian type with short linkages between cooperation and competition. 
Collaborative arrangements in the Italian model might exist, but they have less 
influence on the competitive behaviour of the firms. The Japanese model, with 
the closest link in the uneasy triangle between collaboration and competition, is 
suitable for those medium sized firms which prefer collaborative mechanisms 
for risk sharing. Last but not least, large, especially multinational firms practicing 
collaborative behaviour globally may match the global model. The global model 
has two uneasy triangles. The first, like that of the Japanese model, with a close 
collaboration-competition link, represents the headquarters situation. The 
second triangle for the global model represents the behaviour for the part of the 
firm located in the peripheral regions, where neither collaboration nor 
cooperation occurs to any significant extent. 
Different from Polenske (2004), some scholars pay attention to the 
effects on collaboration of the number of competing firms. Game theorists have 
studied the phenomenon of getting multiple participants to cooperate. Some 
argue that the prospects of cooperation diminish as the number of players 
increase (Oye, 1986). Coleman (1990) tries to give an explanation of this 
problem. ‘If a number of person’s interests are satisfied by the same outcome 
and if the benefits that each experience from his own actions that contribute to 
the outcome is less than the costs of these actions, he will not contribute if he is 
rational. If others contribute, he will experience the benefits of the outcome 
without incurring costs. If others do not contribute, his own costs will outweigh 
his benefits.’ 
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Recent research (Cassiman et al, 2009) advocates the idea that 
collaboration and competition may go hand in hand when firms invent. They 
explore balances and trade-offs on both collaboration and competition in 
respect of R&D, through three different aspects, project knowledge attributes, 
project governance structure, and project partner selection. In particular, R&D in 
collaboration is considered as a value creation process, with R&D in 
competition referred to as a value capture process. This is probably because it 
might be difficult to control the uncertainty inherited in technology transfer. By 
utilising the project level R&D data in STMicroelectronics from 1998 to 2003, the 
quantitative case study model they employed reveals that collaboration mostly 
occurs in basic research and with easily transferable projects. The result also 
suggests that collaboration is as important as competition because by pursuing 
both one may co-create value and capture value. 
2.3.9 Collaboration and Innovation 
Do alliances stimulate innovation in the competitive world? How does it work? 
Are there any variables which influence such results? 
Various studies have observed that close inter-firm collaborations have 
positive effects on a firm‘s innovative activity. Baumol (1992) suggests that due 
to cost sharing, collaboration may stimulate innovation. Even if it does not, since 
collaboration is one way of information exchange, it helps the new technology to 
attain more widespread utilisation, which is welfare improving. Similarly, 
Womack et al. (1991) advocate that collaboration can not only accelerate 
innovation, but may also enhance informational advantages in industries. 
Man & Duysters (2005) selected 30 papers on alliances and analysed 
the effects of M&A and alliances on innovation and the relationship between 
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alliance and innovation. After careful modelling, 73% of hypotheses tested 
showed positive results. The results imply that alliances increase innovation. A 
number of reasons may explain why this happens.  
‗Firstly, cooperative agreements can ease a number of transactional and 
contractual differences (Williamson, 1975, 1985; Hennart, 1988; Jarillo, 
1988).Secondly… the lower risk of large research projects and the integration of 
complementary knowledge may also increase innovation through alliances’. 
Furthermore… collaboration may also lead to a significant reduction in lead 
times in some particular industries. In high-tech markets where prices 
sometimes decline by more than 30% a year, it is obvious that the ability to 
bring products to the market more rapidly can offer a significant competitive 
advantage’. 
 
Similar to Man & Duysters, Guan et al. (2005) use a Chinese industrial 
database on 950 industrial enterprises, and find a positive relationship between 
innovation performance and collaboration among industry, research institutes 
and universities. In other words, the more collaboration the greater is 
technology innovation. 
In particular, latest research specifies a positive relationship between 
collaboration and innovation. Faems et al. (2005) conducted an empirical study 
to examine whether inter-organisational collaboration supports the effectiveness 
of innovation activities. Belgian manufacturing firm level data are collected from 
the CIS for this purpose. In that study, a positive link between inter-
organisational collaboration and innovation performance is finally revealed by 
Tobit models. As we addressed before, a possible explanation may be that 
collaboration leads to an increase in knowledge and a reduction in research 
cost and associated research risk. 
Patrakosol & Olson (2007) collected longitudinal data from 23 top IT 
firms across 9 years and used a Hierarchical Linear Model framework to 
investigate changes in the innovation process. They divided innovation 
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improvements into two groups: evolutionary improvement and revolutionary 
improvement. Evolutionary improvement occurs when the innovation process 
changes are incremental and gradual, whilst revolutionary improvement occurs 
when the process is radical and changed rapidly. In contrast to the statement by 
Baumol (2005) that evolutionary breakthrough is provided by corporates, whilst 
revolutionary breakthrough comes from entrepreneurs, Patrakosol & Olson 
(2007) suggest that close inter-firm collaborations were associated with 
evolutionary but not revolutionary improvement. This indicates that the history of 
the IT firms had engaged in close inter-firm collaboration may go positively with 
the effect on IT innovations. In addition, they also claim that both firm size and 
inter-firm collaboration help firms achieve IT innovation. If a firm cannot grow 
bigger, then engaging in close inter-firm collaboration is an alternative to 
increased IT innovation. 
In contrast, recent studies have started to explore the breadth and depth 
of cooperation in research activities and whether these impact upon innovation 
(Laursen & Salter, 2006). Barge-Gil (2010) compared cooperation-based 
innovators whose innovation mainly relied on cooperation with both internal and 
external resources, and the peripheral co-operators that mainly innovated via 
their own internal efforts. In this article, the former cooperation type in fact was 
identified as the same as the open innovation model (Chesbrough, 2003), 
allowing for multiple channels of cooperation, such as licensing as well as 
collaboration; whilst the later model mainly refers to self-innovation with non-
adopted external information. The author explored the impact of cooperation 
determinants upon the nature of cooperation itself and in particular, whether 
more cooperative effort could be devoted to collaboration. After analysing 
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Spanish CIS manufacturing data from 2002- 2004, the results suggest that 
there are both peripheral co-operators and cooperation-based innovators with 
fewer partners who may be seen as offering a greater depth of cooperation. 
However, most of the determinants of whether firms cooperate or not had little 
different impact upon the two groups, thereby suggesting that there might be no 
strong ties between cooperation and the ways of achieving it. 
As to the question of whether powerful third parties influence the positive 
relationship between collaboration and innovation, Man & Duysters (2005) 
indicate that they do not. That is, any alliances involving public support or a 
public partner do not increase innovation, although they do lower the cost of 
innovation.  
In contrast to the positive relationship between collaboration and 
innovation, only about 10% of selected papers indicate the opposite opinion. 
Some research indicating a negative relationship between alliances and 
innovation can also be found. One possible reason for an alliance to fail may be 
that partners in alliances are often competitors. Fear of helping a competitor to 
develop a new technology may be an incentive to hold back in cooperation 
(Cassiman et al, 2009). Mol (2005) and Barge-Gil (2010) also suggest that the 
collaboration decision may be affected by the fear of leakage of core innovation 
knowledge. Indeed, as Harrigan (1988) suggests, these may be the sort of 
situations in which ‘good friends become enemies fast’. However, Man & 
Duysters (2005) analyse the real reason why a non-positive relationship may 
emerge in some specific situations. They find that this tends to happen when 
the alliance is related to cost-saving objectives rather a new technology 
development process. 
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2.4 Conclusions 
The literature reported above indicates that innovation and especially innovation 
and collaboration, covering issues of collaboration both between firms and 
firms, and between firms and state organisations, is a very live topic and an 
important one. In our game theory research below (chapter 3), we focus on 
collaboration between firms and firms. Then, using the predictions from the 
game theory model as a guide, we empirically explore issues of collaboration 
between both firms and firms, and firms and state organisations, although state 
organisations are much less subject to commercial pressures (Fuller-Love & 
Cooper, 1996).   
The literature listed above indicates that collaboration does indeed 
impact significantly on firms‘ innovation decisions and then upon economic 
growth. The big questions are: when does collaboration occur?; what factors 
particular influence collaboration?; and does collaboration play a more 
important role than self-innovation? Two main streams of thought flow 
throughout the literature review above. The first concerns how to model firms‘ 
decisions upon innovation and collaboration. The second concerns what we 
know about innovation and collaboration in China. We start with the latter. 
Although there is some empirical work available, most work upon the 
determinants and impacts of collaboration relates to the developed economies. 
There is little that applies to developing economies and to China particularly. 
However, the rapid growth and technological development of China make it an 
ideal test bed for study as well as a case study of enormous interest. Being a 
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neglected topic and a matter of importance, it is our intention in the Chapters 
below to explore innovation and collaboration in China. 
In order to do this empirically the research employs the latest panel data 
upon the Chinese manufacturing sector, incorporating the IT industry which is 
an industry with unique features exhibiting innovation and intense competition. 
The main strategy in the IT industry is centred on intellectual innovation, which 
is also a unique feature of high-tech industry in general. Unlike many other 
industries, IT innovations affect other businesses both internally and externally. 
Internally, they transform strategy and organisational structure; externally IT as 
a source of new ways of doing businesses when firms are connected 
electronically. Firms use new tools to connect business partners and customers 
(Hackbarth etc, 2000). Furthermore, latest results even show that, to some 
extent, technology diffusion could be self-propagating rather than driven by 
exogenous factors (Stoneman, 2007).  
The manufacturing sector also includes a number of high-tech industries 
that have two distinct features (Gao and Pan, 2007). The first is that volatility is 
relatively greater than in other sectors, in particular where firms collaborate. The 
other is that high-tech markets are more explicitly differentiated to suit the 
diversity of consumers‘ requirements. Although, in contrast to Gao‘s opinions, Yi 
(2007) believes the substitution rate in high-tech industry is much greater than 
in traditional industries. Since knowledge diffuses rapidly in high-tech industry, it 
is much easier for followers to imitate the latest technology without paying huge 
R&D costs. This to some extent indicates that it is more difficult to differentiate 
products in high-tech markets. On the other hand, since knowledge is so 
important to success in high-tech industry, compared with traditional industries, 
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labour is a less crucial input. Yi therefore claims that the entry barriers in high-
tech industry must be lower. 
By looking at the Chinese manufacturing sector we will thus be trying to 
see whether high-tech and IT-based industries differ from more traditional 
industries and also whether the experience in developing countries differs from 
that of developed countries. However, as the data size would dramatically 
decrease if we restricted the high-tech industries based upon the OECD‘s 
classification of high-tech industries, we may not able to particularly distinguish 
the high-tech industries from the manufacturing industries. Instead, in order to 
explore the unique impacts of innovative decisions in high-tech industries, we 
examine whether firms located at high-tech zone (Qingshanhu District) innovate 
(or collaborate) more than firms located at non high-tech zone (the other seven 
districts at Nan Chang). In particular, in the empirical studies, we would also 
investigate whether the collaboration cost percentage in high-tech firms located 
at the high-tech zone is less than firms in other districts. 
The second stream that runs throughout the literature discussed above 
concerns theoretical approaches to modelling collaboration. As is clear there 
are many. Some are transaction cost based, some are risk sharing based, 
some are more based on trust and others are based on theories of 
organisational behaviour. Obviously there is a limit to what can be undertaken in 
one thesis and thus an initial choice has to be made as to the theoretical or 
conceptual approach that is to be pursued. The choice that has been made is 
that the prime approach to be employed is to model using game theoretic 
approaches.  
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There is a pedigree of past models in this mould that can be built upon. It 
has been shown above, however, that many game theoretic innovation models 
do not even allow for collaboration. The first extension we make to the literature 
is to allow for collaboration. The second extension we make is that our model, 
for the first time, explores the development cost sharing plan under 
collaboration from the viewpoint of the low technology firm. As a result we detail 
how the cost percentages vary with various market characteristics. The third 
extension to be made is that, unlike in most existing models which exclusively 
consider process innovation. We consider product innovation which we argue is 
much more prevalent. In fact it will be allowed that each firm has a distinct 
nature and technology level and firms will base their decisions on their expected 
discounted utility and current profits. A firm may choose either collaboration or 
competition. If it chooses competition the firm would also have the choice 
between innovation and imitation through time. The winner of each innovative 
R&D race discovers how to produce a new superior product, and the winner of 
each imitation race discovers how to produce the state-of-the-art quality 
product.  
The resulting analysis provides insight into when collaboration might 
occur (it depends upon transaction costs, market type, various market 
characteristics, and the possibility of imitation but not simply), how development 
costs are shared across collaborators (it varies with market characteristics, 
although the cost paid by the low technology firm will not exceed 100% in a 
four-strategy set, it may pay more than 100% in a three-strategy set in rare 
cases), and we are also able to make some predictions about changes in firms‘ 
revenue over time as innovation occurs. These predictions are used to guide an 
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analysis of panel data upon technological collaboration in Chinese 
manufacturing in later chapters.  
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3 Competition vs. Collaboration: A Game Theory Approach 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This Chapter provides a game theoretic exploration of the decisions of firms on 
whether to compete or collaborate in the generation and adoption of a 
sequence of new technologies.  
The basic assumptions of the theoretic model employed are similar to the 
patent race model proposed by Vickers (1986), except that here there are three 
main changes. First, the innovations considered here include product 
innovations whereas in Vickers (1986) only process innovations are discussed. 
Secondly, in Vickers (1986) firms always compete in innovation whereas here 
the model is extended so that firms may compete, collaborate or imitate in the 
generation and adoption of new technology, with the choice of strategy being 
endogenous to the model. Thirdly, transaction costs, which are not considered 
at all by Vickers are considered as one of the factors affecting decisions to 
collaborate in both three-strategy set and four-strategy set variants.  
In the next section, the general modelling concept and assumptions are 
discussed. A matter of some importance concerns the Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPR) regime. If this regime is strong then imitation will not be possible. If 
it is weak then imitation will be possible. In section 3.3 models in which imitation 
is not possible and therefore where the possible strategies of the firm 
encompass innovation, collaboration and do nothing, are detailed. In section 3.4 
models of strategy in which imitation is possible and where the strategy sets 
encompass innovation, collaboration, imitation, and do nothing are discussed. 
In section 3.5, we consider a particular example to illustrate our theory 
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illustrating the Cournot equilibrium for both the three and the four-strategy 
cases. Brief conclusions and a discussion of limitations are provided in section 
3.6. 
 
3.2 The Modelling Concept and Assumptions 
3.2.1 General 
Since the framework employed was inspired by the Vickers (1986) model with 
its sequence of innovations, many of the basic assumptions remain as stated by 
Vickers. Specifically: 
a) We consider a duopoly market in which the two firms play two 
stage games with two non-homogeneous products. In particular, firms 
decide what quality of goods and which strategy is optimal to adopt in the 
first stage, and they compete with each other on price in the second stage. 
b) Although we have shown in Chapter 2 that collaboration between 
firms in the development of new technology may be a reaction to market 
and technological uncertainty, Vickers assumes that in a patent race game 
firms have complete information and thus there is no uncertainty. Therefore, 
no matter which strategy firms choose (innovation, imitation, collaboration or 
do nothing), no risk is involved and the only determinant identifying the best 
strategy is the payoff to each strategy option. The patent race to innovate 
can then be regarded as a simple deterministic bidding game (Dasgupta, 
1982; Gilbert and Newbery, 1982). Just as Vickers (1986) suggested, for 
the sake of simplicity, we also assume that firms have complete information 
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and thus uncertainty as an issue is put on one side1. 
c) In Vickers‘s model, firms compete in a game to acquire a superior 
technology offered by a third party. He assumes that the acquirer obtains 
the IPR or patent rights to the technology and thus the game may be 
considered to be a patent race. The winner of the race will have exclusive 
rights to the technology at the date of the race. This will allow the winner to 
become technologically superior to his competitor(s) with no possibility that 
the new technology may be stolen by his rivals in the period. Other firms 
may only attain the same performance as the winner when the next round of 
the sub bidding game finishes. We initially develop models where these 
assumptions with respect to IPR are maintained. However in later work we 
relax the assumptions on IPR. 
d) In Vickers (1986) the firm‘s payoff to different strategies mainly 
depends upon it and its rivals levels of technology, labelled the technology 
gap. In particular, as Vickers (1986) addresses, the firms‘ relative 
technology levels may decide the firms‘ current profit flows. Since each sub 
game only finishes when one player successfully bids, the superior 
technology level must move up one step at a time. This however does not 
mean that the technology gap between players always remain at one 
generation. If a player continually wins, for instance for n steps, then the 
gap between him and his rival would be n plus the initial technology gap at 
the beginning of the game. In fact there may be two sequences of 
outcomes: either a market where the market leader always dominates in 
                                            
1
 Although some researchers suggest that lack of information does not necessarily prevent cooperation/ 
collaboration to reach Pareto efficiency (Kaitala et al, 1995), the initial assumptions of the game that we 
designed still follow Vickers’ models that only allow complete information. 
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each sub game – a persistent dominance market; or a market where the 
follower in sub games always overthrows the previous winner, known as an 
action-reaction market. Vickers suggests that there are important 
differences between such markets and we thus also explore such issues, 
being keen to know what the firms‘ responses will be in the two different 
types of market. 
In addition to these similarities to the work of Vickers we have also 
introduced some extensions. 
e) The most important extension that we introduce is that we allow 
firms to collaborate in the development of new technology. Thus whereas in 
Vickers firms essentially may innovate or do nothing, we initially allow that 
firms may innovate, collaborate or do nothing (a three-strategy model). We 
consider this three-strategy framework as appropriate when there are strict 
IPR regimes as assumed in the original Vickers model. 
f) Often, however, IPR is weak and this raises the possibility that 
firms may imitate rather than innovate (with or without collaboration). Thus 
in later work we relax the assumptions on IPR and consider the possibility of 
imitation, which allows followers to copy the superior technology with certain 
searching cost, so that each firm face four strategies – innovate, 
collaborate, imitate or do nothing – rather than three. 
g) Vickers model is built around process innovation and the nature of 
superior technology is concerned with cost reduction only. The firm with the 
most cost efficient technology will dominate the market and consequently 
obtain monopoly profits. However, if there is product differentiation then a 
cost advantage does not guarantee monopoly profits. Product differentiation 
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may arise in many ways, such as brand, design, different quality products 
and embedded customer service. Firms with a superior technology will have 
greater comparative advantages when they compete, but they may not 
completely squeeze rivals out of the market. Less productively efficient firms 
may also survive through product differentiation even though their 
technology level is not the best. This indicates that only considering process 
innovation may not be sufficient. We need to also consider product 
innovation in the game. We thus allow for both product and process 
innovation, instead of analyzing process innovation alone, by employing an 
improved consumers‘ utility function.  
h) As Vickers does not allow for collaboration he has no need to 
consider transaction costs. In the previous chapter we have argued 
however that the possibility of firms collaborating may well be influenced by 
whether there are transactions cost and if so how large they might be. Thus 
in addition to the R&D cost normally addressed in studies of innovation we 
also allow for transaction cost arising when firms‘ collaborate, covering the 
additional cost of coordination, negotiation and safeguards embedded in 
collaboration. In particular, when firms collaborate, there are various cost 
sharing possibilities and the costs of negotiation may effectively push the 
market to reach an equilibrium (please refer to section 3.5).  
The models that we proceed to develop thus allow that firms may 
innovate i.e. develop new technology alone, collaborate in new technology 
development, imitate (i.e. copy the leaders technology with certain cost) or do 
nothing. These are the alternative strategies that we model below. There is 
however another alternative. This alternative is licensing. In essence, if 
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licensing occurs than the winner of the patent race allows his rival to use the 
new technology that he owns for a royalty fee.  
Of course, licensing will only occur in a world where IPR is strong. 
Otherwise technology may be copied or stolen at lower cost which must be 
preferable to the acquirer. Thus licensing is only relevant in our three-strategy 
models. If licensing were to be introduced in such models they would be similar 
to the four-strategy models, but with a fee being paid by the imitator. Rather 
than do this however we have decided to rule out licensing strategies. Vickers 
does not allow for licensing and neither do we. This not only simplifies our 
analysis but also means that we do not have to incorporate many of the other 
issues that a consideration of licensing would require. For example, some of the 
issues that are raised in the literature on licensing are that: 
(i) Licensing may severely threaten the dominant position of a technology 
leader. Some empirical studies also show that in order to better adapt to local 
tastes, North to South licensing encourages the South to establish local 
research centres to improve licensed innovations (Larson & Anderson, 1994; 
Blumenthal, 1976). Such licensee behaviour may potentially threaten the 
technology owner‘s dominant position by increasing the risks of being overtaken 
by the licensee. If licensing stimulates the technology follower to innovate more 
locally, the best licensing strategy for the licensor is to grant a contract to the 
licensee with the least risk-adverse preferences who will accept the offer. But to 
achieve that goal, the market must be open enough to allow the licensor to 
observe his rival‘s risk preferences. To some extent, this market restriction is 
too strict in most situations. The problem is, when the potential licensee‘s risk 
preference is unobservable, there is no steady strategic equilibrium for licensor. 
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(ii) Gallini and Winter (1985) also support the idea that licensing may 
threaten the licensor‘s technology dominance. After analysing a case of process 
innovation, they believe that providing a license would result in more efficient 
production with less cost - an ex post incentive. Because of such an incentive, 
the licensee may invest more in self-innovation leaving the licensor with a 
dilemma (Teece, 1988). That is, granting a license to a rival could yield 
additional royalty rents but the licensor would have to bear the risk that passing 
the vital knowledge to his rival would enable that rival to generate a better 
technology and competitive advantages (Scherer, 1980).  
(iii) The licensor has to bear the risk that the licensee will misuse the 
technology in other areas or in other ways that have not been agreed in the 
contract (David & Ray, 2006). This risk is inherent in many transactions. If this 
happens, the licensor has to bear possibilities that the technology buyer 
expropriates more rents than he should have (called quasi rents by Hill, 1990). 
To reduce such potential opportunism though cheating, lying or stealing, the 
licensor may have to invest a large amount in safeguards for surveillance and 
investigation.  
(iv) Finally, as the latest technology may help the inventor to achieve 
market superiority over his competitors, in order to maximize the monopoly 
payoff in the post-invention window, the technology inventor normally would not 
license the technology follower immediately after the discovery of innovation. 
There may be a time lag, of one year or even more (Baumol, 1992), that will 
allow the licensor to bring the licensed technology to the market first. In that 
case, the licensee has to sell the products based on the obsolete technology for 
a while until the license takes effect. Baumol (1992) reveals a possibility that if 
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the technology owner licenses the innovation to his rivals, the net return on 
technology will gradually diminish to the cost of capital, indicating the profit of 
the innovation may fall to zero. Thus, compared to collaboration where both 
parties own the intellectual property rights at all times, concerns re profit loss 
may force the licensor not to license their technology or at least, to push the 
starting date of any license out as far as possible (unless the licensee could 
recompense the licensor with a large fee). 
To repeat, however, we do not consider licensing as a strategy option in 
our game theoretic model.  
 
3.2.2 The Formal Model 
We consider a duopoly market in which the firms play two stage games. At the 
first stage, firms decide on both the quality of goods to supply and the 
(technological acquisition) strategy to pursue, whilst at the second stage, firms 
compete with the rival on price until reaching equilibrium. The two firms are 
presented over time with a sequence of technological opportunities for a total of 
T  periods and the strategy choice concerns whether to compete, collaborate or 
imitate in the development and adoption of these technologies.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Game Schedule 
 
Innovation sought:                             1 kt              ……               nkt  . 
 
Firms initial technologies:      H firm  )( kt   
                                               L firm   )1( t  
 
 
We assume that in each period there is a superior technology that can be 
developed that is better than any technologies on offer in the previous k  
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periods. We order the time periods by the level of the superior technology 
1 kt  within that time period. As a result, the larger is t  the better is the 
starting point of the technology in that industry. At any point in time the firm with 
the higher technology level kt  ( 2k ) is defined as H, and the follower 
using/owning the lower technology level 1t , is labelled as L (Figure 3.1). That 
means the technology gap between two firms must be 1k , which is at least 
one. If only one of the firms acquires the new technology, then its technology 
level would rise to level 1 kt , whist the rivals‘ level remains the same as 
previously.  
We are particularly interested in whether, given the strategy choices of 
firms: the market leader (H) will always adopt a new technology and the follower 
(L) will not, so that there will be persistent dominance (PD) over time; or 
whether the market follower will always adopt a new technology and a follower 
will not so there will be action reaction (AR) over time; or whether the firms will 
collaborate over time with a more balanced outcome. We are especially 
interested in the conditions that will produce a collaboration outcome and also, 
with that outcome, the determinants of the collaboration cost that firm L will pay. 
Strategic choices will be driven by the relative payoffs to different 
strategies. Under competition in the generation and adoption of a new 
technology there are two payoffs to consider. The payoff when the firm has the 
technology and its rival does not and vice versa. According to the idea of 
creative destruction, if two firms are competing over the generation and 
adoption of a new technology one may consider that the one with the largest 
difference between the two net payoffs will win the technology race.  
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Both firms are considered to bid in turn until the bid reaches their 
respective incentives. However, since the decision is made at the beginning of 
each sub-game, the one with the lower incentive will definitely lose the sub-
game and give up bidding automatically. Therefore, the real costs of acquiring a 
technology via innovation (the difference between gross and net payoffs after 
payment) are here assumed to equal the R&D costs of the new technology 
rather than, as in Vickers‘s auction framework, the maximum amount that the 
rival would pay. Thus, for each call, no matter who wins the sub-game, the 
winner always pays the real R&D cost. These incentive comparisons thus 
addressed here are the trigger by which one my judge which firm wins in pure 
strategies. Once one firm acquires the latest technology, both firms then move 
to the next sub-game. 
Let ),( ts denote the net payoff to a firm in the sub-game immediately 
after a technology auction where s  shows the technology level of the firm itself 
and t  indicates the technology level of the rival. For example, in time period 
1 kt , if the previous leader H wins, indicating a persistent dominance market, 
then his payoff would be )1,1(  tkt , whilst his rival L has payoff 
)1,1(  ktt ; if the previous follower L wins, indicating an action reaction 
market, then the his payoff would be ),1( ktkt  , whilst his rival H has 
payoff )1,(  ktkt . Table 3.1 below shows the payoffs in this pure 
innovation game. 
 
Table 3.1 Firms’ Payoff in a Pure Innovation Game 
 
 Win Lose 
H )1,1(  tkt  )1,(  ktkt  
L ),1( ktkt   )1,1(  ktt  
 93 
 
We expect that the net payoff to acquisition is positive. This provides 
each firm with an incentive to innovate. Thus we have 
 
)1,()1,1(  ktkttkt                                                            (3.1)   
)1,1(),1(  kttktkt                                                            (3.2) 
 
Following Vickers (1986), we define h 1 ( l 1) as the incentives for firms H 
(L) to win an innovation race. These equal the payoff gap between a winning 
payoff and non-winning payoff (excluding the costs incurred in pursuing any 
strategy) as in 3.3 and 3.4 below. Defining letting 4h ( 4l ) as the incentive for the 
firms H (L) to do nothing yields 3.7 and 3.8 below. If either firm imitates then 
they will both have the same technology levels and both have payoffs of 
)1,1(  ktkt so the incentive to imitate, defined as 3h  ( 3l ), is given by 3.5 
and 3.6 below. To distinguish this payoff after imitation from the same payoff 
from collaboration we use an extra subscript I.  
 
)1,()1,1(1  ktkttkth                                                     (3.3) 
)1,1(),1(1  kttktktl                                                      (3.4) 
)1,()1,1(3  ktktktkth I                                               (3.5) 
)1,1()1,1(3  kttktktl I                                                 (3.6) 
 0)1,()1,(4  tkttkth                                                         (3.7) 
 0),1(),1(4  kttkttl                                                          (3.8) 
 
If there is competition between firms, then when 11 lh   the leader wins 
and there is a persistent dominance market but if 11 lh  , then L wins, leading to 
an action-reaction market. Such ideas based on incentive comparisons are also 
found in other games e.g. Shaked and Sutton (1984) who analyse a two person 
non cooperative bargaining game in unemployment. 
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Firms will either jointly develop new technologies, or jointly acquire new 
technologies from a third party. We continue to assume however that the firms 
still compete on the product market. After the game therefore the post-
collaboration payoff for the two players should be equal. Define this payoff as 
Cktkt )1,1(  , where the capital C denotes collaboration in contrast to 
imitation which has the same gross payoff. 
The incentive to collaborate depends upon the payoff relative to that 
expected under competition. To simplify matters we assume that both firms 
assume that under competition they would lose the game, in which case the 
incentives to collaborate for firms H and L are given by (3.9) and (3.10) 
 
)1,()1,1(2  ktktktkth C                                           (3.9) 
)1,1()1,1(2  kttktktl C                                             (3.10) 
 
We assume, in addition, that 0ih  & 0il  3,2,1i  reflecting that the 
best strategy for any firm with a negative incentive is to ‗do nothing‘. This rule 
indicates that the bidding price from an individual firm must not be bigger than 
his innovative incentive no matter what decision that firm makes. It makes 
sense that they should earn non-negative profits from the deal. The player who 
loses the game under competition is also considered to ‗do nothing‘. 
 
3.3 The Three-Strategy Set (Innovation, Collaboration, or Do Nothing) 
In order to analyse this formal model we initially consider a world where IPR is 
considerably strong and imitation is not a feasible strategy for either firm. No 
imitation allowed may be partly because the existence of competitors is quite 
limited; and also may be the law grants exclusive right to firms which are 
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prerogative in some particular industries. This three-strategy assumption 
actually provides a simpler model where firms have only three possible 
strategies: innovation, collaboration and do nothing. This differs from the 
Vickers model in allowing collaboration.  
Under what conditions will the two firms choose to collaborate rather than 
compete? This will of course depend upon the net payoffs to the two strategies, 
with collaboration requiring that both firms are better off than otherwise. To 
compare the incentives of different strategies, we propose a number of 
comparison paths for both firms. The flow chart (Figure 3.2) illustrates the 
incentive comparison in most conventional competition games. 
The flow chart is designed by using computer programming rules. 
Rectangles represent determined processes, whilst diamonds represent 
undetermined decisions. Arrows show the incentive comparison paths from one 
process to another. If the firm accepts the undetermined decision in the 
diamond, then the strategy he chooses follows the ‗Yes‘ path. Otherwise, the 
arrow showing process picks ‗No‘ path. 
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Figure 3.2 Decision Flow Chart: Three-Strategy Set 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For instance, when a firm encounters an opportunity to launch a new 
technology, he must firstly decide if he ought to collaborate. If he does not 
collaborate, then he moves to the process of competition. He then needs to 
determine whether he will innovate. If yes, then his strategy would be 
innovation. Otherwise, ‗do nothing‘ seems his only other option. In fact, this flow 
chart emphasises how a firm will choose its strategy rather than having its 
strategy predetermined (an idea also reflected in figure 2.1 in chapter 2). 
Table 3.2 is provided as a means by which the game process can be 
better understood. There are various possible combinations of gross payoffs, 
but according to flow chart 3.2, it is clear how to work out the strategy 
equilibrium in each case by comparing different incentives.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do nothing 
 No 
Innovation 
Yes 
Innovation 
Competition 
No 
Collaboration 
Yes 
Firm Decision 
Collaboration 
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Table 3.2 Decision Table under Three-Strategy Set 
 
Market Type Available Strategy Initial Outcome Final Outcome Explanation 
 
 
  11 lh   
   (PD) 
 
 
  H: 1h , 2h  
  L: 2l , 4l  
   ),( 21 lh     ),( 41 lh  
H: Innovation 
L: Do nothing 
   ),( 41 lh     ),( 41 lh  
H: Innovation 
L: Do nothing 
   ),( 22 lh     ),( 22 lh  
Collaboration 
   ),( 42 lh     ),( 41 lh  
H: Innovation 
L: Do nothing 
 
 
   11 lh   
   (AR) 
 
 
  H: 2h , 4h  
  L: 1l , 2l  
   ),( 12 lh     ),( 14 lh  
H: Do nothing 
L: Innovation 
   ),( 22 lh     ),( 22 lh  
Collaboration 
   ),( 14 lh     ),( 14 lh  
H: Do nothing 
L: Innovation 
   ),( 24 lh     ),( 14 lh  
H: Do nothing 
L: Innovation 
 
The first column in the decision Table 3.2 shows market type (persistent 
dominance or action reaction) according to whether the leader or follower has 
the larger payoff in a competition game without a collaboration option. This 
indicates whether the leader or follower would win that game. The loser of the 
game also has the option of doing nothing. The second column represents the 
making of the first decision by comparing the incentives to collaboration and 
competition (which in fact, is denoted by the incentive to innovate if the firm 
wins under competition, or the incentive to do nothing if the firm loses). 
Therefore, the decision in the first diamond of flow chart 3.2 depends upon 
which strategy, collaboration or competition, has the bigger incentive. The third 
column shows the firms‘ initial choices after the incentive comparison. However, 
as the collaboration equilibrium will be attained only when both players agree to 
collaborate, the situation that one firm prefers to collaborate and one does not 
must lead to competition, giving us the final outcomes in column four and the 
corresponding explanations in column five, respectively. Since the strategy 
equilibrium in this decision table appears symmetric upon each market type, to 
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avoid tedium, we only read the table in the case of a persistent dominance 
market. The argument for the action reaction market is then obvious.  
With a persistent dominance market 11 lh  , thus the firm with the higher 
technology level, H, must win any competitive race. This means that the 
laggard, L, would not choose innovation and must pursue the next available 
option i.e. do nothing.  Therefore, in a persistent dominance market, for firm L, 
the innovation option is actually redundant. Thus, as listed in column two, the 
potential strategies for H are collaboration and innovation, whilst the potential 
strategies for firm L are collaboration and do nothing. According to flow chart 
3.2, to make an optimal choice, the firms compare the payoffs to each strategy 
and maximize their possible incentives. There are two possible strategies that 
might be chosen by each player. Thus, the combination of gross payoffs must 
be 412
1
2 CC , as listed in column three. The first of the possible initial 
outcomes in a persistent dominance market, ),( 21 lh , for instance, shows the 
highest strategic incentive for firm H is 1h , indicating 21 hh  , whilst the best 
strategy for firm L is 2l , because 12 ll  . This indicates that H prefers innovation 
and L prefers collaboration. However, as there is no way to supply H with a 
higher payoff through collaboration, H would definitely not accept a 
collaboration offer made by L. Thus, the game becomes a pure competition 
game, although L‘s incentive to play this game is less than his incentive to 
collaborate. Firm L thus chooses the alternative strategy, do nothing, and the 
final outcome is ),( 41 lh . Looking at the second combination of possible initial 
outcomes in a persistent dominance market, we notice that the final outcome is 
that H innovates and L chooses do nothing. But the difference is that compared 
to the first example, L genuinely prefers this combination, whilst previously L 
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preferred collaboration which was not available. The third possible initial 
outcome is, ),( 22 lh , with both firms wanting to collaborate. This initial outcome 
will then become final. However it should be noted that for both firms to want to 
collaborate it is necessary that 12 hh   and 42 ll  . The fourth possible initial 
outcome, using similar arguments yields an ),( 41 lh  final outcome. 
Extending the analysis to the action reaction market, we derive that 
collaboration will occur in two different situations (Table 3.3), one when the 
market is of persistent dominance type, the other where it is of the action 
reaction type. 
 
Table 3.3 Collaboration Conditions in Three-Strategy Set 
 
Situation    Market Type Collaborate Incentive Restrictions 
    I       11 lh  ;       12 hh  ;  42 ll   
    II       11 lh  ;      12 ll  ;   42 hh   
 
 
To better understand how the decision table (Table 3.2) and the 
collaboration condition table (Table 3.3) work, we demonstrate these ideas with 
a simple example. The decision map (Figure 3.3) shows how firms choose their 
optimal strategies upon different markets. The horizontal axes of these decision 
maps illustrate a  combination of various market characteristics, including 
market concentration, degree of product substitution, market size, discount rate 
of price sensitiveness etc., whilst the vertical axes reveals firms‘ incentives 
under different strategies, indicating various market response sets which 
depend upon each player‘s optimal strategy (with the highest possible 
incentive).  
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Figure 3.3 Decision Map of Three-Strategy Set upon Market Types 
 
 
 
In particular, the decision map for each market type, distinguishes four 
areas. In the first the space is split according to whether 12 hh  ; and 42 ll 
whereas in the second, space is split according to whether 42 hh   and 21 ll   
these curves representing the two incentive comparisons. In particular, above 
curves, firms prefer the incentive with the smaller corner mark. For instance, 
point B in the persistent dominance market is above the curve 042  ll , 
showing the incentive for firm L here must be 42 ll  , which consequently tells us 
firm L prefers 2l  more than 4l .Thus the optimal strategy for firm L in this area is 
2l  (collaboration) and the market equilibrium for this point is ),( 22 lh  
(collaboration , collaboration). In contrast, as point A is above 42 ll  and 21 hh  , 
at point A firm H prefers 1h , whilst L desires 2l . Therefore, the expected best 
strategy in this case might be ),( 21 lh  (innovation, collaboration). But as 
explained in Table 3.2 as ),( 21 lh  is not reachable unless both parties agree to 
collaborate, the market finally generates the outcome ),( 41 lh  by downgrading L 
firm‘s incentive from the best strategy 2l  to second best strategy 4l . The firms‘ 
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decision equilibrium is shown for each space with each point representing a 
status that encompasses both players‘ strategic decisions. 
To show how firms strategic decisions might move (even alter) as market 
type changes we integrate the two boxes. Figure 3.4 generates a combined 
decision map by introducing a red U shape like market type curve ( 11 lh  ). For 
convenience, we also mark all restrictions and strategy equilibria in blue and 
black upon the two different markets, respectively. 
 
Figure 3.4 Combined Decision Map of Three-Strategy Set 
 
 
Points above 11 lh   are such that 11 lh  , indicating a persistent 
dominance market. Therefore above the red curve the decision allocation rules 
must follow those of a persistent dominance market, whilst all points below 
11 lh   comply with strategy combinations in an action reaction market.  
Although the shape of the curves assumed in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 may 
change with market characteristics and the definition of the strategy incentive 
functions, this approach offers a unique angle from which to observe the 
decision table generated from the framework and provides some insight in to 
how firms‘ decisions change when incentive restriction or market type change. 
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The figure also provides other benefits: firstly, it shows there is no room for 
other strategy combinations and the possibilities we addressed in table 3.2 fill 
the decision map for the three-strategy case. Secondly, it helps us to 
understand the boundaries of each final combination, for instance, if we simply 
shift the curve 21 hh   to a higher level or squeeze the curve 42 ll  to a lower 
position then there will be more opportunities for collaboration in the persistent 
dominance market. Thirdly, it will also allow us to consider extra strategies over 
and above the three considered here. It is to that which we now turn. 
 
3.4 The Four-Strategy Set (Innovation, Collaboration, Imitation, Do 
Nothing) 
Figure 3.5 Decision Flow Chart: Four-Strategy Set 
 
v 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Innovation and do nothing are sometimes not the only strategies available to 
firms in a technology competition. If IPR is not too strict, it may be the case that 
a firm may be able to imitate its rivals and acquire new technology in that way. 
Of course imitation may still involve some costs such as search and learning 
Do nothing 
 No 
Imitation 
Yes 
Imitation 
Innovation 
Yes 
Innovation 
Competition 
No 
Collaboration 
Yes 
Firm Decision 
Collaboration 
 No 
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cost but normally such costs would be expected to be less than the self-
innovation cost. To introduce the possibility of imitation we create a new 
decision flow chart in Figure 3.5.  
By following the logic in section 3.3, the old flow chart (Figure 3.2) is 
expanded by adding an imitation option. In Figure 3.5, firms can now choose to 
imitate if they fail in an innovation auction. Thus, as assumed in three-strategy 
case, if a firm wins under competition, the possible strategy incentives he 
compares encompass either collaboration or innovation. But if a firm fails in the 
innovation auction, now his possible strategy set contains collaboration, do 
nothing and imitation. A new decision table is thus generated as in Table 3.4, 
showing six initial outcome combinations for each market type ( 613
1
2 CC ). 
Firms then choose the initial outcome combination with the highest incentive as 
their optimal strategy. 
Table 3.4 Decision Table under the Four-Strategy Set 
Market Type Available Strategy Initial Outcome Final Outcome Explanation 
 
 
   
   
  11 lh   
   (PD) 
 
 
   
   
  H: 1h , 2h  
  L: 2l , 3l , 4l  
   ),( 21 lh     ),( 31 lh  
H: Innovation 
L: Imitation 
   ),( 41 lh  
H: Innovation 
L: Do nothing 
   ),( 31 lh     ),( 31 lh  H: Innovation 
L: Imitation 
   ),( 41 lh     ),( 41 lh  
H: Innovation 
L: Do nothing 
   ),( 22 lh     ),( 22 lh  
Collaboration 
   ),( 32 lh     ),( 31 lh  H: Innovation 
L: Imitation 
   ),( 42 lh     ),( 41 lh  
H: Innovation 
L: Do nothing 
 
 
    
   
  11 lh   
   (AR) 
 
 
   
   
  H: 2h , 3h , 4h  
  L: 1l , 2l  
   ),( 12 lh     ),( 13 lh  
H: Imitation 
L: Innovation 
   ),( 14 lh  
H: Do nothing 
L: Innovation 
   ),( 13 lh     ),( 13 lh  H: Imitation 
L: Innovation 
   ),( 14 lh     ),( 14 lh  
H: Do nothing 
L: Innovation 
   ),( 22 lh     ),( 22 lh  
Collaboration 
   ),( 23 lh     ),( 13 lh  H: Imitation 
L: Innovation 
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   ),( 24 lh     ),( 14 lh  
H: Do nothing 
L: Innovation 
 
In a persistent dominance market, for example, if 21 hh  , 32 ll  and 42 ll  , 
firm H must prefer 1h (innovation), whilst L likes 2l (collaboration), resulting in the 
initial outcome ),( 21 lh .However, as collaboration does not offer a higher 
incentive for H ( 12 hh  ), the firm with the higher technology level will refuse to 
collaborate with L. Thus, L has to compete with H by choosing the higher payoff 
from imitation and do nothing. So the final outcome in this combination turns out 
to be ),( 31 lh  
when
 43
ll  ;  and ),( 41 lh  when 43 ll  . Similarly, by employing this 
method, other final outcomes in the decision table may also be decided. We 
then extract from table 3.4 when collaboration may occur in the two different 
market types to form collaboration condition table in a four-strategy set (Table 
3.5). 
 
Table 3.5 Collaboration Conditions in a Four-Strategy Set 
 
Similar to above, we may demonstrate how imitation affects the firms‘ 
decision map by adding two extra incentive restrictions into Figure 3.3, marked 
by dashed lines in Figure 3.6. Each final outcome in Table 3.4 has been 
allocated to a corresponding area in the decision map. Comparing with Figure 
3.3, we notice that taking account of imitation imposes extra restrictions onto 
the strategy set and decreases the collaboration area ),( 22 lh in both market 
types. Essentially this is because the firm may prefer to imitate rather than 
collaborate. In the persistent dominance market, for instance, points in the 
Situation    Market Type Collaborate Incentive Restrictions 
    I       11 lh  ;       12 hh  ;  42 ll  ;  32 ll   
    II       11 lh  ;      12 ll  ;   42 hh  ; 32 hh   
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triangle in the middle of the box originally belonged to collaboration in the three-
strategy case. But since for points below the curve 32 ll  firm L here prefers 
imitation, this will replace collaboration. The final outcome therefore, turns to be 
H innovates and L imitates rather than both collaborate. 
 
Figure 3.6 Decision Map of Four-Strategy Set upon Market Types 
 
 
Again, to better observe the whole decision map in a dynamic market, we 
integrated the two decision maps of different market types (Figure 3.7). We 
retain the market type curve ( 11 lh  ) as in three-strategy case. As shown in the 
following figure, all the area above the red curve may be regarded as a 
persistent dominance market, occupied by blue decision outcomes whilst all the 
area below the market type curve is an action reaction market, highlighted by 
black outcomes. Since imitation diminishes the area of collaboration in both 
market types, it definitely decreases the combinations producing collaboration 
),( 22 lh  in the general decision map. Although we should note that the standard 
to identity market type ( 21 hh  ) might vary with actual cases, the ideas 
embodies in this box still greatly help us to better understand the distribution of 
decision equilibria (Table 3.4). 
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Figure 3.7 Combined Decision Map of Four-Strategy Set 
 
 
 
3.5  An Example 
For illustrative purposes we now construct an example two stage model of the 
above kind. We suppose there are two firms that compete in a product market 
each with one product. Using backward induction, we firstly analyse a Cournot 
equilibrium in prices at the second stage and then look at strategic choices at 
the first stage as regards competition, collaboration, imitation etc and thus 
product qualities. 
 
3.5.1 Utility Function 
In contrast to horizontal product differentiation, the concept of vertical product 
differentiation was introduced earlier by Hotelling (1929) and assumes that 
distinct products on the market differ according to their quality levels, such 
goods otherwise being homogeneous. Consumers would then choose (at equal 
prices) the product offering higher quality. However Shaked and Sutton (1982) 
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argue that there may be a trade-off between a goods‘ quality and its price. If so, 
consumers will prefer those goods that offer the best value for money. Following 
Motta (1991), we allow similar behaviour. 
On the other hand, products may be horizontally differentiated which 
arises when there is no agreed quality ordering over the products on the market 
e.g. if products differ in terms of colours, designs, and brands. People may thus 
have completely different product choices although all goods may embody the 
same technologies.  
Shaked and Sutton (1990) use a simple linear model to illustrate that, at 
equilibrium, there is a relationship between market size and market 
concentration with a competition effect and an expansion effect depending on 
the elasticity of substitution. They argue, by considering sequential entry, that 
pre-emption is not particularly advantageous relative to simultaneous entry. 
Therefore, in our model, we suppose neither firm has any first mover priority. In 
each stage of the game, both firms make their decisions simultaneously. 
Although it is possible to model innovation as changes in either pure 
vertical product differentiation or pure horizontal differentiation there would 
seem some advantages in encompassing both. To some extent, e.g. in the IT 
industry, much modern innovation concerns not only technology upgrading, but 
also cost saving, (i.e. changes that are both vertical product differentiation and 
horizontal product differentiation). Shaked and Sutton (1990), propose a utility 
function that incorporates both horizontal and vertical product differentiation. 
Earlier Shaked and Sutton (1987) has also integrated both horizontal and 
vertical differentiation to explore the determinants of market size and market 
concentration. They found that with product improvements, market size is 
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particularly affected not by the size of fixed cost but by the ability to substitute 
from fixed cost (R&D) to variable cost. However, as they realised, their non-
cooperative games may have collusion as a preferred outcome and thus such 
games may also suggest that firms would prefer to collaborate rather than 
compete. Such models may have some implications for our main concerns 
here. 
We proceed by assuming that consumers maximise utility subject to a 
budget constraint and following Shaked and Sutton (1987, 1990) and 
Matsubayashi (2007) we write the utility function in an indirect utility form: (3.11) 
 
           MxuxuxuxuxuxuU jjiijjiijjii  
22
                 (3.11) 
Where  jjii xwxwYM   
            
)( jiii uupw                                                                          (3.12) 
 
This utility function is composed of two parts, utility from (constrained) 
income M  and utility from each player consuming two goods. Matsubayashi 
(2007) claims that consumer‘s utility, in fact, is related to the perceived price, 
but not the real price they pay. That is to say, for instance, the utility to 
consumers given by two products with same price but different technologies 
must differ. Even though their prices may be identical, the product embodying 
higher technology must generate greater utility. Goods with higher technology 
potentially decrease the perceived price, which gives consumers more utility. 
However, Matsubayashi ignores the cross competitor effects of product 
technology. When i ‘s rival, j  upgrades his product technology level, it must 
increase the consumers‘ perceived price for i  goods, although neither i ‘s real 
price, nor technology level changes. Therefore, we assume that perceived 
price, iw  for goods i  is influenced by both own technology level and the 
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technology gap between himself and his competitor. iu and ju are the per unit 
utilities generated by the two goods i and j  with distinct technology levels. In 
particular, the higher is the technology level of the product, the higher is the 
utility the consumer may gain from each good. Note that as each firm only 
produces one kind of good in the market, either player could offer either iu  or 
j
u . Positive parameters  ,   and  reflect market characteristic. In particular, 
  reflects the symmetry degree of the market and when   = 1, it indicates a 
symmetric market with both firms of the same size.   is the discount rate of 
price sensitiveness to the products technology changes. It decreases the 
perceived price when technology gap grows between the firm himself and his 
rival. 
Similar to Shaked and Sutton, (1990), we introduce a parameter   (
 2,0 ) as an index of substitution to represent not only consumers‘ unique 
preferences, but also to explore the degree of market concentration. In 
particular, when 0 , there is no substitution effect, even if the products have 
identical technologies. With pure vertical product differentiation 0  and (3.13) 
holds 
 
        MxuxuxuxuU jjiijjii  
22
;                                       (3.13) 
 
On the other hand, if firms‘ technology level remains the same, the model 
turns into a pure horizon product differentiation model. In this case, as ji uu   
(3.14) holds 
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           jjiijiiijiiijiii xpxpYxuxuxuxuxuxuU  
22
 (3.14) 
 
In addition setting ji uu  enables representation of process innovation. 
In fact, process innovation is pure horizontal product innovation and decreasing 
unit variable cost (in rare cases, it could be increasing (Matsubayashi, 2007)). 
Therefore, the utility function is ideal for considering both process innovation 
and product innovation. 
 
3.5.2 Cost Function 
The firms‘ cost function consists of fixed cost (R&D) and variable costs and is 
assumed to be capable of being written as (3.15) 
 
)()1( 2 jii xxu   ,                                                                       (3.15)  
where ji
uu 




*
; 10                                                                    (3.16) 
 
The first term of (3.15) denotes the real R&D spending on developing 
new technology. Spillover effects containing , iu , ju  and  , are denoted by 
 , to measure the ease of imitation (Motta, 1991). It is assumed that   declines 
as the technology gap with the other product (k – 1) increases and the greater is 
the technology gap between players, the more difficult it is for the follower to 
steal technology from the leader. If 2k  and 10   , it is easy to show that 
the minimum gap in product technologies is 1, which ensures that  1,0 . In 
addition, following Matsubayashi‘s, (2007) assumption, we suppose a linear 
increasing relationship between product quality and R&D, whose unit cost is 
measured by 2 . 
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The second term of the RHS of (3.15) is the transaction cost involved in 
collaboration encompassing the unit transaction cost   and the joint output level
)( ji xx  . As stated in section 2.3.4, some scholars believe that the IPR works 
on collaboration indirectly through transaction cost (Schroder, 2005; Cassiman 
& Veugelers, 2006), thus, instead of incorporating it in R&D cost, we introduce 
this term as an extra cost that firms incur when they collaborate. In particular, as 
incurring transaction cost will help guarantee realisation of the post 
collaboration payoff by diminishing opportunism, it will assist in helping firms 
come to an agreement on the sharing of other (e.g. development) costs under 
collaboration. This may assist in establishing a cost sharing equilibrium. We 
assume that total transaction costs vary with the size of joint output. The greater 
is the volume of joint output level, the more difficult will it be for firms to reduce 
opportunism. This idea is also supported by Dow (1985) who advocates that the 
unit of transaction cost may vary with capital values and Chen etc (2006), who 
suggest that transaction cost efficiency moves with output. 
We define   ,  as dummy variables, with a value of either 1 or 0. In 
particular,  is equal to one when firms collaborate, whilst  is equals to one 
when firms imitate. Thus, depending upon the value of  , , under product 
innovation, if 0  ( no spillover effect exists), 0 (no collaboration), the cost 
function for innovation turns into  
 
2iuC  ;                                                                                            (3.17) 
 
If 1 (spillover index 
ji uu 




*
), 0 (no collaboration), the cost function 
for imitation is 
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C


,                                                                     (3.18) 
 
If 0 , 1 , the total cost function for both collaborative firms becomes to 
)(2 jii
C xxuC                                                                        (3.19) 
 
In a collaboration game both firms, rather than just the winner (as under 
competition), will contribute to R&D costs (or contribute to any bids to acquire 
technology) and bear transaction costs, they thus share the total cost of R&D, 
patent fees, expenditure for reducing opportunism etc.). Although both firms will 
obtain the same technology, this does not mean that they necessarily have to 
share costs equally. How much each pays depends upon the bargain between 
the players (Buckley and Casson, 1996). According to our above assumptions 
on technology cost, one might expect however that the total R&D spending is 
the same under collaboration as under competition. Also, this condition 
guarantees that the technology owner will not obtain extra abnormal profit from 
collaborative behaviour. 
Thus, if the target is a product offering utility iu , we assume that the R&D 
cost of development is given by (3.17), i.e. 2iuC  . If let 
w  and v  
respectively represents the cost paid by firm H and L under collaboration, then 
by introducing a parameter n , we define the cost portions paid by H and L may 
be represented by CCnw )1(  , and 
CnCv  , which indicates that 
CCC CCnnCwv  )1(                                                            (3.20) 
 
In this model, it is theoretically possible to show that n  has a positive 
value. However in some specific circumstance, n may be negative (Rosenkranz, 
1995) if the post-collaboration payoff is so attractive that the leader pays an 
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extra cost to the follower to convince him to agree to collaborate. In that case, 
the follower may free ride on the launching of the new technology, by accepting 
a side payment from his rival. In other words, the leader may pay more for the 
same level of technology achieved under competition. The bargains from 
collaboration would make it worthwhile.  
 
3.5.3 Cournot Equilibrium  
Assume firms i  and j are symmetric and denote *p , 
*x as equilibrium price and 
output respectively. If consumers maximize their utility function, we therefore 
have the inverse demand equation (3.21) 
 
)4(
)()(2
22
*





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jjiiij
i
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uwuwuu
x
                                                       (3.21) 
where 
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
                                                                     (3.22) 
 
For each strategic choice we maximize each player‘s profits subject to 
the product innovation cost function yielding the equilibrium of price, output, and 
revenue as follows: 
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1E  and 2E  are competition and collaboration strategies respectively. 
Note, that even though the format of the price equation looks identical for both 
products, the actual value varies with the technology levels iu  
and 
ju . As 
21   EE  , to guarantee a positive value for price, product outputs and firms‘ 
revenue, we therefore assume the market structure coefficient satisfies  

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u
                                    (3.26) 
 
We substitute the players‘ technology level )1( t , and )( kt  into the 
expression for equilibrium revenue under different situations, then we have 
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where  222 )16)(4(
2
 
F
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28
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Therefore, according to our definitions above of the innovation 
incentives, the firms‘ incentives to adopt new technology under different 
circumstances are as below: 
CRRl  311                                                                          (3.33) 
CRRh  241                                                                         (3.34) 
CnCRRl  362                                                                      (3.35) 
CCnRRh )1(262                                                               (3.36) 
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ICRRl  353                                                                         (3.37) 
ICRRh  253                                                                        (3.38) 
04 h                                                                                         (3.39) 
04 l                                                                                          (3.40) 
It is clear that both 5R  (revenue with imitate) and 6R  (revenue with 
collaboration) indicate revenues when both firms produce products based on 
the same technology level. But the value of 6R  
is bigger than 5R , showing that 
firms‘ revenue must be greater when choosing collaboration instead of imitation. 
That is because transaction cost diminishes market uncertainties. In other 
words, we claim that transaction costs help to increase firms‘ revenue under 
collaboration. This reflects the fact that collaboration could maximize players‘ 
gross payoff. On the other hand, increasing transaction cost will certainly 
partially absorb profits earned from collaboration. Thus, the net payoff to 
collaboration actually reflects the trade-off between the cost minimization and 
rent maximization. 
Another observation is that, from the equilibrium functions of price, output 
and revenue, (3.23)--(3.25), price and revenue are always positively related to 
iu , , and negatively related to ju , , whilst output is only positively related to 
 , and negatively related to 
ju , . Thus, 
Prediction 1: Increases in the rival‘s product technology level and 
market size or decreases in the market structure coefficient, will decrease the 
firm‘s price, output and revenue. 
Prediction 2: Increasing the firm‘s own technology level must increase 
its price level and revenue (which reflects the theory of creative destruction). 
In the following section, we will look into firms‘ various incentives in 
different situations to explore under what circumstance firms prefer 
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collaboration and in particular, what the cost sharing plan will be if players 
choose to collaborate. We first analyse the three-strategy case with 
collaboration, innovation and do nothing, with both persistent dominance market 
and action reaction markets separately explored. In section 3.5.5, further 
investigation adds imitation as an extra restriction. This analysis leads to further 
modelling predictions. 
 
3.5.4 The Three-Strategy Set 
We first investigate the determinants of whether firms collaborate and how the 
costs are shared in a collaboration fort the three-strategy case. We consider the 
persistent dominance and the action reaction markets separately. 
 
Persistent dominance market 
 
  
According to situation I in table 3.3, collaboration will occur in a persistent 
dominance market if: 
1. 11 lh   
2. 12 hh   
3. 42 ll   
 
Of which the first requirement 11 lh  , indicates that the market type is 
persistent dominance. Substituting (3.27) to (3.30), into 1h , 1l , we then get the 
constraint 
11 lh  =(3.30)-(3.28)-(3.27)+(3.29)>0 
 
which is equivalent to  
  
22
2
22
22222
3
)28(
)8(4
)1)()(1()28(2
)1()()1()()1()8(4











ktktt
tkttktkt
  (3.41) 
 
Similarly, for requirement 2 & 3,  12 hh   & 42 ll  , we require that  
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                                                                 (3.42) 
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                                                                      (3.43) 
 
(3.42) and (3.43) jointly suggest that if (3.41) is met then the firms may 
collaborate if n  is in the range of  21,nnn . Obviously to avoid n ‘s upper bound 
1n being smaller than its lower bound 2n ,    must be limited in the range of  





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where )
1
2
1
8
(
2
1





tkt
kM

  and )
1
2
1
8
(
2
1





ktt
kN

 , respectively. 
 
 
Action reaction market 
 
 
In an action reaction market collaboration will occur if: 
 
1. 11 lh   
2. 12 ll   
3. 42 hh   
 
The first requirement 11 lh  , indicates that the market is an action 
reaction type. Substituting (3.27) to (3.30), into the expressions for 1h , 1l , and 
we then get the result that 3   if 11 lh  =(3.30)-(3.28)-(3.27)+(3.29)<0.  
From requirements 2 & 3 ( 12 ll   & 42 hh  ) we have  
)(
16
4
ji xxC
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nn


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;                                                                    (3.45) 
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                                                                (3.46) 
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(3.45) and (3.46) jointly suggest that if 3   then firms may collaborate 
for n ‘s in the range of  43 ,nnn . In particular, to avoid n ‘s upper bound 4n
being smaller than its lower bound 3n ,   must be limited to the range of  


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
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3.5.4.1 When Do Firms Collaborate (Three-Strategy Set) 
 
By considering the three conditions on  , we can now explore the impact of   
on firms‘ responses to see under what circumstance firms will collaborate. Table 
3.6 illustrates the required values of  if firms are to collaborate in both 
persistent dominance and action reaction markets. From the Table 3.6, we see 
that the requirements upon   are quite stringent and only for a limited range of 
values will collaboration occur. 
 
Table 3.6 Required Conditions for Collaboration in Three-Strategy Set 
 
Market condition on   Explanations 
1   
Ensures the equilibrium price, equilibrium output and the 
equilibrium revenue are all positive.  
2   Ensures ],[ 21 nn  is not empty 
3   Ensures it is a persistent dominance market; otherwise, it is 
assumed to be an action reaction market 
4   Ensures ],[ 43 nn  is not empty.  
 
 
According to the table above, in a persistent dominance market the 
upper bound on  if collaboration is to occur is 3 , whilst the lower bound is 
),max( 21  . As the values of 1
 , 2 , 3  vary with the value of other 
parameters, such as t , k ,  ,  , and  , the border of both the upper bound 
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and lower bound change as these parameters change. To better illustrate this, 
we employ MATLAB to illustrate how the possibility of collaboration changes as 
individual parameters change. 
Figure 3.8 illustrates how the possibility of collaboration changes as the 
technology gap, k , changes in a three-strategy persistent dominance market. 
The collaboration conditions 1 , 2 , 3  are represented by blue, green and red 
line respectively. According to table 3.6, the   will satisfy the conditions for 
collaboration if it lies above both the green and blue lines but below the red line. 
As a result, the interior area between the three lines may be regarded as the 
area where collaboration is possible and any market with such a value for   will 
exhibit collaboration. From Figure 3.8, we may also observe that increasing the 
technology gap will decrease the possibility of collaboration eventually to zero. 
That is to say, if firms‘ technology gap is bigger than certain level (in this case, it 
is about 17k ), firms will not collaborate in a persistent dominance market. 
 
Figure 3.8 Impacts of Technology Gap on Collaboration in a Three-Strategy PD Market 
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Figure 3.9 Impacts of Substitution Index on Collaboration in a Three-Strategy PD Market 
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Figure 3.10 Impacts of Initial Technology Level on Collaboration in a Three-Strategy PD 
Market 
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Figure 3.11 Impacts of Discount Rate of Price Sensitiveness on Collaboration in a Three-
Strategy PD Market 
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Figure 3.9 to 3.11 respectively indicate how the possibility of 
collaboration in a three-strategy persistent dominance market varies when the 
substitution index  , the initial technology level t ,and the discount rate of price 
sensitiveness  changes. It is clear that in general, increasing  , t ,and  may 
increase the possibility of collaboration. In particular, growth in t  may cause a 
change from non-collaboration to collaboration. Firms may not start to consider 
collaboration as a better option unless their initial technology level reaches a 
certain level (in this case, it is about 4t ).  
By combining the findings from figure 3.8 to figure 3.11, we thus claim: 
Prediction 3: In a three-strategy persistent dominance market, the 
probability of collaboration generally increases with the product substitution 
index, the initial technology level and the discount rate of price sensitiveness, 
but decreases with the technology gap. 
As addressed in section 2.3.6, there is a debate about whether higher 
transactions costs lead to more or less collaboration. That is because, on one 
hand, incurring transaction costs is an effective way to avoid the risk that a 
partner acts opportunistically, improves the transaction process and helps firms 
to realise the potential rents of collaboration. But on the other hand, since the 
transaction cost absorbs profit from the collaborative rents, overemphasis on 
the protective mechanism may reduce the net gain (Madhok & Tallman, 1998). 
Thus, players face a trade-off between reducing opportunism and increasing 
returns. Only if the increase in expenditure on transaction cost is less than the 
incremental rents, yielding a higher net payoff in the post collaboration period, is 
it worth while investing in any capability that will reduce opportunism. The 
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dilemma is that as result there are no clear predictions on the relationship 
between the transaction costs incurred and the probability of collaboration. 
However, in the three-strategy persistent dominance market, we found 
that if there is an increase in the value of  , the green line, then 2 would drop 
to a lower level. Since only 2  contains  , this would imply that increasing the 
transaction cost may decrease 2 , but the positions of 1  and 3  are 
unaffected Thus increasing   may increase the probability of collaboration until 
2  drops to a lower position than 1 . We consequently may state: 
Prediction 4: In a three-strategy persistent dominance market, 
increasing transaction costs will stimulate collaboration until the transaction cost 
reaches a certain level. When transaction cost is above that level, the chance of 
collaboration will not be affected by further increases in transaction costs. 
Prediction 4 implies that in a persistent dominance market, when the 
transaction cost level is low, the effect of reducing opportunism from increased 
transaction cost outweighs the extra cost burden. The net result is a positive 
relationship between transaction cost and collaboration opportunity. But as 
transaction costs become large, the incremental rents may not cover extra 
expenditure on transaction costs, In this case, whether firms‘ collaborate may 
be affected by other market characteristics, such as  ,,,, , but not by 
transaction cost. Thus prediction 4 indicates that in a three-strategy market the 
relationship between transaction cost and collaboration is not simple. Whether 
transaction cost influences collaboration depends upon its level and other 
market characteristics. This might explain why there is such a long running 
debate on collaboration and transaction costs in past literatures. 
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In contrast, according to table 3.6, the conditions on   affecting the 
probability of collaboration in an action reaction market are 1  , 3   and 
4  , which are respectively represented by blue, red and green lines in the 
Figures below. In Figures 3.12 to 3.15 we illustrate how the probability of 
collaboration changes in an action reaction market, when technology gap k , 
substitution index  , initial technology level t  and discount rate of price 
sensitiveness  change. On this basis we claim that: 
Prediction 5: In a three-strategy action reaction market, the probability 
of collaboration generally increases with the initial technology level, but 
decreases with the technology gap, the product substitution index and the 
discount rate of price sensitiveness. 
Since increasing the transaction cost will further lower the position of 4 , 
this will loosen the 4 restriction. However, as both red and blue lines are 
already far above the green curve, relaxing the condition on 4  does not bring 
any greater probability of collaboration. Thus, 
Prediction 6: In a three-strategy action reaction market, increasing 
transaction cost neither encourages nor diminishes the probability of 
collaboration. 
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Figure 3.12 Impacts of Technology Gap on Collaboration in a Three-Strategy AR Market  
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Figure 3.13 Impacts of Substitution Index on Collaboration in a Three-Strategy AR Market 
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Figure 3.14 Impacts of Initial Technology Level on Collaboration in a Three-Strategy AR 
Market 
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Figure 3.15 Impacts of Discount Rate of Price Sensitiveness on Collaboration in a Three-
Strategy AR Market 
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3.5.4.2 Sharing Costs under Collaboration (Three-Strategy Set) 
 
Apart from the issue of whether firms will collaborate we are also interested in 
how the (R&D) costs will be shared when they collaborate. For values for   in 
the shaded firms prefer collaboration rather than competition, and there may be 
differing cost sharing rules that are consistent with these values. The firms in 
fact have various possibilities of cost sharing. As long as   stays in the interior 
area, any  21,nnn (in a persistent dominance market) or  43 ,nnn (in an 
action reaction market) could generate the greatest net payoff to both firms from 
collaboration. However, what is the best cost sharing plan of n  in the range of 
 21,nn or  43,nn ? Could transaction costs push both firms to negotiate on a fixed 
cost equilibrium agreed by both players? 
Such questions mainly concern cost or profit sharing or cost or profit 
allocation issues. These are generally solved in cooperative games by using 
one of two solutions, the Shapley value solution and Nash bargaining solution 
(Mcginty, 2007). To use a Shapley solution two conditions must be met. First, 
the value of collaboration must be non-negative; second, the joint collaboration 
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cost must be smaller than choosing non-collaboration, which is called 
superadditivity (Krajewska et al, 2008; Kaitala et al, 1995; Mcginty, 2007).As 
shown in our model, 1   satisfies the first condition. However, since 
collaboration cost contains both positive R&D cost and transaction cost, the 
joint value of the collaboration cost may be non-smaller than choosing non-
collaboration strategies. Thus, we prefer to employ the Nash bargaining solution 
when dealing with the collaboration cost sharing problem, (which also helps the 
joint collaboration organisation to reach Pareto efficiency). 
Suppose the collaboration cost equilibrium can only be reached where 
the players‘ joint net payoff is maximized (Dow, 1985). The net payoffs ( iNP ) for 
both players (which differ from the incentive functions) in both a persistent 
dominance market and an action reaction market, are measured by: 
))()(1(6 jiH xxCnRNP       for H                                   (3.47) 
))((6 jiL xxCnRNP               for L                                    (3.48) 
 
To optimize the value of the joint net payoff, we take first order condition 
for LH NPNP * by substituting the value of post collaboration payoff function 
(3.32). 
 
0))((2))((
)*( 22 

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jiji
LH xxCnxxC
n
NPNP
            (3.49) 
 
The second order condition on the maximisation requires that                        
0))((2 2  ji xxC                             (3.50) 
 
The convex curve for the joint payoff guarantees that its optimal value is 
reached when 5.0n , showing the optimal cost percentage for firm L is to pay 
50% when both firms agree to collaborate. However, since the acceptable 
range of cost coefficient n  for collaboration may exclude 5.0n , firms could 
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also negotiate to collaborate when  21,nnn  or  43 ,nnn . In this case, since 
the second order of joint payoff is strictly negative, the maximum value of 
LH NPNP *  may be calculated upon the critical value of  21,nn  or  43,nn . 
Proposition 1. If a three-strategy market allows persistent dominance 
behaviour under competition, firms will collaborate when the collaboration cost 
for L satisfies: 







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5.0 if ,
5.0
 0.5 if ,
22
11
nn
nn
n
 
 
Proposition 2. If a three-strategy market allows action reaction 
behaviour under competition, firms will collaborate when the collaboration cost 
for L satisfies: 

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Table 3.7 Conditions of Collaboration Cost in a Three-Strategy Market 
 
The table above combines the collaboration conditions on   in Table 3.6 
and proposition 1 & 2, showing precisely in what circumstance firms collaborate 
and the share of the collaboration cost that needs to be paid by the technology 
follower L. The first row of conditions in table 3.7 shows that in a persistent 
Range of   Market Type Range of n  Sub-range of n  n  
)),max(,( 21   11 lh   (PD) No Collaboration   
]),,[max( 321   11 lh   (PD)  21,nn  0.51 n  1nn   
21 5.0 nn   5.0n  
5.02 n  2nn   
)),max(,( 433   11 lh   (AR) 
No Collaboration   
  
)),,[max( 43   11 lh   (AR)  43,nn  0.53 n  
43 5.0 nn   
5.04 n  
3nn   
5.0n  
4nn   
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dominance market, there is no collaboration unless the market allows a positive 
price, output and revenue and existence of a collaboration cost sharing plan 
possibilities. The second row indicates that in a persistent dominance market, 
only a market with   which satisfies 1  , 2  and 3  will allow firms to 
collaborate. In particular, when firms collaborate, the transaction cost would 
push negotiable collaboration cost to an equilibrium which follows the rules in 
proposition 1. When 3   the market type would change from persistent 
dominance market to action reaction. In particular, if   is in a range of 
)),max(,( 433  , then the negotiable collaboration cost set for firms is empty, 
indicating that there exists no proper collaboration cost sharing plan when firms 
collaborate. Another feature we observe is that if   reaches the point of 
),max( 43   or above, both firms will prefer collaboration and the way to share 
collaboration cost will depend upon proposition 2. 
We may now state two further predictions. 
Prediction 7: Increasing the value of   may cause the market structure 
to change from persistent dominance to action-reaction. 
Prediction 8: When   is small, neither firm will wish to collaborate even 
though they have the chance to do so. Firms will collaborate only when   is 
above a certain level. 
On the other hand, it is clear to see that in each market type, the 
collaboration cost equilibrium actually contains three sub-equations. This would 
make our analysis excessively complicated if we discussed the three sub-
equations separately. We therefore use MATLAB to simulate the collaboration 
cost percentage function rather than explore first order differentiation of each 
parameter. In fact, as the first and second order of differentiation for some 
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parameters are not constantly positive or negative, it is almost impossible to 
conclude on each parameter‘s potential impact. Since the MATLAB programme 
allows the value of n  to pick the very sub-equation automatically when n  
matches its corresponding requirements, we are not required to calculate the 
complex implications of changes in the collaboration cost percentage equation. 
Instead, we observe how the collaboration cost equilibrium changes as we shift 
the value of each individual parameter. 3-D figures enable us to discuss the 
impacts of two parameters at one time. As we are interested in four parameters, 
two sets of 3-D figures may be needed. In each set of 3-D figures, two graphics 
captured from different angles are provided. We first look at how the 
collaboration cost percentage changes in a persistent dominance market, then 
move to an action reaction market. 
Figure 3.16 suggests how the collaboration cost percentage changes in a 
three-strategy persistent dominance market, if we change substitution index 
and the technology gap k . The figures only cover cases where the value for 
makes collaboration feasible.  
Figure 3.16 Impacts of Technology Gap and Substitution Index on Collaboration Cost in a 
Three-Strategy PD Market when Collaboration is Feasible 
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In Figure 3.16, we notice that the collaboration cost percentage paid by L 
drops dramatically at some points, indicating the cost percentage in that state is 
zero. This is because the applied   is out of the acceptable range. In other 
words, the figure above only shows the left image from the original collaboration 
cost percentage map integrated with the collaboration condition maps. For 
instance, as shown in figure 3.8 and figure 3.9, with conditions that 1.0 , 
10k , 10t , 1 , 5.0 , 1 , 10 , firms may choose collaboration 
when 8.0 to 1.4. But the value of   given from the market is 15 . That 
means no collaboration activity is preferred, so we consequently cannot 
observe the general trend of collaboration cost if they do choose collaboration 
when the fitted market parameter is feasible. Thus, adding collaboration 
conditions into collaboration cost selection models gives us an illusion that the 
collaboration cost paid by firm L is dramatically low. To avoid this problem, we 
need to take the cap of collaboration conditions off from both collaboration cost 
selection models and collaboration cost figures. Therefore, all the figures 
relating to collaboration cost percentages below are drawn regardless of the 
impact of collaboration conditions and are generated only with the original 
collaboration selection models. 
Figure 3.17 below describes how the collaboration cost percentage 
changes in a three-strategy persistent dominance market, if we change the 
substitution index   and technology gap  , whilst Figure 3.18 below suggests 
how collaboration cost percentage in three-strategy persistent dominance 
market moves if we change initial technology level   and perceived price index  . 
In fact, we have tested a number of collaboration cost percentage functions by 
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substituting different value ranges. Beyond the different values obtained for  , all 
their shapes are the same. 
Figure 3.17 Impacts of Technology Gap and Substitution Index on Collaboration Cost in a 
Three-Strategy PD Market 
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Figure 3.18 Impacts of Initial Technology Level and Discount Rate of Price Sensitiveness 
on Collaboration Cost in a Three-Strategy PD Market 
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From these figures, we find that increasing   decreases the 
collaboration cost percentage n  initially but gradually starts to increase it. At a 
certain point with a high substitution level,   explodes implying a high 
collaboration cost percentage. This result suggests that in general, the greater 
is product substitution, the less is the portion of collaboration costs that firm L 
will pay. But in a market with similar products, increasing product substitution 
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would results in a greater collaboration cost portion paid by L. On the other 
hand, increasing k  normally decreases the collaboration cost percentage n . 
This result indicates in general, that a greater technology gap decreases the 
collaboration cost portion paid by L. 
From Figure 3.18 we find that increasing the initial technology level t  
rapidly decreases the collaboration cost percentage paid by L until it reaches 
50% where it stays no matter how t  or   further change. However, n  would 
decrease gradually if we keep increasing t . On the other hand, increasing the 
discount rate of price sensitiveness,  , would first gradually increase the 
collaboration cost percentage until it reaches 50%. But n  increases quickly with 
  once n  exceeds the 50% platform. This result indicates the fact that in 
general, increases in the initial technology level diminishes the firm L‘s 
collaboration cost percentage, whilst the discount rate of price sensitiveness 
increases it.  
It is clear from Figure 3.17 & 3.18 that the collaboration cost share paid 
by L varies from 0 to any positive value, which means that in a persistent 
dominance market, the low technology firm must pay when it collaborates. In 
particular, we notice the percentage paid by L could even exceed 100% in 
extreme cases when the transaction cost is small enough (for instance when 
1 ). This result indicates that, in some rare circumstances, the high-
technology firm pays nothing but could even receive an extra payoff just for 
agreeing to collaboration from his rival who is keen to launch new technology!2 
                                            
2
 Beyond the variable parameters’ values from different markets, we found that the rare case where the 
low technology firm pays more than 100% only occurs when the product substitution index is extremely 
high or/and the initial technology level is very low. That means that collaboration on a product with a 
high substitution index or/and a low initial technology level might occur in rare cases. An example of 
such a situation may be petroleum exploitation collaboration between foreign enterprises and the China 
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Similar idea has been supported by Rosenkranz (1995) who advocates that the 
player may receive extra side payments from his rival for collaboration. 
Therefore, based on the information obtained from above figures, two 
more predictions are generated for a persistent dominance market. 
Prediction 9: In a three-strategy persistent dominance market, the 
collaboration cost percentage paid by the lower technology firm generally 
increases with the discount rate of price sensitiveness, but decreases with 
increases in the technology gap, the product substitution index and the initial 
technology level. However in a market with highly similar products, the 
collaboration cost percentage paid by the lower technology firm increases with 
the product substitution index. 
Prediction 10: Under a three-strategy persistent dominance market 
structure, if firms collaborate, the firm with the lower technology level must pay. 
As to the percentage he pays, this depends upon the nature and market 
structure of both firms. However, in rare cases, the percentage could exceed 
100%. 
                                                                                                                                
National Offshore Oil Corporation (which by law is the single firm responsible for the overall business of 
exploiting offshore petroleum resources in the People's Republic of China in cooperation with foreign 
enterprises since the 1980s and thus this is a case of a three-strategy market in which the possibility of 
imitation is ruled out). Article 8 of the ‘Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Exploitation of 
Offshore Petroleum Resources in Cooperation with Foreign Enterprises’ (http://english.gov.cn), states 
that: 
‘…the foreign enterprise party to the petroleum contract … shall provide the investment to carry out 
prospecting, be responsible for prospecting operations and bear all prospecting risks; after a commercial 
oil (gas) field is discovered, both the foreign contractor and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
shall provide the investment for its cooperative development….’ 
This regulation clearly shows that the foreign party has to bear all exploitation cost in the collaboration 
before an oil (gas) field is discovered. If we take pre-collaboration cost (hidden cost by Teece, 1986; 
Ergun et al, 2007) into account, such as transaction cost, the foreign party therefore may bear more 
than 100% of exploration costs.  
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In contrast, the cost paid by the lower technology firm in a situation of 
collaboration in an action reaction market is shown by figures 3.19 & 3.20. 
Similar to the analysis in a persistent dominance market, the first two graphics 
represent how collaboration cost changes in a three-strategy action reaction 
market when the substitution index and technology gap change, whilst the other 
two graphics indicate the impacts of initial technology level and perceived price 
index on collaboration cost. 
Figure 3.19 Impacts of Substitution Index and Technology Gap on Collaboration Cost in a 
Three-Strategy AR Market 
 
10 ;15 ;1 ;5.0 ;1 ;10 ];30,2[ ];2,0[   tk  
 
 
 
Figure 3.20 Impacts of Initial Technology Level and Discount Rate of Price Sensitiveness 
on Collaboration Cost in a Three-Strategy AR Market 
 
10 ;15 ;1 ;5.0 ];2,1.0[ ];20,0[ ;10 ;1.0   tk  
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As clearly shown in Figure 3.19, increases in   result in the gradual 
decrease of n  until n  reaches 50%, whilst increases in k  lead to the growth of 
n  starting from 5.0n . We therefore claim that in a three-strategy action 
reaction market, the collaboration cost percentage paid by firm L increases with 
the technology gap, but decreases with the substitution index. 
From Figure 3.20, we find that an increase in t  consistently increases n , 
whilst an increase in the discount rate of price sensitiveness  , slightly reduces 
the level of n . In particular, the lowest percentage firm L pays in an action 
reaction market is 50%. This finding shows that the collaboration cost proportion 
paid by firm L in an action reaction market increases with the initial technology 
level but decreases with the perceived price index.  
In addition, even although n  may decrease rapidly at a lower level of t , 
its value still keeps above 0.5, indicating that in an action reaction market, when 
firms collaborate, the lower technology firm always pays the bigger proportion of 
the cost. That may be explained by the argument that since firm L definitely 
wins the competition in an action reaction market, even a small contribution to 
costs by his rival is welcome. Again, based on the information obtained from the 
above figures, two further predictions in an action reaction market are therefore 
generated. 
Prediction 11: In a three-strategy action reaction market, the 
collaboration cost percentage paid by the lower technology firm generally 
increases with the technology gap and the initial technology level, but slightly 
decreases with increases in the product substitution index and the discount rate 
of price sensitiveness.  
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Prediction 12: In a three-strategy action reaction market, if firms 
collaborate, the firm with the lower technology level must pay more than 50% of 
the R&D cost. 
 
3.5.5 The Four-Strategy Set 
We now allow that an extra endogenous imitation strategy is available to firms 
and here reconsider the whole game framework by investigating the impact 
upon the probability of collaboration and the allocation of R&D costs and 
transaction cost in the new equilibrium.  
 
Persistent dominance market 
  
According to situation I in Table 3.5, the conditions that must be met for 
collaboration to occur in a persistent dominance market in the four-strategy 
case are: 
1. 11 lh   
2. 12 hh   
3. 42 ll   
4. 32 ll   
 
Comparing with the three-strategy case, it is clear that an extra 
requirement (4) is added which requires that firms must obtain a higher return 
through collaboration than imitation. By substituting from equations (3.31) and 
(3.32), the new collaboration cost restriction that meets the condition that 32 ll   
is 
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5n , therefore, is the new upper bound on the collaboration cost paid by L 
in a persistent dominance market. It must be also bigger than the lower bond 1n
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, if the collaboration cost sharing set is not to be empty. Satisfying  ][],[ 5,121 nnnnn  
generates an additional restriction on   if collaboration is to occur when 
imitation is feasible, this being, 
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Function sets (3.52) implies the newly added restriction from imitation, 
, is smaller than 5  if 5  is bigger than zero or is larger than 5  if 5  is smaller 
than zero. Similarly, in action reaction market, we may have 
 
 
Action reaction market 
 
In an action reaction market with imitation, if collaboration is to occur we 
similarly require that: 
1. 11 lh   
2. 12 ll   
3. 42 hh   
4. 32 hh   
 
The additional restriction (4) indicates that with imitation as a possible 
strategy, collaboration will only acquire if the incentive for firm H to collaborate 
is no smaller than the incentive to imitate, i.e. 32 hh  . This means, 
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For the range of possible collaboration cost shares to not be empty 
requires that   ][],[ 4,643 nnnnn  which adds another restriction on   that must 
be met if collaboration is to occur i.e. 
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3.5.5.1 When Do Firms Collaborate (Four-Strategy Set) 
 
The four conditions that   must satisfy if collaboration is to occur are 
summarized in Table 3.8. 
Table 3.8 Required Conditions for Collaboration in a Four-Strategy Set 
Market condition on   Explanations 
1   
Ensure the equilibrium price, equilibrium output and the 
equilibrium revenue are all positive.  
2   Ensure ],[ 21 nn  is not empty 
3   Ensure it is persistent dominance market; otherwise, it is 
assume to be action reaction market 
4   Ensure ],[ 43 nn  is not empty.  
0 if  
0 if  
55
55




 
Ensure ],[ 51 nn  is not empty 
 6   Ensure ],[ 46 nn  is not empty 
 
Looking first at the probability of collaboration in a persistent dominance 
market, the upper bound of   is ),min( 53  , whilst the lower bound is 
),max( 21  . As the value of 1 , 2 , 3 and 5  varies with the value of other 
parameters, such as t , k ,  ,  , and  , the values of both the upper bound 
and lower bound will change as the three parameters change.  
In order to illustrate the impact of the imitation condition we have 
modified our previous MATLAB exercises to include curves representing 5 . 
We draw two curves for 5 , representing limiting values for the spillover index 
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 of 01.0  represented by black dash curve and 99.0  marked by black 
curve. 
In particular, as the range of 5  varies with the value of transaction cost 
  we may explore the impacts of all parameters upon the level of transaction 
cost. To be explicit, we discuss each situation when the transaction cost is low (
1 ) and when the transaction cost is large ( 20 ), respectively. Thus, 
different from figures in the three-strategy section above, all the following 
figures are illustrated with two transaction cost groups. In each group, two 
spillover index curves are represented and two extents of imitation sizes as 
well. 
Figure 3.21 shows how the possibility of collaboration changes as the 
product substitution index   increases when imitation is allowed. As should be 
clear, when the transaction cost level is low, the curve 5  representing the 
restriction on the probability of collaboration decreasing from the possibility of 
imitation, cuts the area located between the red curve and green curve into two 
halves. According to Table 3.8, only if   is smaller than 5  (when 05  ) is 
there any probability of collaboration. Thus, only in markets with   located in 
the area defined by the black, red and green curves are collaboration probable.  
However, in a market with large transaction cost, we found the value of 
5  lies far below the blue curve 1 . This indicates that introducing the extra 
strategy, imitation, does not actually influence the chance of collaboration. 
Indeed, deceasing the spillover effect tends to raise the black curve along with 
growth of imitation, but it is still far away from affecting the firms‘ collaboration 
decision.  
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Figure 3.21 Impacts of Substitution Index on Collaboration in a Four-Strategy PD Market 
 
1 ;5.0 ;1 ;10 ;10 ];2,0[   tk  
 
Similarly, Figures 3.22 to 3.24 indicate how the probability of 
collaboration in a four-strategy persistent dominance market changes when the 
technology gap  , the initial technology level t ,and the discount rate of price 
sensitiveness  change. We observe that adding imitation 5  into a four-
strategy set does not further change the positions of 1 (blue curve) 2 (green 
curve) and 3 (red curve) from that found under a three-strategy set. Therefore, 
the predictions concerning the relationship between transaction cost and 
collaboration remain identical to what we predicted in the three-strategy set 
case. Prediction 4 may consequently be modified as follows: 
 
 
Figure 3.22 Impacts of Technology Gap on Collaboration in a Four-Strategy PD Market 
 
 
1 ;5.0 ;1 ;10 ];30,2[ ;1   tk  
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Figure 3.23 Impacts of Initial Technology Level on Collaboration in a Four-Strategy PD 
Market 
 
1 ;5.0 ;1 ];30,0[ ;10 ;1   tk  
 
 
Figure 3.24 Impacts of Discount Rate of Price Sensitiveness on Collaboration in a Four-
Strategy PD Market 
 
1 ;5.0 ];2,1.0[ ;10 ;10 ;1.0   tk  
 
Prediction 4: Regardless of whether there are three or four strategies, in 
a persistent dominance market, increasing transaction costs will stimulate 
collaboration until the transaction cost reaches a certain level. When transaction 
cost is over that level, the chance of collaboration will not be affected by further 
increases in transaction costs. 
We are particularly interested in whether collaboration is more likely after 
imitation is added into the strategy set. Since the curve 5  is far above the 
other three curves in these three figures (Figure 3.22—3.24) when transaction 
cost is low, whilst 5  is far below 321 ,,  , it seems that if there is a positive 
probability of collaboration in three-strategy case, adding the extra option, of 
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imitation will make little difference. However we do note that increases in t  from 
a low level when transaction cost is low, may lead (Figure 3.23) the outcome to 
change from non-collaboration to collaboration. This means that firms in a 
market with low transaction cost level, may not consider collaboration because 
imitation provides them a greater net payoff, unless their initial technology level 
reaches a certain level (in this case, it is about 1t ).  
By combining the findings from figure 3.21 to 3.24, we claim: 
Prediction 13: In a four-strategy persistent dominance market, where 
the transaction cost is low, adding the option of imitation would decrease the 
probability of collaboration when the product substitution index is high or the 
initial technology level is low, where firms in both situations may prefer to imitate 
rather than collaborate. 
Moreover, we notice that increasing the spillover index from the position 
reflected by the black dash curve to the black curve, will result in a decrease of 
5 in all the situations when transaction cost is low. Reducing 5  intensifies the 
effects set down in Prediction 13. Thus, we claim, 
Prediction 14: In a four-strategy persistent dominance market, where 
transaction cost is low, increasing the size of imitation will further decrease the 
collaboration opportunity when the product substitution index is high or the initial 
technology level is low. 
On the other hand, all figures from 3.21 to 3.24 also show that when 
transaction cost is large, even though increasing the spillover index will lead to 
a greater 5 , the chance of collaboration remains the same as with the three-
strategy set. Thus, we have, 
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Prediction 15: In a four-strategy persistent dominance market, where 
transaction cost is high, increasing the size of imitation will neither stimulate nor 
decrease the collaboration opportunity. 
To explain why collaboration opportunity is not influenced by allowing for 
imitation we need to look into why firms choose collaboration instead of other 
strategies. In fact, the only reason that firms collaborate in our model is that the 
net payoff from collaboration is greater than from other strategies. In a four-
strategy market, introducing imitation will allow the possibility to launch new 
technology with lower costs. For those firms in a market with low transaction 
cost, their decisions are more elastic and vulnerable to cost change. Thus, 
increasing imitation in that situation may significantly decrease collaboration 
opportunities so that firms may change their minds and choose imitation rather 
than collaboration. On the other hand, if firms decide to collaborate with high 
transaction costs the net payoff from collaboration must far outweigh the gains 
from other strategies. The attraction of imitation therefore may not seem to be 
as desirable as it is in a market with low transaction cost.  
In contrast, according to Table 3.8, the collaboration restrictions on   in 
an action reaction market are 1  , 3  , 4  ,and 6   which are 
respectively represented by blue, red, and green lines and black curves in the 
following figures. Figures 3.25 to 3.28 illustrate how the probability of 
collaboration varies in a four-strategy action reaction market, when technology 
gap k , substitution index  , initial technology level t  and discount rate of price 
sensitiveness   change. Similar to prediction 4, taking imitation into account 
does not differ the relationship between collaboration and transaction cost in 
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four-strategy action reaction market. Thus, we may rewrite prediction 6 to better 
fit action reaction market in both strategy-sets. 
Prediction 6: Regardless of whether there are three or four strategies, in 
an action reaction market, increasing transaction cost neither encourages nor 
diminishes the probability of collaboration. 
Besides, the figures in four-strategy action reaction market also show 
that the extra restriction that 6  ,
introduced by allowing imitation, is generally 
not binding and thus allowing imitation in an action reaction market does not 
influence firms‘ decisions on collaboration. Therefore, 
Prediction 16: In a four-strategy action reaction market, the probability 
of collaboration by firms does not differ from when imitation is feasible. 
 
Figure 3.25 Impacts of Technology Gap on Collaboration in a Four-Strategy AR Market  
 
1 ;5.0 ;1 ;10 ];30,2[ ;1.0   tk  
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Figure 3.26 Impacts of Substitution Index on Collaboration in a Four-Strategy AR Market 
 
1 ;5.0 ;1 ;10 ;10 ];2,0[   tk  
 
 
Figure 3.27 Impacts of Initial Technology Level on Collaboration in a Four-Strategy AR 
Market 
 
1 ;5.0 ;1 ];20,0[ ;10 ;1.0   tk  
 
 
Figure 3.28 Impacts of Discount Rate of Price Sensitiveness on Collaboration in a Four-
Strategy AR Market 
 
1 ;5.0 ];2,0[ ;10 ;10 ;1.0   tk  
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3.5.5.2 Sharing Costs under Collaboration (Four-Strategy Set) 
 
Since the equation of *HNP  and 
*
LNP  remains the same in the four-strategy case 
as in the three-strategy case, the convex curve for the joint payoff ** * LH NPNP , 
still indicates that the ideal cost sharing under collaboration is fifty/fifty. 
However, if the boundaries of the collaboration cost possibilities exclude the 
point 5.0n , the cost equilibrium when firms collaborate would depend upon 
the critical values of cost negotiation boundaries. As stated in 3.52 and 3.54, 
allowing imitation will add a new collaboration restriction for each market type. 
Thus, to generate the new collaboration cost equilibrium, we must combine all 
four collaboration restrictions and consider how to properly integrate two cost 
negotiation sets. 
Proposition 3. If a market generates persistent dominance behaviour 
under (technological) competition, firms collaborate when collaboration cost for 
firm L satisfies: 

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Proposition 4. If a market generates action reaction behaviour under 
(technological) competition, firms collaborate when collaboration cost for firm L  
satisfies: 
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Since the collaboration rents are higher than the imitation payoff, 6R must 
be bigger than 5R . In addition the spillover index lies between 0 and 1. Thus we 
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may prove that 15 n , indicating that in a four-strategy persistent dominance 
market, the maximized collaboration cost percentage paid by L, n , must not be 
greater than 100%. 
Prediction 17: In a four-strategy persistent dominance market, (different 
from the three-strategy case), the collaboration cost portion paid by the lower 
technology firm will never exceed 100%. 
Combines the conditions on   determining the probability of 
collaboration in Table 3.8 and propositions 3 & 4, Table 3.9 below shows under 
what circumstances firms will collaborate and the cost share needed to be paid 
by the technology follower L in a four-strategy set. Comparing with the similar 
table in the three-strategy case, Table 3.9 clarifies the impact of the possibility 
of imitation on when firms will collaborate and how costs will be shared in 
equilibrium.  
Table 3.9 Conditions of Collaboration Cost in a Four-Strategy Market 
 
We note that the extra restriction that the imitation possibility introduces may 
reduce the frequency of collaboration relative to the three-strategy case. 
Collaboration may not occur because (i) under collaboration, the market may no 
longer offer positive prices, output and revenue, nor allow a reasonable range 
Range of   Market Type Range of n  Sub-range of n  n  
)),max(,( 21   11 lh   (KD) No Collaboration   
)],min(),,[max( 5321 
 
11 lh   (KD)  ),(),( 5121 nnnn
 
0.51 n  1nn 
 
21 5.0 nn   5.0n  
5.0),min( 52 nn  ),min( 52 nnn   
]),,(min( 353   11 lh  (KD) 
No Collaboration   
)),,max(,( 6433 
 
11 lh   (AR) 
No Collaboration   
  
)),,,[max( 643 
 
11 lh   (AR)  ),(),( 4643 nnnn
 
5.0),max( 63 nn
43 5.0 nn   
5.04 n  
),max( 63 nnn   
5.0n  
4nn   
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for cost sharing (ii)  imitation may offer a higher net payoff rather than 
collaboration and (iii) room for the negotiation of collaboration cost has been 
reduced to zero. 
As in section 3.5.4.2, we use MATLAB to merge the two ranges of n  for 
each market type to simulate the collaboration cost percentage functions. By 
adding an additional loop syntax before the cost selection programme, the 
software allows the model to pick out fitted critical value of n  to form a new 
upper or lower bound, which is then used in the cost selection models in the 
second part of the programme. As in section 3.5.4.2, the 3-D figures below 
demonstrate how the collaboration cost portion changes as other factors, such 
as the product substitution index, the technology gap, the initial technology level 
and the discount rate of price sensitiveness change. In addition, to reveal the 
impact of imitation, we show results for a spillover index of 0.01 and 0.99. 
Figure 3.29, for instance, reveals that in general, regardless of the 
strength, imitation as an extra strategy option may not much change the 
collaboration cost figure. But as the spillover index increases, the collaboration 
cost may reduce significantly given a low value of the technology gap.  
 
Figure 3.29 Impacts of Technology Gap and Substitution Index on Collaboration Cost in a 
Four-Strategy PD Market 
 
10 ;15 ;1 ;5.0 ;1 ;10 ];30,2[ ];2,0[   tk  
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Similar deductions may be generated from the comparison of figures 
when other factors change for both persistent dominance and action reaction 
markets. Figure 3.30 to 3.32 illustrate that regardless of the market types and 
the transaction cost level, the collaboration cost proportion remains as in the 
three-strategy case no matter what the strength of imitation. We thus state: 
Prediction 18: There are generally no significant differences between 
the collaboration cost equilibrium in the four-strategy case and the three-
strategy case. However imitation may induce a lower collaboration cost share 
for firm L if there is a small technology gap. 
Figure 3.30 Impacts of Initial Technology Level and Discount Rate of Price Sensitiveness 
on Collaboration Cost in a Four-Strategy PD Market 
 
10 ;15 ;1 ;5.0 ];2,1.0[ ];20,0[ ;10 ;1.0   tk  
 
Figure 3.31 Impacts of Technology Gap and Substitution Index on Collaboration Cost in a 
Four-Strategy AR Market 
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Figure 3.32 Impacts of Initial Technology Level and Discount Rate of Price Sensitiveness 
on Collaboration Cost in a Four-Strategy AR Market 
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3.6 Conclusion 
3.6.1 Contributions and Findings 
The analysis in this chapter, inspired by Vickers (1986), is based on a two stage 
game with two players and the sequential arrival of new product technology. 
Compared with the original work by Vickers, three main changes have been 
made. One is that collaboration is considered (as well as imitation) within the 
firm strategy set, another is that the model concerns product innovation rather 
than process innovation and thirdly transaction costs linked to collaboration are 
included as well as R&D costs. 
Each firm is allowed to produce one product variant in each time period 
and tries to optimise its net payoff when it encounters new technology. The 
strategy that suits each firm mainly depends upon the strategy incentives, which 
according to the theory of creative destruction, are defined by the different 
payoffs from pursuing a strategy and not pursuing that strategy. By assuming a 
strategy decision path, we compare the strategy incentives under different 
situations to generate a decision map for the lower technology firm. We are 
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particular interested in the conditions and determinants of collaboration 
incentives, collaboration and cost sharing under collaboration. 
We propose an example by employing a utility function similar to that 
introduced by Shaked and Sutton (1990) and Matsubayashi (2007) to find the 
equilibrium outputs, prices and revenues. This improved utility function contains 
a product substitution index and reflects the degree of market symmetry, 
allowing product differentiation even when firms use the same production 
process, thereby indicating that firms have to consider both consumer 
preferences and production costs when they decide whether to collaborate. In 
particular, we first calculate the firm‘s rival‘s optimal output level and then use 
backward induction to generate the best response function for each player 
when the market reaches equilibrium. By assuming a cost function associated 
with the technology level of products, a spillover index and transaction costs, it 
is possible to detail strategy incentives by substituting the post-strategy payoff 
and corresponding costs. The way the cost function is defined suggests that 
when firms collaborate, they need to maximize their post collaboration payoff as 
well as to minimize their collaboration cost proportion. 
An important characteristic of our approach is that we employ MATLAB 
to programme both the collaboration opportunity restrictions and the modelling 
of collaboration cost percentages.  
Our model predicts under what condition firms will collaborate and under 
what conditions they will not. It also predicts what the collaboration cost 
percentages will be if firms collaborate. All our predictions are summarised in 
Table 3.10. The predictions are classified into three groups. One group focuses 
on the probability of collaboration, one is concerned with collaboration cost, and 
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the third group is about other issues. Note, in particular, that the predictions in 
the first two groups may differ according to market type (i.e. persistent 
dominance vs. action reaction) and strategy set (i.e. three-strategy set vs. four-
strategy set). 
Table 3.10 Generated Predictions 
Predictions Keynotes of each Prediction 
Predictions about the Probability of Collaboration 
3 In a three-strategy persistent dominance market, the probability of collaboration generally 
increases with the product substitution index, the initial technology level and the discount 
rate of price sensitiveness, but decreases with the technology gap. 
5 In a three-strategy action reaction market, the probability of collaboration generally 
increases with the initial technology level, but decreases with the technology gap, the 
product substitution index and the discount rate of price sensitiveness. 
13 In a four-strategy persistent dominance market, where the transaction cost is low, adding 
the option of imitation would decrease the probability of collaboration when the product 
substitution index is high or the initial technology level is low, where firms in both situations 
may prefer to imitate rather than collaborate. 
14 In a four-strategy persistent dominance market, where transaction cost is low, increasing 
the size of imitation will further decrease the collaboration opportunity when the product 
substitution index is high or the initial technology level is low. 
15 In a four-strategy persistent dominance market, where transaction cost is high, increasing 
the size of imitation will neither stimulate nor decrease the collaboration opportunity. 
16 In a four-strategy action reaction market, the probability of collaboration by firms does not 
differ from when imitation is feasible. 
4 Regardless of whether there are three or four strategies, in a persistent dominance market, 
increasing transaction costs will stimulate collaboration until the transaction cost reaches a 
certain level. When transaction cost is over that level, the chance of collaboration will not be 
affected by further increases in transaction costs. 
6 Regardless of whether there are three or four strategies, in an action reaction market, 
increasing transaction cost neither encourages nor diminishes the probability of 
collaboration. 
Predictions about Collaboration Cost 
9 In a three-strategy persistent dominance market, the collaboration cost percentage paid by 
the lower technology firm generally increases with the discount rate of price sensitiveness, 
but decreases with increases in the technology gap, the product substitution index and the 
initial technology level. However in a market with highly similar products, the collaboration 
cost percentage paid by the lower technology firm increases with the product substitution 
index. 
10 Under a three-strategy persistent dominance market structure, if firms collaborate, the firm 
with the lower technology level must pay. As to the percentage he pays, this depends upon 
the nature and market structure of both firms. However, in rare cases, the percentage could 
exceed 100%. 
11 In a three-strategy action reaction market, the collaboration cost percentage paid by the 
lower technology firm generally increases with the technology gap and the initial technology 
level, but slightly decreases with increases in the product substitution index and the 
discount rate of price sensitiveness. 
12 In a three-strategy action reaction market, if firms collaborate, the firm with the lower 
technology level must pay more than 50% of the R&D cost. 
17 In a four-strategy persistent dominance market, (different from the three-strategy case), the 
collaboration cost portion paid by the lower technology firm will never exceed 100%. 
18 There are generally no significant differences between the collaboration cost equilibrium in 
the four-strategy case and the three-strategy case. However imitation may induce a lower 
collaboration cost share for firm L if there is a small technology gap. 
                                         Predictions about Other Issues 
1 Increases in the rival‘s product technology level and market size or decreases in the market 
structure coefficient, will decrease the firm‘s price, output and revenue. 
2 Increasing the firm‘s own technology level must increase its price level and revenue (which 
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reflects the theory of creative destruction). 
7 Increasing the value of   may cause the market structure to change from persistent 
dominance to action-reaction. 
8 When   is small, neither firm will wish to collaborate even though they have the chance to 
do so. Firms will collaborate only when is above a certain level. 
 
The majority of these predictions are new to the literatures. To some 
degree at least this is because, unlike most other studies, these predictions 
represent a systematic strategic mapping relating to the determinants of 
collaboration and collaboration cost on product innovation rather than process 
innovation. One may note that the results also, innovatively, focus on the cost 
percentage paid by the low technology firm when collaboration occurs. To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first model that has provided a game theoretic 
exploration of the decisions of firms on low technology firm‘s cost sharing 
strategy when it collaborates.  
Although the initial assumptions were inspired by Vickers (1986), we 
focus more on product innovation and more importantly, emphasise the impact 
of the possibility of collaboration on the equilibrium outcomes. In Vickers model, 
he concluded that Bertrand competition generates a persistent dominance 
market, whilst Cournot competition leads to an action reaction market. In other 
words, competition today discourages competition in the future. Vickers 
therefore explores how the way that firms choose strategies can result in 
different market types. In our model, however, we would rather look into how 
firms choose strategies upon markets with different characteristics. From figure 
3.4 and figure 3.7, it is clear that the advantages of our model is that we actually 
able to stand back from the market type and show how strategic decisions 
might alter as market type changes. Indeed, although we still analyse firms‘ 
optimal strategy incentives under different market types, we allow that the 
strategy is endogenous. 
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Moreover, different from Vickers (1986), we also allow the possibility of 
imitation so that firms have a set of four possible strategies. When a firm‘s 
exclusive IPR can be expropriated or the number of its rivals grows significantly, 
the firm may consider imitation as an optional strategy thus turning a three-
strategy market into a four-strategy market (which is stated as prediction 13). 
Vickers‘ model does not consider such issues. By re-designing the MATLAB 
animation programmes, we clearly show how the extent of potential imitation 
impact upon the chance of collaboration and the sharing of collaboration costs 
(predictions 14--16). We also showed how the size of spillovers impacted on 
these variables. 
The predictions we have generated concerning different market types 
and market characteristics, are not simply grouped by revealing univariate 
impacts on the chance of collaboration and collaboration cost sharing. This, to 
some extent, helps us to address some of the more controversial arguments in 
the literature on the relationship between collaboration (or collaboration cost) to 
their determinants. For instance, some people (Oye, 1986; Coleman, 1990) 
argue that the extent of collaboration must decrease as the number of 
competitors grows, whilst Cassiman e al (2009) suggests the relationship 
between collaboration and competition may not be negative but instead the two 
go hand in hand. Our prediction 13-16 explains this debate by illustrating how 
differing different market types and transaction cost levels matter.  
Another example is how collaboration opportunity changes as transaction 
cost changes (see predictions 4 & 6). These two predictions discuss the 
particular trade-off between collaboration and transaction cost. As addressed by 
Williamson (1985) and Hill (1990), transaction cost is spending incurred actually 
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to avoid opportunism being embedded in the process of collaboration. Thus 
increasing transaction cost must partly decrease opportunism. But on the other 
hand, increasing transaction cost also absorbs profit from firms‘ post-
collaboration payoffs. The relationship between the extent of collaboration and 
increasing transaction cost therefore depends upon the joint effect by balancing 
opportunism reduction and cost saving. Some skeptics (Schroder, 2005) argue 
that the change in transaction cost is often associated with a change in IPR. 
Tighter IPR ensures a lower transaction cost, which results in a higher chance 
of collaboration. They thus suggest a negative relationship between the extent 
of collaboration and transaction costs. In our model, however, we explain this in 
the following way via the impact of imitation. When the spillover effect in a 
persistent dominance market diminishes with tightened IPR, the black curve 5  
must move to a lower level, which consequently means that collaboration 
opportunity decreases. This idea has been incorporated in prediction 14. It 
should however be noted that rather than changing transaction cost through the 
spillover index, ‗changing transaction cost‘ in our model only means the effect of 
changing   but with other market characteristics remaining constant. Therefore, 
prediction 4 & 6 do not contradict to the traditional Schroder‘s view but rather 
offer an alternative angle to observe the relationship between collaboration and 
transaction cost.  
 
3.6.2 Limitations 
Compared with most of literature concerned with two player games modelling 
competitive innovation auctions, the depth of the theoretical models which we 
have employed more generally explore firms‘ optimal strategy. We model both 
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the collaboration incentive and collaboration. However, as with all modelling 
there are limitations. 
1. There may be other strategy options than those which we 
consider. For example we allow four options which firms may choose when 
they encounter a superior technology in market. There may be other option 
such as licensing or outsourcing, which could be considered. 
2. Our model excludes uncertainty. The game we analyses is a 
deterministic bidding game and the patent race, therefore involves no risk. 
However, in reality, innovation, imitation, or collaboration must all involve 
uncertainty. Firms try to innovate (or imitate, or collaborate), but have no 
guarantee of success of innovation, even if the input of R&D is extremely 
high. Introducing uncertainty would have complicated our modelling too 
much. 
3. In our model, the number of players who collaborate we assume is 
restricted to two. But in reality the game could be a multi-player game. Firms 
may even form subgroups to collaborate against or with their common rivals.  
4. Collaboration partner in our framework are assumed to be private 
firms. In reality, firms may not be privately owned and may also collaborate 
with other institutions, such as universities, self-funded institutions, or state 
owned enterprises. The issue of collaboration with these is not considered in 
this chapter.  
This last point may be of special relevance to a study of collaboration in 
China where, in fact, the government may have ownership of most medium and 
big enterprises. But, in general we know little about the innovation patterns and 
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the collaboration patterns in China, and there is very limited literature to which 
one may turn. 
It is our intention in the Chapters that follow to explore new data upon the 
extent and the patterns of technological collaboration in China. In addition to 
illustrating ―what‖ we also wish to explore ―why‖. Although the theory above will 
be useful in the latter exercise, the limitations of the theory mean that there is 
no simple read over from the theory to the empirics. It is our intent to use the 
predictions above to guide our empirical work below rather than using the 
empirical data below to test the theory above. 
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4 Datasets and Indicators 
4.1 Introduction 
This Chapter is primarily concerned with initial analysis of a previously unused 
short panel of firm level survey data in order to reveal the patterns of innovative 
and collaborative activity in Chinese manufacturing industry. The chapter first 
details data sources and the construction of statistical indicators prior to 
presenting the revealed patterns.  
The chapter is the first of two parts that provides some empirical insight 
into the issue of collaboration in innovation. The previous chapter has explored 
theoretical issues whereas these two chapters concentrate mainly upon 
empirical analysis. In an ideal world it would be the case that the empirical 
analysis would lead on in a seamless form from the theoretical analysis with the 
latter providing clear guidance as to the definitions of variables, functional forms 
and other such matters and the former would be capable of providing 
measurement of variables and parameters just as necessitated by the theory.  
In this case however moving from theory to empirics is not simple, 
particularly when issues concern, for example, the nature of the Chinese 
economy. It is not a simple market economy where firms are owned by private 
individuals or shareholders and firms may act as indicated by private incentives. 
The state has had and still has a much larger role to play than that. Specifically, 
in contrast to the assumption in the game theory chapter which only allows firms 
to collaborate with other firms, in China we find that firms collaborate 
extensively with local and national non-commercial institutions and also with 
overseas institutions. Similarly in the theory chapter we tended to concentrate 
 159 
upon product innovation rather than process innovation. This is a distinction that 
is difficult to maintain given the data source. 
For these and other similar reasons, in this and the next chapter, rather 
than trying to impose the theoretical framework employed above upon a world 
that is different in many respects from what has been assumed in that 
framework and thus attempting to validate or invalidate specific predictions from 
the game theory chapter, we intend instead to utilise game theoretical 
predictions only as a guide to the exploration of the empirical data. The 
guidance indicates the concepts at which we wish to look and provides some 
suggestions as to how variables may be measured, but it is only guidance that 
is provided and not precision. 
In section 4.2, we first discuss the nature of our firm-level datasets, 
including the benefits of using data from the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China (NBS), data collection and sample characteristics. To the best of our 
knowledge this is the first occasion on which data from the ‗China Innovation 
Survey‘ and the ‗Annual Corporate Financial Survey‘ has been used for such 
purposes and as such suggests that there is a definite contribution to 
knowledge being made.  
Section 4.3 addresses the measurement of variables and indicators to be 
used in the empirical analysis in this and the next chapter. It is here that we 
make the link between the theory above and the realities of the data. Our 
discussion leads us to define three ―dependent‖ variables and five main 
explanatory variables, ‗R&D‘ (R&D), ‗patent‘ (PAT), ‗education‘ (EDUC), 
‗technology level‘ (TL), and ‗technology gap‘ (TG) as well as other relevant 
control variables, such as ‗spillover effect‘ (SE), ‗perceived price‘ (PP), ‗district‘ 
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(DIS), ‗registration‘ (REG) and transaction cost which is respectively 
represented by ‗market concentration‘ (MCON), ‗operational personnel ratio‘ 
(OPR) and ‗complementary assets‘ (CAST). Section 4.4 provides an overview of 
the data as well as breakdowns by time and industry, and correlations among 
the variables. The final section summarises the findings and provides markers 
re the content of the next Chapter. 
 
4.2 Nature of the Datasets 
The data employed in our empirical work is derived from the China Innovation 
Survey and the Annual Corporate Financial Survey undertaken by the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), which is the only official authority offering 
data gathered by the Chinese government.  
The advantages of using NBS data are that: (i) Cooperating with NBS is 
efficient in terms of time demands and expense. A separate data gathering 
exercise would be out of the question. (ii) Although currently, in China, a small 
number of institutions, funded by various universities (such as Peking 
University, Tsing Hua University, and Nan Kai University), gather firm level 
information across industries, the NBS data encompasses more firms and more 
indicators than other sources. In fact for some firms with specific ownership 
patterns, such as state enterprises with a military background, it is difficult to 
obtain data and the only agreed authority to collect data from all firms in China 
is NBS. (iii) NBS applies a universal standard of statistical definition and 
measurement of classification for each term and each firm which may differ 
from that in other surveys. For example, the term ‗firm‘ in the China Innovation 
Survey and Annual Corporate Financial Survey, was defined as organisations 
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with annual revenue at or over fifty million yuan (about 5 million pounds) – so 
called Large and Medium sized Enterprises 3  - but in other databases the 
definition of a firm may differ across source and time. The common NBS 
definitions are reinforced in that, for each firm, selected staff are obliged to 
attend a regular training (workshop) offered by NBS in order to fully understand 
statistical definitions and the way of filling in survey forms. This significantly 
reduces the possibilities of errors in the data gathering process. Using surveys 
organised by central government thus provides the best chance of obtaining 
valid and truthful data.  
The pyramid like structure of NBS contains a large number of 
downstream local statistics departments, which are in charge of local data 
gathering and usage. I cooperated with the Nan Chang Statistics Department. 
As such local departments are only able to provide data on local firms this 
means that our empirical analysis encompasses only firms located in Nan 
Chang city. We chose Nan Chang for two reasons. First they were willing to 
collaborate with our study. Second, Nan Chang is the capital of Jiang Xi 
province, located in central China, and well represents the middle income level 
in China. It is one of the faster growing cities in China, at a rate in excess of 
15% in five continuous years from 20034, which is significantly higher than the 
national average growth rate. Industry structure in 2005 (2007) was 7.2% 
(5.8%) primary industry (Agriculture), 52.8% (55.1%) secondary industry 
(Industry), and 40% (39.1%) tertiary industry (Service and Others), indicating 
                                            
3
 Indicating, of course, that all conclusions obtained from our analysis should be read as only relating to 
Large and Medium sized Enterprises 
4 To be more precise, the five year GDP growth rates excess from 2003 are, 15.5%, 16.5%, 16.8%, 17.5, 
and 17.4%, respectively. 
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significant growth in the secondary sector. In particular most of the GDP growth 
at Nan Chang was contributed by manufacturing industry, including high-tech 
firms (http://www.jxgdw.com, 2008). More information about industrial sector 
definitions and classifications will be detailed in the following sections. 
The data we are employing is firm level data covering Manufacturing in 
Nan Chang from 2005 to 2007. The reason we chose manufacturing as our test 
bed is because Manufacturing is commonly agreed to be an engine of growth 
(Cornwall, 1977; Fagerberg & Verspagen, 2002) and is a sector where 
technological competition is probably more intense than in other sectors of the 
economy. As our concern is the circumstances that cause firms to collaborate 
and innovate, this is probably better than employing data from other sectors 
with less technological competition. 
One problem with accessing and using firm level data in China is that, 
according to the article 15 of Chapter III ‗The Administration and Publication of 
Statistical Data‘ in the Statistics Law of the People‘s Republic of China:  
 
‘Statistical data pertaining to State secrets must be kept confidential. 
Single item investigation data concerning any individual or his／her 
family shall not be divulged without the consent of the said person. 
Statistics institutions and statisticians shall have the obligation to 
maintain commercial secrets of the units and individuals under their 
statistical investigation, which they have come to know in the process.’  
 
Such restrictions have limited the extent to which the data that are 
employed here have been used in the past. Relative to studies based upon data 
in other countries there are very few papers that address micro level innovation 
strategies in China. Even in such studies that do exist, most focus on province 
(state) level data rather than firm level data. In the work reported upon here we 
have been able to overcome the problem of maintaining confidentiality and as a 
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result this work merits recognition as the first to use firm level data to investigate 
firms‘ innovation and collaboration strategies in China (and in fact in any mid-
income level developing country).  
Given the confidential nature of the data and the limit of the Statistics 
Law of the People‘s Republic of China, the original survey data was modified by 
the Nan Chang Statistics Department to first erase sensitive firm level 
information such as firm name, firm code, firm contact, and firm precise 
geographical location. Then, for identification, each firm was marked by a 
unique reference number. This number is not only very important when we 
combine the information from four different forms in the two surveys, but it also, 
in particular, is necessary to create the data panel across years. However, all 
other information which cannot be easily used to allocate firm identity, such as, 
date of foundation, firms‘ industry code, and the amount of R&D spending, etc. 
were made completely available. This has meant that we have available a rich 
source of firm level information thereby enhancing our results. Initially we were 
not allowed to immediately access the data from the Nan Chang Statistics 
Department. Instead, we went twice to their local office to undertake our 
analysis. Eventually however we were granted full access to their online 
database under staff surveillance. 
The data employed here comes from the annual report database (as 
opposed to the quarterly and half year surveys which are also undertaken). The 
longer time window covered by an annual report is seen as advantageous. The 
data we use covers the years from 2005 to 2007.  Prior to 2005 different data 
collection forms with different emphases and questions were employed by NBS. 
In fact, before 2005, most indicators relating to innovation activity were 
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generated by the Economics Survey and the Manufacture Survey respectively, 
which mainly focused on output value, cost saving or individual profit rather than 
innovation activity. Even though firms were asked ‗Did the firm innovate this 
year?‘ or ‗How many innovations did the firm adopt this year‘, there was little 
further detail on matters in which we are interested; for example ‗what kind of 
innovation‘ was not asked in the earlier survey. It is thus not possible to take our 
data back before 2005. 
In addition, in China, firms‘ innovation environments significantly 
improved after 2005. Many high-tech firms were assembled by local 
governments to generate cluster effects. In particular, from 2003, the Nan 
Chang government introduced an innovation scheme named ‗Two-Four-Five‘ 
project. In this project, by the end of 2010, the innovation related cluster would 
include: two-areas (‗A Technical Economic Development Area‘ and ‗A High-tech 
Industry Development Area‘; four-parks, ‗A Local industrial Park‘, ‗An Affiliated 
Facilities Industrial Park‘, ‗A Returnee Innovation Park‘ and ‗A University 
Innovation Park‘; and five bases, ‗A High-tech Industry Base‘, ‗An Industrial 
Gradient Transfer Industry Base‘, ‗A Big Enterprises‘ Affiliated Facilities Industry 
Base‘, ‗A Green Environmental Protection Food Industry Base‘ and  ‗A 
Characteristic Products Industry Base‘5. To achieve this long term goal, Nan 
Chang provided a special manufacturing fund with 40 million RMB in 2004 and 
invested 10 million RMB from 2005 to reinforce technology-cluster6. 
                                            
5 The policies are stated in the internal government document, ‘Decisions to Speed up Building Modern 
Manufacturing’, Hong [2003]22, where Hong is the city abbreviation of Nan Chang, whilst [2003]22 
represents this document as the 22nd internal document produced in year 2003. Please note, as 
unpublished materials are normally excluded from reference lists or bibliographies, we address cited 
internal government document in footnotes. Policy resources, therefore, also follow this rule. 
6 ‘Policy Details about Manufacturing Development ’, Hong [2004]30 
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Also, to speed up the development of high-tech industry, benefits were 
introduced to reward firms or individuals that frequently innovated, including tax 
deductions, loan subsidized interest, resource supply priority (water, electricity, 
petrol), and individual innovation contribution prizes. To be more precise, any 
innovation project with investment whose amount is below 200 million RMB, 
could benefit from a construction tax deduction of up to 80%, whilst investment 
on innovation projects above 200 million RMB, could obtain a construction tax 
exception. In particular, for large or major innovation projects, firms could 
receive loan subsidised interest up to 1 million RMB for a single project 7 . 
Besides, a local science and technology competition is held annually. The 
winner of the competition will be awarded up to 100 thousand RMB individual 
bonuses plus 400 thousand RMB research funding8. 
Moreover, other exclusive policies have been generally introduced for 
attracting highly skilled and highly talented workers, including experienced 
engineers and prestigious researchers. The policy ranges widely, from salary 
bonuses to housing subsidies9 . Even though such policies can not directly 
influence innovation size and frequency in Nan Chang, they all at least to some 
extent, still increase innovation capability in the future. 
Such policies will have significantly impacted upon the innovation 
environment in Nan Chang. Allowing for time lags in the impact of policy this 
suggests that, although our data does not allow us to go back before the year of 
                                            
7 ‘Management of Special Fund for Nan Chang’s High-tech Industry’, Hong [2003]27 
8 ‘Nan Chang Science and Technology Awards Rules’, Hong [2006]114 
9
 ‘Housing Benefits for Attracting Highly Skilled People’, [2003]31; and ‘Measures for Introducing 
National Highly Talented People’, [2003]41 
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2005, any attempts to do so might well be self-defeating because of the 
different environment in those earlier years. 
Our data ends in 2007 as this was the latest year for which we could get 
access to the database from the local statistics department. According to the 
Statistics Law of the People‘s Republic of China, data must be carefully 
assessed before being formally released to the public. The release order firstly 
comes from the central government, to provincial government, then to local 
government. That is to say, the public may first read national statistics from the 
yearly statistics book issued by NBS, then provincial statistics, and finally local 
city statistics. This whole procedure may take more than several years which is 
why panel data later than 2007 is not available. 
The two surveys we are using, the China Innovation Survey and Annual 
Corporate Financial Survey, were conducted independently and by different 
groups within NBS. This collection method reinforces efficiency and increases 
the flexibility and veracity of data collection but the required linking of two 
surveys has increased our processing time. There is some redundancy in 
having two data sets, and we have also found some inconsistencies in the data 
collected in the two surveys but we will explain more of that below. 
4.2.1 China Innovation Survey 
Our data from the China Innovation Survey relates to major innovations in Large 
and Medium sized Enterprises in Nan Chang. The database covers 33 major 
industries, including High-tech industries, in both manufacturing and services, 
with annual & monthly panel data on a rich array of information on firms‘ 
registered details, industrial development status, employment, main economic 
indicators, gross output value, and product sales revenue. Details about 
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technology change such as R&D expenditure, technology change funding 
resource, and number of patents, are also included.  
The survey consists of three NBS designed forms in total: the innovation 
project form (Form B107-1); the innovation activity form (Form B107-2); and the 
corporate details form (Form 601), respectively. An English translation of each 
of these forms is reproduced as an Appendix to this Chapter. Every firm with 
annual revenue over 50 million RMB is under an obligation to fill in this set of 
three forms. The responses thus cover the whole population as defined by the 
definition of a firm. 
The first form, the innovation project form, contains information on major 
innovation projects whose annual value is at or bigger than 100 thousand RMB. 
Apart from erased confidential data, such as firm code, firm name, director of 
project and contacts, the form includes data upon the project size, innovation 
nature, innovation patterns, innovation usage, innovation target, the starting and 
finishing date of projects, the number of people involved in projects (sorted by 
educational background), the number of working hours involved and internal 
project expenses in the reporting year.  
The number of projects normally indicates the size of major innovation 
activities in the firm. The higher the number of projects is, the more major 
innovation is the firm involved with in the year. As shown in the appendix 
designed by the NBS, universal regulations, innovation nature, innovation 
pattern, innovation usage and innovation target are all classified with a 
subcode. A firm which receives this form, only needs to match the proper terms 
into the category classification and simply fills the corresponding subcode into 
the form. The third column, ‗Details‘, in each category classification gives 
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people more explanation to help them allocate their firms‘ innovation type. For 
example, in the regulations for classifying innovation nature, the details for 
National Project (subcode 1), are ‗Including 863 projects, Xinghuo projects, 
Pandeng projects‘, which clearly defines the range of ‗National Project‘. 
Similarly, the survey classifies innovation by categories, which allows us to 
distinguish collaborative and non-collaborative projects using the pattern code. 
This information makes it possible to analyse the link between innovation and 
collaboration.  
The second form, the innovation activity form, gathers detailed 
information on overall innovation activity, including information on people 
involved in innovation, funding collection (source) and expenditure, innovation 
output and others. It should be noted that some of the indicators overlap with 
the first form, but are in fact subtly different. For instance, ‗the internal 
expenditure‘ (No.15) in the innovation activity form measures all the internal 
expenses relating to technology change occurred during that year whereas ‗the 
internal project expense‘ (No.11) in the innovation project form, B107-1, only 
covers the amount of spending for that one project. It is the same with the 
indicators of ‗No. of people involved in innovation activity (01)‘, ‗people with 
engineering qualification (05)‘, and ‗people without engineering qualification but 
with higher degree (06)‘ in the innovation activity form.  
Thus, the second form is more focused on firms‘ characteristics rather 
than single innovation projects. This is because firms involved in many 
innovation projects sometimes may not easily distinguish expenditure etc, by 
projects. For example, some researchers may be involved in more than two 
innovation projects. But when we count the ‗number of people involved in 
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innovation project‘, simply adding across indicator 7 in the innovation project 
form may lead to double counting. Another possibility is that some innovation 
efforts produce more than one outcome. For example, knowledge accumulated 
from one project may increase the firms‘ absorptive capacity on other innovation 
projects. If that happens, the spillover effect of ‘Expenditure on improving 
existing technology‘ (indicator 42 in the innovation activity form) may 
significantly influence the firms‘ ability to adopt or adapt the innovations from 
other players. Either ignoring such spillover effect or simply adding up each 
project‘s ‗Expenditure on improving existing technology‘ in such cases could 
cause overestimation or serious error. To overcome this problem we try to 
measure such factors at the firm level rather than the project level.  
The innovation activity form also has the advantage that, as we noted, 
the innovation project form covers only projects with an annual value bigger 
than 100 thousand RMB. However, for most small firms or firms with a limited 
innovation budget, this may be too high to meet. If the number of such small 
projects is large in proportion to the total then omitting them could cause serious 
bias. To overcome this problem, the innovation activity form (25) provides 
information on the total ‗number of innovation projects‘ without any value limit. 
Obviously, as the ‗number of innovation projects‘ includes those above the value 
limit, this term must not be smaller than the biggest value of project number in 
the innovation project form. 
Neither the innovation project form alone nor the innovation activity form 
alone can fully represent firms‘ innovation activity. The first emphasises the 
nature and the type of major innovation, whilst the latter generally describes the 
characteristics of the firm itself and overall innovations. We have thus used both 
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forms to construct our data set. In the empirical studies, we mainly utilise the 
innovation activity form to provide data on independent variables but employ the 
innovation project form to generate data upon dependent variables. 
The third and last form, the corporate details form, introduces firms‘ 
registration information, such as industry code, date founded, place of 
registration, registration type, organisation type, as well as other variables. The 
data thus collected, being largely free of details on innovation, may be used to 
provide information upon control variables that may affect firm behavior and for 
which correction is required in the empirical work. One critical piece of 
information that can be obtained from this form is the industry code for the firm. 
Since the innovation frequency and innovation behavior may vary from industry 
to industry, allowing for the industry in which the firm is located is crucial.  
As an OECD country, in China the industrial classification largely follows 
‗the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities‘ 
(ISIC) Rev 3.1 as defined by the United Nations Statistics Division 
(http://unstats.un.org/). However, to better fit the Chinese situation, some 
modifications have been made with the order of the industry code altered by 
NBS and a few industry classifications modified. Each industry code contains 
four digits in total. The first two digits represent the major industrial sector whilst 
the other two digits define the firms‘ major products (service). In ISIC Rev 3.1, 
there are 16 different major industrial sectors defined. These are: 
 A – Agriculture. hunting and forestry 
 B - Fishing 
 C - Mining and quarrying 
 D - Manufacturing 
 E - Electricity, gas and water supply 
 F - Construction 
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 G - Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles         
and  personal and household goods 
 H - Hotels and restaurants 
 I - Transport, storage and communications 
 J - Financial intermediation 
 K - Real estate, renting and business activities 
 L - Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 
 M - Education 
 N - Health and social work 
 O - Other community, social and personal service activities 
 P - Activities of private households as employers and undifferentiated 
production activities of private households 
 Q - Extraterritorial organisations and bodies 
However, the NBS Chinese industry definitions combine section D 
‗Manufacturing‘, section E ‗Electricity, gas and water supply‘ and part of section 
C ‗Mining and quarrying‘ jointly labeling these as ‗Manufacturing‘. To be more 
precise, ‗Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat‘ and ‗Mining of non-ferrous 
metal ores‘, both of which are classified into section C in ISIC Rev 3.1, have 
been added into Chinese ‗Manufacturing‘ as industry 32, and 33, whilst 
‗Electricity supply‘, ‗Gas supply‘ and ‗Water supply‘, all of which are classified to 
section E, are in China coded as industry 44, 45, and 46, respectively. In 
addition, the NBS counts ‗Manufacture of rubber and plastics products‘ (code 25 
in ISIC Rev3.1) as two separate industries instead of one, ‗Manufacture of 
rubber products‘ (industry 29) and ‗Manufacture of plastics products‘ (industry 
30). In addition, ‗Manufacture of man-made fibres‘ has been removed from 
‗Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products‘ (code 24 in ISIC Rev3.1) and 
is listed as a new independent industry. Last but not least, in the manufacturing 
defined by NBS, industry 12 and 38 are empty. 
The industry classification (GB/T 4754—2002) currently used by NBS 
has been employed in data collection since 2003 (http://www.sts.org.cn, 2002) with 
the number of major sectors, as the following list shows, increased from 16 to 
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20. In particular, sector A, called primary industry, mainly represents agriculture, 
and sector B to E, as secondary industry, measures industry, including 
manufacturing, whilst the rest of the sectors, referred to as tertiary industry, are 
normally recognised as service sectors.  
 A – Agriculture, fishing, hunting and forestry 
 B- Mining and quarrying 
 C - Manufacturing 
 D - Electricity, gas and water supply 
 E – Construction 
 F– Transport, storage and communications 
 G –Computer service and software 
 H - Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and 
personal and household goods 
 I - Hotels and restaurants 
 J - Financial intermediation 
 K - Real estate, renting and business activities 
 L –Business rental service 
 M –Science research and technical support service 
 N - Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 
 O– Residential service and others 
 P - Education 
 Q - Health and social work 
 R – Culture, sports and entertainment service 
 S – Public management and organisations 
 T - Extraterritorial organisations and bodies 
Our data relates solely to firms that are considered to be part of the 
manufacturing sector as defined by the Chinese industrial classification. The 
finer industrial classification of the firms in that sector is then made according to 
the classification detailed in section 3 of the Appendix to this chapter. Although 
we had thought to separate out high-tech firms from other firms, the definition of 
high-tech firms in the data is a problem. In 2002 (www.sts.org.cn, 2003), the NBS 
released a set of definitions for high-tech firms encompassing a list of selected 
four digits industry codes, which is compatible with OECD's classification of 
high-technology industries. Apparently, only a few sub industries in each major 
industry were to be recognised as high- tech industry. For example suppose the 
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industry code 37XX represents the ‗Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, 
semi-trailers and other transport equipment‘ industry while the industry code 
3762 is the ‗Aircraft and Spacecraft‘ industry which is recognised as one of the 
high-tech industries by NBS, then apart from the industry with code 3762, all 
other firms in the ‗Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers and other 
transport equipment‘ industry, 37XX, could only be counted as normal, non-
hightech, manufacturing industry. This we have considered to be too restrictive. 
Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, we ignore the high-tech industry 
classification. 
 
4.2.2 Annual Corporate Financial Survey 
This survey was not dispatched and collected by the Society & Technology 
Group but by the Manufacturing Group, which generally is responsible for the 
calculation of statistics upon economic growth and calculating local GDP. Since 
the deadline for the Annual Corporate Financial Survey is normally set at the 
beginning of the following year, a date later than the China Innovation Survey, 
the data collection always produces a better result. For instance, there are 
some missing values for ‗annual revenue of major products (service)‘ and ‗value 
of assets‘ (indicator 18) on the corporate details form. But in the Annual 
Corporate Financial Survey, both indicators are also included and there are no 
missing values. Therefore, to provide a better data set we substitute for the 
value of these two indicators in the corporate details form and ‗number of 
people involved in innovation activity‘, (indicator 01 in the innovation activity 
form), by the equivalent data from annual corporate financial survey.  
The other point we should note about this survey is that the value of 
profit does not equal the difference between ‗revenue of major products 
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(service)‘ (code 124) and ‗cost of major products (service)‘ (code 125). This is 
because: the gap between ‗revenue of major products (service)‘ (code 124) and 
‗cost of major products (service)‘ (code 125) may not be exactly the same as the 
difference between the revenue from ALL products (service) and the cost of ALL 
products (service). When calculating firms‘ profit, other expenses, such as 
operating expenditure, administration cost, and fiscal expense should be taken 
into account as well, which would significantly diminishes profit. However we do 
not have the data available that would allow this. 
Compared with the China Innovation Survey, the Annual Corporate 
Financial Survey provides extra data upon the value of stock (code 002) 
including final goods (003). These, to some extent, indicate the popularity of the 
firms‘ products on the market, in that, ceteris paribus, the less popular is the 
product the larger will be the value of unsold stock. In addition the value of stock 
minus the value of stocked final goods provides an indicator of the value of the 
stock of intermediate goods. We will make use of such data as spillover 
indicators in the following section. 
4.3 Indicators 
In Chapter 3 above we have used game theoretic methods to produce a large 
number of predictions as to the determinants of whether firms collaborate and, if 
they do, how collaborations costs will be shared. The predictions are 
summarised in Table 3.10. These are of course some of the matters that we are 
here approaching empirically. However, moving from these theoretical 
predictions to the empirical work is fraught with difficulties. This is for two main 
reasons.  
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First the theoretical approach developed in the previous chapter does not 
neatly transfer to the real world context. Three examples of this problem are: (i) 
in the game theory model, collaboration meant collaboration between 
competing rival firms in a given market firm but the data for the Chinese region 
studied reveals that most collaboration activities have been between firms and 
local government; (ii) in the theory firms are assumed to be competing rivals, in 
reality, collaboration may be with firms that are upstream or downstream of 
each other; and  (iii) the game theoretic model concentrates upon product 
innovation whereas in fact  firms undertake both product and process innovation.  
Secondly, although the theoretical chapter provides a number of 
predictions these are both limited and in many cases involve parameters and 
constructs that are either impossible to observe or difficult to measure. Thus for 
example in Table 3.10 key issues concern whether (i) the market is an action 
reaction or a persistent dominance market and (ii) whether firms perceive the 
world to offer three or four strategies. We are unable to observe these factors. 
One might also note that the models provide no predictions at all as to what are 
the determining factors of whether the firms introduce new products or 
processes (through either innovation of collaboration) but rather concentrate 
upon whether any new products will be generated by collaborative activity or not. 
Having said this however we should note that the theory does suggest that 
there are certain variables that are relevant to the issues under discussion and 
as such may merit some empirical attention. In particular we note that 
technology level, technology gap, spillover effects, perceived price and 
complementary assets, play important roles in the theory. Reflecting this in our 
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empirical work indicates that we are using the theory as a guide to analysis of 
the data rather than using the data as a test bed of the theory.  
In order to proceed we argue that there are three main issues in which 
we are interested: do firms innovate; if they do innovate do they self-innovate or 
collaborate; and if they collaborate how the costs of collaboration are shared. 
These concerns lead us to the three dependent variables in our empirical 
analysis which we label, not surprisingly as Innovation, Collaboration and Cost 
Percentage. In the next subsection we will discuss their definitions and 
measurement. 
 
4.3.1 Dependent Variables 
Because in the China Innovation Survey questions re collaboration in innovation 
are parts of questions relating to innovation we start by looking at innovation 
activity per se.  
 
Innovation, INNO (i ,t):  
 
In Form B107-1, category classification, section 2, eight types of innovation 
activities are included. Activity pattern subcode 6, ‗innovation by self-research 
department‘, is the indicator which is most commonly used in economic models 
as indicating whether a firm is undertaking innovative activity. However, firms 
may also be innovative because they are collaborating with others on 
innovation. Form B107-1 considers the following collaborative activities which 
are also different types of innovation 
‗Collaboration with abroad institutions‘; 
‗Collaboration with national universities‘; 
‗Collaboration with national independent institutions‘; 
‗Collaboration with registered foreign investments‘; 
‗Collaboration with registered other investments‘; 
‗Collaboration with local government‘; 
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‗Others‘ 
 
We follow this reasoning and define a firm as innovative if it is 
undertaking any of these collaborative activities or reports ‗innovation by self-
research department‘. Thus, compared to the use of the term ‗innovation‘ in the 
game theory chapter, which only covered self-innovation, the definition of 
innovation we are using in the empirical analysis has a broader meaning, 
including both self-innovation and collaboration, perhaps thereby tending more 
towards a more general sense of technological change. 
We employ a binary variable, INNO (i,t), to represent whether firm i 
innovated in year t. Therefore, if the firm carried out innovation INNO (i,t),would 
be measured as 1 and otherwise as 0. These data may then be used to classify 
firms as innovative or non-innovative.  
 
 
Collaboration, COLL (i, t):  
 
 
In contrast to the assumptions of the game theory model, in China, many Large 
and Medium sized enterprises or institutions are either owned by government or 
have government support. Thus instead of restricting ourselves to only 
collaboration between firms as considered in the game theory chapter, a full 
picture of collaborative activity requires that we also consider collaboration with 
non-market institutions and national and local government. 
Once again Form B107-1, part 2, provides information upon whether 
firms have collaborated. Of the classes listed all but subcode 6, ‗innovation by 
self-research department‘, could be considered to be collaboration. We 
consequently define a binary variable COLL, that it reflects whether the firm has 
 178 
collaborated or not, according to whether the firm makes a positive response to 
any part 2 subcode other than subcode 6.  
 
Cost percentage, CP (i,t) 
 
The game theoretic analysis above provides for the first time some insight into 
how the firm with lower technology will share in collaboration costs. However, it 
is difficult from the data to classify a firm as a technology leader or follower and 
as such for empirical purposes the theoretical predictions are of little use. In the 
empirics therefore we concentrate upon how collaboration cost varies with other 
variables. This approach will give us a general picture of collaboration cost 
changes and contribute to a wider literature rather than just discussing the lower 
technology firms‘ collaboration cost sharing strategies. As collaboration, the 
empirical analysis of cost sharing will differ from a direct carry over from the 
game theory chapter. 
Form B107-2, code 22 provides information upon ‗External expenditure 
by collaboration‘ which represents the firm‘s collaboration cost. Making use of 
the industry classification (Form 601, code I), we may also explore the average 
collaboration cost in different industries. Then we may investigate the cost 
percentage variable CP (i,t), by taking the ratio of a firm‘s collaboration cost to 
the sum of industry average collaboration cost and the firm‘s collaboration cost. 
The value of this variable, CP, should be in the range between 0 and 1. The 
higher this value is, the higher cost percentage the firm bears when it 
collaborates. 
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4.3.2 Independent Variables 
 
In the absence of clear theoretical guidance (although not completely ignoring 
our theory) we need to take a more eclectic and less precise view at what 
factors determine innovation collaboration and cost shares. The independent 
variables which we explore as determinants of innovation, collaboration and 
cost allocation strategies, mainly derive from three aspects of the firm - 
innovative ability, absorptive capacity (Castellacci, 2008) and catching up 
capacity (Blalock & Gertler, 2009).  
 
We choose these three factors because they are all trigger factors in 
technological growth. The former two focus more on conditions within the firm, 
whilst the last pays more attention to exogenous conditions. One approach 
(Castellacci, 2008) suggests that the latter two factors determine the ―club‖ to 
which a firm may belong. High innovative ability and absorptive capacity results 
in being  amber of the advanced club; low innovative ability but high absorptive 
capacity leads firms to be in the followers club;  while poor innovative ability and 
absorptive capacity results in the firm being in the marginalized club. 
On the other hand, according to the Schumpeterian concept, as catching 
up ability relates to players‘ technological positions in markets and technology 
diffusion, this may also consequently influence firms‘ decision on technology 
changes (Nelson & Phelps, 1966; Blalock & Gertler, 2009).  
These three factors are multi-dimensional concepts and as such 
measured by a number of different variables. In the following we detail what 
these variables might be and how they are to be measured. As we do so we 
also discuss why/how the variables may impact on the dependent variables of 
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interest. Most of independent variables illustrated below are inherent from 
relevant concepts in existing literatures, such as R&D, PAT, EDUC, whilst 
others, such as TL and TG, are inspired by our game theory model. However, 
since very little empirical work addresses the collaboration cost sharing 
problem, there is little guide as to how to proceed empirically. So we use the 
same variables to look at the determinants of the collaboration cost sharing in 
the following chapter. 
The first aspect, innovative ability is measured by looking at two 
interrelated concepts, innovation input and innovation output. The innovation 
input is normally measured by R&D, whilst the innovation output is measured by 
the number of patents applied for or owned. Although high correlation may be 
observed between R&D and patents (Kleinknecht, 1996), to explore whether 
firms‘ collaborative strategies vary with innovation input or innovation output, we 
employ both of them as indicators to investigate the impact of innovation ability 
on collaboration and collaboration cost, unless this causes severe 
autocorrelation. For innovation, however, since our measure of innovation 
indicates that any firm (or innovation project) must involve some R&D input, 
R&D may not truly be an independent variable. Therefore in modelling whether 
firms innovate, we explore the role of innovative ability by using innovation 
output only.  
 
R&D, R&D (i, t):  
 
R&D is normally regarded as the main measure of innovation input, and in 
some literatures is quite closely linked with the amount of innovation 
(collaboration) (Tomiura, 2009). Aghion etc (2001) suggest a negative 
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correlation between firm innovation and its R&D spending in the previous 
periods. However most studies indicate that R&D normally increases innovation 
(Davidson and Segerstrom, 1998) and even firm size (Kleinknecht, 1996). As 
suggested by Fagerberg (1987) and Castellacci (2008), compared with other 
indicators, R&D normally has wider coverage, we therefore define R&D as 
representing innovation ability from the innovation input aspect. To calculated 
R&D of firm i in year t, we take the logarithm of the sum of ‗R&D expenditure‘ 
(Form B107-2, code 20) and ‗expenditure on new products‘ (Form B107-2, code 
21).  
 
 
Patent, PAT (i, t) 
 
 
PAT, as the abbreviation of the variable representing patenting activity, 
represents the innovative ability from the innovation output aspect. Differently 
from R&D as an innovation input, innovation output is sometimes 
underestimated when people measure innovations. As the ‗pure‘ technology 
efforts between technology leader and technology follower are often 
represented by patents, Fagerberg & Verspagen (2002) claimed that innovation 
measured by patenting activity must become more and more important. To look 
into the ‗Innovation Activity Output‘ section in the form B107-2, we define the 
measurement of innovation output, PAT, by the firm‘s stock of patents as 
measured by the sum of ‗Number of applied patents‘ (code 39) and ‗Number of 
owned patents‘ (code 41). 
The second aspect of independent variables we are looking into is 
absorptive capacity, which indicates determinants related to the firms‘ ability to 
absorb innovations. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) consider that absorptive 
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capacity may refer to ‘ability to recognize the value of new information, 
assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends’. It not only affects the process of 
technology diffusion and technology transformation, but also, more importantly, 
it influences the success of technological change (Fagerberg, 1987). Most 
literatures suggest this variable closely relates to the educational background of 
human capital, including literacy rate, secondary schooling and higher 
education (Castellacci, 2008; Blalock & Gertler, 2009). That is because firms 
need skilled personnel to successfully adopt new technology (Blalock & Gertler, 
2009). On the other hand, dramatically increasing R&D budgets, to some 
extent, may also increase the absorptive capacity and reduce the technology 
gap between technology follower and frontier. Klein and Lim (1997) however, 
emphasise that, compared with the importance of researchers, the positive 
impact from R&D becomes quite limited. By analysing independent technology 
development in Japan and Korea from 1974 to 1988, they conclude that the 
stimulation on achieving gap reduction from increasing researchers is relatively 
larger than from R&D growth. We therefore measure firms‘ absorptive capacity 
by firm level human capital, as follows. 
 
Education, EDUC (i,t) 
 
 
We employ data on ‗People with engineering qualification‘ (Form B107-2, code 
05) and ‗People without engineering qualification but with higher degree‘ (Form 
B107-2, code 06). Together they represent the number of people with a higher 
educational background. Also, we employ ‗People involved in innovation activity‘ 
(Form B107-2, code 01) as people who are involved in R&D activity. The 
variable, EDUC is the ratio of people who are involved in R&D activity with a 
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qualification or higher degree relative to the total number of personnel employed 
in innovative activity. Since previous research (Ke & Luger, 1996) suggest that 
R&D staff with higher educational background may help to increase firms‘ 
absorptive capacity, we claim that when firms launch technology change 
strategies (innovation, imitation or collaboration), the higher ratio EDUC, the 
higher possibility of success would be. 
The last aspect of explanatory variables influencing strategy decisions is 
the capacity to catch up, measuring the possibility and ability that firms catch up 
with the technological frontier. Some people suggest that catching up capacity 
may be counted as part of firms‘ absorptive capacity, because it measures 
technological infrastructures (Castellacci, 2008). But others argue that to catch 
up with technological leader, any factors influencing firms‘ rival‘s position must 
be as important as their own technology position. This indicates that any other 
determinants including endogenous characteristics of firms themselves or 
exogenous characteristics of the market may both affect players‘ catching up 
capacity. Instead of being part of absorptive capacity, we therefore prefer to 
discuss catching up capacity separately. To be more precise, to measure 
catching up capacity, we employ two variables technology level (TL) and 
technology gap (TG). 
 
Technology level, TL (i, t) 
 
 
The first variable representing catching up capacity is defined as ‘the ability to 
use technological knowledge efficiently and to the extent to which technological 
knowledge is accumulated, invested in, produced and innovated‘ (Ryu & Byeon, 
2011). This also describes the technology level of firms at the opening of any 
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competitive competition. Indeed, although there are some recent empirical 
studies discussing how firms‘ technological catching up capacity varies upon 
initial technology conditions (Castellacci, 2008; Canova, 2004). There is no 
simple indicator of this variable. Neoclassical theory believes the technology 
development is closely related with labour and capital. Ryu and Byeon (2011) 
evaluated the technology level using a technology growth curve. But others, 
Soete (1981), account for the impact of this variable as a partial effect of 
innovative ability rather than classifying it as a separate determinant. Fagerberg 
(1987) who tested the technology gap approach by employing data on 25 
countries from 1960-1983, suggested use R&D or patent statistics to measure 
technology level. By adopting factor analysis, Klein and Lim (1997) classified 
eight different means of measuring technology level as developed by Sharif and 
Haq (1980). They are 
 
‘Real per capita GDP’; 
‘The ratio of R&D expenditures to GDP’; 
‘R&D expenditures per researcher’; 
‘The number of researchers per 10,000 workers’; 
‘The value added by the industry’; 
‘The volume of technology trade of the industry’; 
‘The number of patents registered for the industry’; 
‘The ration of R&D expenditures to total sales of the industry’, respectively 
 
However, as the old technology growth curve might be constantly 
replaced by new technology, the methodology employed by Ryu and Byeon 
(2011) is not acceptable. Also, since the figure of firm level GDP, technology 
trade (sum of technology imports and exports), value added and total sales are 
not feasible in our dataset, we may only have to consider the other possibilities. 
We therefore decide to use the index of ‗R&D expenditures per researcher‘ to 
measure the technology level variable. To do this, the ‗R&D expenditures‘ (Form 
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B107-2, code 20) and ‗people involved in R&D‘ (Form B107-2, code 07) are 
employed respectively. 
Similar to R&D, since the measure of TL contains R&D, it may not be a 
true independent regressor for innovation. We thus exclude both R&D and TL 
when we estimate the determinants of innovation equation. 
 
Technology gap, TG (i, t):  
 
 
The technology gap is another important but complex indicator of the firms‘ 
technological position and measures the technology level of the firm compared 
to that of its rivals. On one hand, a larger technology gap may stimulate the 
technology followers‘ desire to replace their current technology (Verspagen, 
1991). Generally, a smaller technology gap is not enough to push firms to 
launch innovation because firms may already pick ‗the low-hanging fruit‘ 
technologies which are cost efficient (Blaclock & Gertler, 2009). On the other 
hand, firms with a larger technology gap may lack the ability to apply new 
technology from the technological leader. Being too far away from the leader 
could significantly reduce the possibility of catching up. In Schumpeterian 
creative destruction theory, the technology gap is one of the trigger factors 
influencing the degree of technology diffusion and economic growth 
(Castellacci, 2008; Fagerberg, 1987; Fagerberg & Verspagen, 2002). Therefore, 
by following the argument that technology gap may be considered as one 
trigger factor of technology transfer between technological leader and 
technological follower (Klein & Lim, 1997; Spencer, 1967; Balasubramanyam, 
1973), we would like to address technology gap as an independent variable and 
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explore how technology gap influences firms‘ catching up capacity in empirical 
studies. 
Blalock & Gertler (2009) advocate that people may use the mean of three 
years firm total factor productivity on FDI as a baseline to measure technology 
gap, whilst Kokko (1994) suggests three other measurements, capital 
intensities, patent fees and labour productivity. Since the nature of our datasets 
does not provide any firm level data on patent fees or labour productivity, we 
cannot use them as technology gap indicator. Capital intensity, on the other 
hand, may confuse the boundaries of technology intensity and capital intensity 
in industries. That is because sometimes the capital intense industry may not be 
the technology intense industry, such as iron and steel or chemicals (Sjoholm, 
1999). To overcome this drawback, we therefore seek an alternative method to 
measure technology gap. Following suggestions by (Sjoholm, 1999), we use 
investment ratios to measure the technology gap instead of capital intensity, 
presuming that the larger investment ratio, the larger difference in technologies. 
Therefore, to calculate the variable of investment ratio, we take the share of 
‗Value of Assets‘ which includes all tangible and intangible assets (Financial 
Survey Form, code 009) to the ‗Number of people involved by the end of year‘ 
(Financial Survey Form, code 145). 
 
4.3.3 Control Variables 
Apart from explanatory variables illustrated in section 4.3.2, we also list various 
control variables which may influence decisions on innovation, collaboration and 
collaboration cost. The first possible determinant, which might normally be 
neglected by empirical studies is spillover effect which represents the size of 
imitation (Franco & Sasidharan, 2010). 
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Spillover effect, SE (j, t):  
 
 
The spillover effect shows how fast rivals in a market may imitate a new 
innovation from the original inventor or, the possibility that a new technology 
leaks out. Generally speaking, these effects represent a process of copying, 
emulating, or stealing of other firms‘ technology. Some researchers (Fagerberg 
& Verspagen, 2002) suggest such influence may be indirect. They claim that 
rather than being an exogenous factor, spillover effects work on firms‘ catching 
up capacity through the technology gap. Innovation may lead to divergence of 
the technology gap, whilst spillover results in convergence. Besides, the higher 
spillover, the shorter period in which the innovator can enjoy monopoly profits 
and thus the more disadvantageous his position is. But others suggest that 
spillover effect may be considered as an exogenous factor. In North-South 
theory, e.g. Grossman and Helpman (1994), it is argued that imitation may 
directly affect firms‘ payoff in both current period and in the future, by not only 
helping the follower reduce the monopoly profits earned by the innovator from 
the new technology, but also spreading the new technology to the whole 
industry, (sometimes known as technology diffusion, Aghion, et. al, 2005, in 
other literatures). 
It is necessary to distinguish any technology stealing effect from the 
product substitution effect. The previous effect is related to the market structure, 
which is normally affected by the business environment, such as monopoly 
regulations and specific industry characteristics; whilst the latter effect only 
depends upon differences between products normally resulting from differences 
in brand values or technology levels. On one hand, the spillover effect is not 
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exactly the same as imitation, but on the other, it is to some extent one of the 
possible consequence of imitation and may represent the intensity of imitation.  
Fagerberg (1987) suggests that the investment share, which is the 
percentage of gross fixed investment at the firm level compared to the industry 
level, may be used to measure spillover, whilst others (Bloom et al, 2007; 
Greenaway et al, 2004; Franco & Sasidharan, 2010) believe R&D expenditure 
in industries may well capture spillover effects. However, as firms normally try to 
protect their R&D outcomes from external excess (Slivko & Theilen, 2011), 
using R&D expenditure in industries may incorrectly reflect the level of the 
spillover effect in the industry. Inspired by Greenaway et al. (2004), we therefore 
employ indicators intensively related with both technology imports and 
technology diffusion, which are ‗expenditure on introducing technology from 
abroad‘ (Form B107-2, code 43) and ‗expenditure on technological diffusion‘ 
(Form B107-2, code 44) respectively. The sum of two indicators above jointly 
represents the imitation efforts or expenditure made by firms. Thus, the 
individual spillover in industries could be measured by the share of firms‘ 
imitation expenditure on the average imitation expenditure in industries. The 
advantage of our measurement is that on one hand, firm‘s spillover effect 
increases when the expenditure of technology imports and technology diffusion 
increases, whilst on the other hand, the firm‘s spillover effect will, however, 
decrease, if the average imitation expenditure in industry increases. This is to 
say, the spillover effect may depend not only upon their own imitation 
expenditures, but also upon other players‘ imitation efforts. 
The second control variable which may play an important role in 
technology diffusion is transaction cost. As explained in previous chapters, high 
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transaction costs may reduce opportunism and impact upon technology 
transaction or technology diffusion. It is involved in the process of negotiating, 
monitoring, and enforcing a contingent claims contract. However, few 
researchers quantify transaction cost in empirical studies (McCann et al, 2005). 
As Williamson (1996) stated, ‘the measurement of transaction costs poses 
formidable difficulties’. Therefore, bearing in mind the complexity and range of 
transaction cost, the methods we are using here might be considered as an 
approximation. To be precise, we look into transaction cost from three 
perspectives, the negotiation perspective, the monitoring perspective and the 
enforcement perspective, and by employing the following variables as 
indicators: market concentration (MCON); the operational personnel ratio 
(OPR); and complementary assets (CAST). 
 
Market concentration, MCON (j,t) 
 
 
Since market concentration increases with a reduction in the number of players, 
firms‘ transaction costs may also change with concentration as the number of 
players affects the complexity of the bargaining problems that players may face. 
Therefore, transaction costs could be reflected in the degree of market 
concentration (Frank & Henderson, 1992). We thus use market concentration 
as the indicator of transaction costs. 
Market concentration, the firms‘ share of total industry production, also 
represents the degree of market competition. As illustrated in Chapter 2, there 
are still heated discussions on the relationship between competition and 
innovation, especially on the relationship between competition and 
collaboration. Some researchers (Oye, 1986; Coleman, 1990) suggest 
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increasing market concentration would decrease the chance of launching new 
technology. But others (Cassiman et al, 2009) believe competition and 
innovation (collaboration) may go hand in hand. The problem is, on one hand, 
increasing market competition would stimulate post-innovation (collaboration) 
payoff, called the ‗Escaping Competition‘ effect, whilst on the other hand, it also 
reduces the technology follower‘s incentive, called the ‗Schumpeterian‘ effect 
(Aghion et al, 2005). Therefore, how firms perform when they encounter a 
technological change may be the result of the joint impact of the ‗Escaping 
Competition‘ effect and the ‗Schumpeterian‘ effect. Thus, although we count 
market concentration as a determinant of catching up, we would like to explore 
exactly how it works in the Chinese Manufacturing test bed.  
The literature generally suggest to us three different ways to measure 
market concentration, which are the Concentration Ratio (CR), the Herfindahl 
index (HHI or simply H index) and index of industry concentration (   index, 
Hennart, 1991). The first indicator, the Concentration Ratio, calculates the total 
output produced in an industry by a given number of largest firms in that 
industry (Frank & Henderson, 1992). It is common to use the largest four or 
largest eight firms to generate CR, so called 4CR  or 8CR . But a high 
dependence on the number of largest firms chosen is also a drawback when 
generating CR, because it assumes there are at least four or eight firms existing 
in the industries. This condition may normally not always be satisfied in practice, 
especially for small datasets (Li et al, 2007). The second indicator, the 
Herfindahl index measures ‘the sum of squared establishments’ shares of the 
industry’s total gross output or total employment’ (Sjoholm, 1999; Lu & Tao, 
2006). Differently from CR, the advantage of the Herfindahl index is that bigger 
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firms will be granted greater weight in the calculation of market concentration. It 
indicates that using H index to measure market concentration incorporates the 
effect of firm size. Suppose there are N  firms in a particular industry. Then the 
algorithm for market concentration in that industry is:  



N
i
iZH
1
2  
where iZ  represents the gross output (or human capital) share for firm i . 
The third algorithm of market concentration, advocated by Ellison and 
Glaeser (1997), the index of industry concentration (  index), is an integration 
of the idea of Herfindahl with the spatial Gini coefficient which measures market 
concentration in different geographic regions where firms are located (Krugman, 
1991).   Suppose there are N firms located at M different regions. The equation 
of market concentration is then written as: 
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where G, H, and jx  
represented for spatial Gini coefficient, H index, and the 
ratio of total output (employment) in region j to total employment in the 
population.  
However, there is a fatal drawback in this index of industry concentration. 
That is, if the value of the H index equals to 1 (where the market has 100% 
market concentration), the   index is meaningless. In other words, the   index 
is only suitable for relatively competitive industries. We therefore employ the 
second concept, the Herfindahl index, as the measurement of market 
concentration. To precisely calculate it, we use employment as a measure of 
firm size and obtain data from, ‗number of people involved by the end of year‘ 
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(Form 601, code M), and the ‗industry code‘ (Form 601, code I). We first 
calculate total employment in different industries. Then we measure iZ  
by the 
share of industry‘s employment generated by firm i. By summing up over i 
market, concentration is generated for each industry.  
 
 
District, DIS: 
 
 
In addition to any concentration effect, there may also be additional regional 
effects. That is to say, apart from the influence of firm size, firms locating at 
different regions may also affect the decision to innovate (Wang & Hao, 2011). 
We consider this region effect by adding another dummy variable, District. 
According to data from the district section in Form 601 (code E), we 
know there are eight different districts in Nan Chang, which are Anyi District, 
Donghu District, Jinxian District, Nanchang District, Qingshanhu District, 
Qingyupu District, Xihu District and Xinjian District, respectively. As innovation 
activity may differ in a technology intense industry which mostly locates at Nan 
Chang National High-tech Industrial Development Zone in Qingshanhu District, 
we define a region dummy variable to equal to 1 when firms are geographically 
registered at Qingshanhu District. Otherwise, the variable, DIS, equals to zero if 
firms are registered at somewhere else. This setting, to some extent, may 
correct any region effect on market concentration and consequently help us to 
understand if firms locating at different areas significantly differ on their 
innovation strategies.  
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Operational personnel ratio, OPR (i,t) 
 
 
Monitoring the process of technology transaction is another important function 
that generates transaction costs and it may involve the firm in substantial costs. 
Banker et al (1995) suggest that using the number of personnel in different 
sectors may be an effect method for measuring transaction volume. We thus 
employ the operational personnel ratio, measured by the ratio of ‗people 
involved in technological management and services‘ (Form B107-2, code 03) to 
‗people involved by the end of year‘ (Financial Survey Form, code 145) to 
represent such monitoring costs.  
 
Complementary assets, CAST (i,t) 
 
 
Either the importance of complementary assets or the existence of 
complementary assets (specialised assets) is widely considered as an 
alternative way to measure transaction costs (Teece, 1986; Smith & Aldrich, 
1991). Evidence shows that apart from R&D investment, complementary assets 
might be another important reason causing innovation failure. Controlling 
complementary assets must be equally important for players who develop new 
technology (Teece, 1986). Besides, since non-recovered assets enlarge sunk 
costs, their existence significantly improves trust and also decreases 
opportunism when two players collaborate. To measure transaction cost, we 
therefore also take complementary assets into account, measured by the 
logarithm of the sum of ‗Expenditure on capital construction relating to 
innovation activity‘ (Form B107-2, code 47) and ‗Price of all equipment for 
production and operation‘ (Form B107-2, code 49). 
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Perceived price, PP (i,t) 
 
 
In Chapter 3, we discussed the effect of perceived price when building the 
customers‘ preference function. We argued that customers‘ decisions to 
purchase products depend upon the perceived price rather than the real price. 
Therefore, in empirical works, we also include the variable, perceived price, as 
one of control variables. 
In our game theory model, the perceived price is explored through the 
discount rate of price sensitiveness. When the discount rate of price 
sensitiveness varies, it could directly affect consumers‘ perceived price which 
could appear to be either higher or lower than the real price. This idea was also 
supported by Shin (1985) who analysed the consumers‘ perceived price on 
purchasing electricity under multistep block rate schedules. He believes that 
since the marginal price information is costly, it is very possible to realise a 
higher perceived price. There are a number of arguments in the literature as to 
what affects the perceived price. Liu (2010) advocates that perceived price 
varies with three dimensions, which are communication and interaction, price 
expectation, and reputation and service quality, whilst Zhang et al (2007) 
suggest consumers‘ involvement with products‘ price information may play an 
important role. When consumers‘ target products are low technological goods, 
such as toothpaste, greater involvement with product price information will 
significantly influence consumers‘ perceived price, whilst when their target 
products are technologically intense goods, such as computers, the influence of 
the involvement with product price information becomes weak. On the other 
hand, some researchers (Campbell, 2007; Ordonez et al, 2000) claim that the 
major determinant of perceived price is fairness. As our datasets however do 
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not allow us to explore further any of the ideas above, we employ other 
indicators to reveal perceived price instead. 
Berkowitz and Walton (1980) mention that the perceived price may be 
influenced by perceived worth. When consumers believe it is value for money, 
product acceptability must increase (Winer, 1988). Therefore, to measure 
perceived worth, we look into the problem of product acceptability. We use the 
ratio of value of stocked final goods (Financial Survey Form, code 003) in 
annual revenue (Form 601, code O) to measure whether firm‘s products are 
welcomed by market. By comparing with other existing products in the market, a 
more welcomed product would normally give consumers higher utility 
suggesting a lower perceived (quality adjusted) price. We thus assume a 
negative relationship between the stock of final goods and products‘ 
acceptability, which indicates that a higher proportion of stock of final goods 
may lead to lower perceived worth but a higher perceived price. 
 
Registration, REG 
 
 
To test whether ownership plays an important role in innovation decisions, we 
also include an ownership dummy variable called registration. In the section on 
the type of registration in form 601 (code J), we note that there are three major 
registration groups: domestic assets, assets of Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and 
foreign assets. We define a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for all 
kinds of domestic ownership whilst firms in the other two major registration 
groups take a value of zero. This dummy variable therefore explores whether 
domestic firms have a higher chance of innovating or collaborating and whether 
their collaboration cost determinants differ from firms with other ownership. 
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4.4 Initial Data Exploration 
In this section, we describe the data in both a general and specific sense 
indicating, prior to the econometric analysis in the next chapter, any revealed 
patterns within and across variables. Table 4.1 below summarises the particular 
data sources from which the various variables and constructs are derived. 
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Table 4.1 Variables and Indicators  
 
Variable 
Type 
                        Variables Code                        Indicators                Data code     Type 
 
 
Dependent 
variables 
Innovation INNO (i ,t): Innovation pattern 1-8 B107-1, code 2 binary 
Collaboration COLL (i, t) Innovation pattern 1-8 except 6 B107-1, code 2 binary 
 
Cost percentage 
 
CP (i,t) 
Ratio of firm’s collaboration cost to the sum of  
industry average collaboration cost and firm’s 
collaboration cost 
Form B107-2, code 22 
Form 601, code I 
censored, 
percentage 
 
 
 
 
Explanatory 
variables 
 
Innovative 
ability 
Innovation  
input 
R&D R&D (i, t): logarithm of the sum of ‘R&D expenditure’ and 
‘expenditure on new products’  
Form B107-2, code 20 
Form B107-2, code 21 
logarithm 
Innovation  
output 
Patent PAT (i, t) sum of ‘Number of applied patents’ and ‘Number 
of owned patents’ 
Form B107-2, code 39 
Form B107-2, code 41 
count 
Absorptive 
capacity 
 
Education 
 
EDUC (i,t) 
Ratio of people who involved in R&D activity with 
qualification or higher degree to entire innovative 
activity group 
Form B107-2, code 05 
Form B107-2, code 06 
Form B107-2, code 01 
percentage 
 
Catching up 
capacity 
Technology level TL (i, t) R&D expenditures per researcher Form B107-2, code 20 
Form B107-2, code 07 
count 
Technology gap TG (i, t) Investment ratio Financial Survey Form, code 009 
Financial Survey Form, code 145 
percentage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Control 
Variables 
 
Spillover effect 
 
SE (i, t) 
the share of firms’ imitation expenditure on average 
imitation expenditure in industries 
Form B107-2, code 43 
Form B107-2, code 44 
Form 601, code I 
percentage 
 
 
 
 
Transaction 
cost 
 
Negotiation 
perspective 
 
Market 
concentration 
 
MCON (i,t) 
Herfindahl index 



N
i
iZH
1
2  
Financial Survey Form, code 145 
Form 601,  code I 
percentage 
Monitor 
perspective 
Operational 
personnel ratio 
 
OPR (i,t) 
ratio of ‘people involved in technological 
management and services’ to ‘people involved in by 
the end of year’ 
Form B107-2, code 03 
Financial Survey Form, code 145 
percentage 
Enforcement 
perspective 
Complementary 
assets 
 
CAST (i,t) 
logarithm of the sum of ‘Expenditure on capital 
construction relating innovation activity’ and ‘Price 
of all equipment for production and operation’  
Form B107-2, code 47 
Form B107-2, code 49 
logarithm 
Perceived Price PP (i,t) Ratio of the value of stocked final goods in annual 
revenue 
Financial Survey Form, code 003 
Form 601, code O 
percentage 
District DIS Equals to one for firms geographically registered at 
Qingshanhu District. 
Form 601, code E dummy 
Registration REG Equals to one for domestic assets Form 601, code J dummy 
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4.4.1 Sample Nature and Panel Characteristics 
As explained above, the three years of data we employ are derived from the 
China Innovation Survey and Annual Corporate Financial Survey at Nan Chang, 
which is the capital of Jiang Xi province. However, for most people who are not 
familiar with the Chinese situation, having a general overview of Nan Chang‘s 
economic strength, in particular, some description of firms in this region before 
the data exploration would be helpful. We therefore here explore the economic 
background by looking into some major economic indicators for Nan Chang, 
Jiang Xi and China as a whole. This will also help us to understand the 
economic relationship and economic status between Nan Chang and Jiang Xi in 
China.  
 
The economic environment 
 
 
As we intend to generate a comparison across Nan Chang, Jiang Xi and 
China‘s national data, it is very important to explore the same indicators at the 
three levels for the years from 2005 to 2007. However, the information included 
in China‘s national year book is much less detailed than information in the 
province level yearbook. Some indicators in the province level yearbook, such 
as ‗R&D human capital distribution in firms or institutions‘, cannot be found in 
national yearbooks. This indicates that the common indicators we may discuss 
are relatively limited. To ensure consistency in data, we therefore employ only 
five different indicators that commonly appeared in all three yearbooks from 
2005 to 2007, which are ‗GDP in local area‘, ‗per capita GDP‘, ‗Value of imports 
and exports‘, ‗R&D expenditure‘, and ‗Weight of R&D expenditure on local GDP‘. 
The selection of these five indicators is based on two aspects. One is an 
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economic aspect including three former indicators which explore local market 
performance, whilst the other is an R&D aspect including the latter two 
indicators, focusing more on innovation activity. It should be noted that, 
differently from our empirical firm level data in the China Innovation Survey and 
the Annual Corporate Financial Survey which focus on Large and Medium sized 
Enterprises with annual revenue at or over 50 million Yuan, the data published 
in all yearbooks are derived from larger scale Enterprises with annual revenue 
at or over 5 million Yuan. This indicates that the data from yearbooks may offer 
us a more general and broader view. 
Table 4.2 illustrates a comparison of major economic indicators for Nan 
Chang, Jiang Xi and national data from 2005 to 2007, which are notated by NC, 
JX and N, respectively. In each cell, we list the level and the annual growth rate 
(in brackets). For instance, ‗NC 1007.7 (16.8%)‘ in the first row in column 05 
means that GDP in Nan Chang in year 2005 was 100770 million Yuan, which 
was 16.8% higher than GDP in 2004.  
From table 4.2, we notice that in general all five indicators in that the 
three levels increase with time and the annual growth rates also increase. In 
particular, the growth rate of R&D expenditure from 2005 – 2007 exceeds 20% 
per annum at all three levels. We also find that the growth rate of economic 
performance and technological performance at lower levels is greater than at 
higher levels. That is to say, the indicators in Nan Chang normally performed 
better than in Jiang Xi province, whilst the indicators in Jiang Xi province 
normally performed better than China‘s average level. That is probably because 
on the nationwide level, the economic power of Jiang Xi province is moderately 
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strong among all China‘s provinces, and on the province level, as the capital of 
Jiang Xi province, Nan Chang has a cluster effect on manufacturing. 
 
Table 4.2 Major Economic Indicators Comparison among Nan Chang, Jiang Xi and 
National Data from 2005 to 2007 
 
Indicators 05 06 07 
GDP in local area  
(100 million Yuan) 
NC 
JX 
N 
1007.7   (16.8%) 
4056.8   (17.4%) 
183085  (14%) 
NC 
JX 
N 
1183.9  (17.5%) 
4670.5  (15.1%) 
211924 (15.7%) 
NC 
JX 
N 
1389.9  (17.4%) 
5500.3  (17.8%) 
249530 (17.7%) 
Per capita GDP 
(Yuan) 
NC 
JX 
N 
22390    (29.9%) 
9440      (16.6%) 
14040    (13.8%) 
NC 
JX 
N 
26131   (16.7%) 
10798   (14.4%) 
16164   (15.1%) 
NC 
JX 
N 
30460   (16.6%) 
12633   (17%) 
18934   (17.1%) 
Value of imports and 
exports 
(100 million Dollars) 
NC 
JX 
N 
17.45     (30.1%) 
40.59     (15%) 
14219    (23%) 
NC 
JX 
N 
24.90    (42%) 
61.94    (52%) 
17604   (23.8%) 
NC 
JX 
N 
31.95    (28.3%) 
94.79    (53%) 
21738   (23.5%) 
R&D expenditure 
(million Yuan) 
NC 
JX 
N 
836.8     (42%) 
3157.7   (35%) 
245000  (24.6%) 
NC 
JX 
N 
1315.2  (57%) 
4362.1  (38%) 
300300 (22.6%) 
NC 
JX 
N 
1688.5  (28.4%) 
5476.1  (25.5%) 
366400 (22%) 
Weight of R&D 
expenditure on local 
GDP 
NC 
JX 
N 
0.83%    (22.1%) 
0.79%    (16.2%) 
1.34%    (9.8%) 
NC 
JX 
N 
1.11%   (33.7%) 
0.94%   (19.0%) 
1.42%   (6.0%) 
NC 
JX 
N 
1.21%   (9.0%) 
1.00%   (6.4%) 
1.47%   (3.5%) 
 
We now analyse economic strength in more details by discussing each 
indicator in Table 4.2. From the indicators ‗GDP in local area‘ and ‗Per capital 
GDP‘, we found the per capita GDP in Nan Chang is dramatically greater than 
in both Jiang Xi province and China as a whole. However, although the GDP 
level in Nan Chang is higher than the China‘s average level, the GDP level in 
Jiang Xi province is slightly lower. This indicates that our target datasets reflect 
a mid-income and moderate developing region with intensive growth potential. 
There are 33 provinces10 in China. We find that although the growth rate 
of imports and exports in Jiang Xi (and in Nan Chang) increased dramatically 
each year, the imports and exports level in Jiang Xi (and in Nan Chang) are still 
extremely low. This fact indicates that the main markets of firms in Jiang Xi tend 
to be local. However, targeting local markets does not necessarily mean less 
                                            
10
 The term ‘province’ in this thesis refers to provincial level division, which is the basic unit in the China 
Statistical Yearbook. To be precise, it includes 22 provinces, 4 municipalities, 5 autonomous regions and 
2 special administrative regions. 
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competitiveness. Firms may still compete with others in any province in China, 
although this information may not be obtained from statistical yearbooks. 
The last two indicators in Table 4.2 are designed to look at the R&D 
aspect. In particular, the ‗total R&D expenditure‘ measures the amount of R&D 
effort in each region by absolute value, whilst the ‗weight of R&D expenditure on 
local GDP‘ reveals the R&D effort through relative value. From the data in the 
fourth row, we found that R&D investment at all levels increased dramatically 
from 2005 to 2007. The lowest growth rate of R&D expenditure was 22%, whilst 
the biggest rate exceeds 57%. As innovation output is normally positively 
associated with the innovation input, we assume there exists significant growth 
in innovation and collaboration in the annual data in Nan Chang. But on the 
other hand, from the low value of the indicator that ‗weight of R&D expenditure 
on local GDP‘, we realised the efforts of R&D input in both Nan Chang and 
Jiang Xi are still limited, although the growth rate of R&D input exceeds the 
average national level. 
 
Panel data characteristics 
 
 
Although the above is informative it is worth noted that the data that we employ 
in our empirical analysis does differ in at least two basic ways. Firstly, datasets 
derived from forms B107-1 and B107-2 contain completely different types of 
data. The former collects data on all projects undertaken by firms, whereas the 
latter describes the general innovation activity of firms. Any one firm may have 
several innovation projects underway within a time period and projects may 
even extend beyond a single time period. Secondly as our approach is 
concerned with the innovative activity of firms our emphasis is upon data related 
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to the firm. The panel of firms included within our sample is thus based on the 
responses to form B107-2. 
Using form B107-2, our sample (which is also the population) of Large 
and Medium sized firms for the three years from 2005 to 2007 is 79, 79 and 86 
respectively. The panel is thus unbalanced. As some firms left the sample (the 
market), whilst others joined, the panel contains 103 different firms within 3 
years and 244 observations (ID * Time) in total. As a simple picture of the 
history of these firms shown in Table 4.3, approximately 62% of firms are in the 
sample for all 3 years, whilst about 11.7% (7.77%+3.88%) of firms successfully 
survived for continuous 2 years. We note that 10% of firms existed for only the 
first period while nearly 13% of firms were created in the last period. These 
results suggest that the manufacturing industry in Nan Chang is intensely 
competitive. A comparison of survival rates suggest that the market elimination 
ratio decreased as time proceeded which may reflect the result of a maturing 
market environment, including legislation encouraging patent protection order in 
recent years. 
 
Table 4.3 Descriptions of Panel Data Sample 
 
Pattern of observed firms Observation number Observation percentage 
Observed in all three years (***) 64 62.14 
Observed in the last year (··*) 13 12.62 
Observed in the first year (*··) 10 9.71 
Observed in the last two years (·**) 8 7.77 
Observed in the first two years (**·) 4 3.88 
Observed in the middle year (·*·) 3 2.91 
Observed in the first and last year (*·*) 1 0.97 
Total 103 100 
 
Using form B107-2, we can provide a breakdown of the data by year and 
by 2-digit industries. However, there is still considerable controversy in the 
literature about whether one should select by 2-digit industry code or 4-digit 
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industry code. On one hand, some researchers (Swartz & Aronson, 1967) claim 
that since 4-digit industry code may well group firms with similarities, using 4-
digt industry code could decrease the bias against rejection of the null 
hypothesis and generate more powerful comparisons. On the other hand, 
however, some results reveal that the benefit of employing 2-digit industry code 
may outweigh its drawbacks (Tomiura, 2009).  
Since the ISIC industry structure is based on firms‘ similarities, using a 4-
digit industry code may severely limit any indication of firm diversification (Mills 
& Schumann, 1985; Bowen et al, 1982). Firms apparently appear more 
diversified using a 2-digit industry classification than a 4-digit classification. In 
particular, for firms producing various but similar products which are located in 
the same 2-digit industry but different 4-digit industry codes, using 2-digit 
industry codes may avoid selection bias by considering the diversification of 
firms. Secondly, Wernerfelt and Montgomery (1988) advocate that the average 
profitability across 2-digit industry is a better measure of performance than 
which at the 3-digit or 4-digit level. Thirdly, some financial researches on stock 
prices suggest that estimates of the industry effect is insensitive to whether 2 or 
4 digit industry classifications are used (King, 1966; Kahle & Walking, 1996). 
Last but not least, to the best of our knowledge, all empirical works related to 
Chinese manufacturing are based on 2-digit industry11 codes (Luo & Cao, 2005; 
Lu & Tao, 2006; Li et al, 2007; Wang & Hao, 2011; Bai, 2011). We therefore 
also classify our data using 2-digit industry codes rather than 3 or 4 digit 
industry code. 
                                            
11
 Though the industry classification in these researches is based on 2-digit industry, most of their data 
are derived from province level rather than firm level.  
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Table 4.4 shows the total number of sample firms in each year and in 
each 2-digit industry. The sum over industries for each year equals the number 
of observations in that year: e.g.79 and 86 for 2005 and 2007 respectively. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the distribution of the number of firms by year and by 
industry based on the data from table 4.4. According to the manufacturing 
structure Table in appendix, we found that most firms are in technology 
intensive industries. In particular, from table 4.4, we notice that in certain 
industries, there is only one firm. However, following the general discussion of 
data from table 4.2, this does not necessarily mean that there is no competition 
in the market and the local market is a monopoly. Nor does it mean that just 
because there is only one firm recorded that the firm will not collaborate. This is 
partly because our data are derived from Large and Medium sized firms with 
annual revenue at or over 50 million RMB. All other firms, such as up-scale 
firms with lower annual revenue and small firms, are not investigated. The firms 
may also compete or collaborate with firms based elsewhere or even overseas. 
However as we do not have any knowledge of nationwide firm level datasets, 
we cannot discuss these issues further.  
Table 4.4 Sample Industry Breakdown: 2005-2007  
Industry 2005 2006 2007 Industry 2005 2006 2007 Industry 2005 2006 2007 
13 3 3 4 24 0 0 0 35 2 2 2 
14 4 4 4 25 0 0 0 36 6 6 8 
15 3 2 3 26 6 5 3 37 4 4 5 
16 1 1 1 27 8 8 8 39 10 8 8 
17 5 5 6 28 1 1 1 40 1 2 1 
18 1 2 1 29 1 1 1 41 0 0 0 
19 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 42 0 0 1 
20 0 1 1 31 4 3 3 43 0 0 0 
21 0 0 0 32 2 2 2 44 8 8 8 
22 1 1 1 33 2 2 3 45 0 0 1 
23 4 4 4 34 2 3 5 46 0 1 1 
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Figure 4.1 Sample Distribution of Firms 
 
 
Table 4.5 indicates the average sample number of firms per industry for 
each of the sample years (based on 33 and not 26 industries). The data show 
that on average, there were approximately 2.4 firms in each industry. The 
number would be slightly higher if ‗empty‘ industries were removed from the 
sample. The maximum number of firms recorded in an industry falls from 10 in 
2005 to 8 in 2006 and 2007. Given that the number of observations increases 
from 79 in 2006 to 86 in 2008 this might mean that over time the inter industry 
spread of firms in Nan Chang is becoming more equal. Result from Table 4.9 
below also confirms this. 
 
Table 4.5 Description of Number of Firms by Industry 
 
Year Number of industries Average number of firms in each industry 
2005 33 2.393939 
2006 33 2.393939 
2007 33 2.606061 
 
4.4.2 Data Exploration of Technology Changes 
The data sources provide considerable details upon the nature of innovative 
activity. To better understand the scope of technology changes (including both 
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self-innovation and collaboration) in the sample, we detail the innovation 
variable by different characteristics. Table 4.6 illustrates the breakdown of 
innovation projects from form B107-1 by ‗innovation nature‘, ‗innovation pattern‘, 
‗innovation usage‘ and ‗innovation target‘ for each year 2005 to 2007. The 
figures in each cell show the count number for each group, whilst the numbers 
in the brackets represent the weight of innovation in that group relative to the 
population. For instance, in the first row, first column, ‗21 (4.6%)‘ means that 21 
projects are national projects, representing 4.6% of all projects reported in 
2005. One important point we need to address is that firms are allowed to pick 
only one type of classifications when they fill in the survey form. We did not 
observe any project with two or more types in any classification. That is to say, 
for instance in the case of innovation patterns, firms could only choose one 
specific pattern from the eight choices. There is no way that a project is 
classified as involving both self-innovation and collaboration with institutions, or 
a project involves collaboration with both universities and institutions. 
Table 4.6 Innovation Projects Breakdown upon Different Means of Classification 
Innovation Nature  
 05 06 07 
1. National Project 21   (4.6%) 13  (2.5%) 17  (3.0%) 
2. Local Project 17   (3.7%) 41  (7.9%) 51  (8.9%) 
3. Entrusted Project by other firms 63   (13.7%) 13  (2.5%) 16  (2.8%) 
4. Self Project 357 (77.6%) 450(86.5%) 478(83.7%) 
5. Project from abroad 2     (0.4%) 3    (0.6%) 7    (1.2%) 
6. Others 0     (0%) 0    (0%) 2    (0.4%) 
Innovation Pattern  
 05 06 07 
1. Collaboration with abroad institutions 2     (0.4%) 25  (5.4%) 2    (0.4%) 
2. Collaboration with national universities 29   (6.3%) 9    (1.7%) 21  (3.7%) 
3. Collaboration with national independent institutions 15   (3.3%) 26  (5%) 24  (4.2%) 
4. Collaboration with registered foreign investments 1     (0.2%) 0    (0%) 1    (0.2%) 
5. Collaboration with registered other investments 24   (5.2%) 29  (5.6%) 41  (7.2%) 
6. Innovation by self research department 252 (54.8%) 214(41.2%) 248(43.4%) 
7. Collaboration with local government 134 (29.1%) 213(41%) 215(37.7%) 
8. Others 3     (0.6%) 4    (0.8%) 19  (3.3%) 
Innovation Usage  
 05 06 07 
1. Fundamental research 0     (0%) 0    (0%) 0    (0%) 
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2. Applied research 1     (0.2%) 1    (0.2%) 1    (0.2%) 
3. R&D 269 (58.5%) 332(63.8%) 405(70.9%) 
4. Applied R&D 190 (41.3%) 187(36%) 165(28.9%) 
Innovation Target 
 05 06 07 
1. To develop brand new product 190 (41.3%) 176(33.8%) 232(40.6%) 
2. To increase functions of existing product 84   (18.3%) 60  (11.5%) 64  (11.2%) 
3. To improve performance of product 54   (11.7%) 101(19.4%) 131(22.9%) 
4. To increase productivity 45   (9.8%) 63  (12.1%) 89  (15.6%) 
5. To decrease energy consumption 15   (3.3%) 21  (4.0%) 20  (3.5) 
6. To decrease raw materials consumption 8     (1.7%) 30  (5.8%) 9    (1.6%) 
7. To decrease pollution 12   (2.6%) 22  (4.2%) 10  (1.8%) 
8. Others 52   (11.3%) 47  (9.0%) 16  (2.8%) 
 
From Table 4.6, we observe that the total number of all types of 
innovation projects increases from 460 in 2005, to 520 in 2006, and 571 in 
2007. The growth in the number of innovation projects, especially the increment 
in 2006, may be the cause of increase in the R&D input recorded in Table 4.2. 
On average, more than 80% of innovation projects are ‗self-projects‘, which 
indicates that firms have a strong self-incentive to pursue technology changes. 
In contrast, projects arranged by central government or local government are 
relatively limited 
The innovation pattern section in Table 4.6 reveals that nearly half the 
innovation projects are counted as self-innovation, and half are considered to 
be collaborative projects. We find in general, both the size and the relative 
importance of self-innovation are lower in the year 2006 and 2007 compared to 
2005. This result shows that firms in Nan Chang have greater tendency to 
collaborate in recent years. The data also shows that both ‗collaboration with 
registered foreign investments‘ and ‗collaboration with registered other 
investments‘ is relatively small. The majority of collaboration occurs between 
firms and local government, which represents more than 30% of all innovation 
projects. This is partly because local government sometimes supplies R&D 
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funding for certain projects. Moreover, firms intending to innovate often need 
policy support from local government, such as schemes to attract talented 
people12. This is one of the examples why the game theoretic model may not 
strictly apply to collaboration in China for that model only addresses 
collaboration with other firms while intensive collaboration with local government 
is obviously present in our data. Similarly, in Chapter 5, innovation and 
collaboration is defined to include these joint activities between firms and local 
government. 
The results in the innovation usage section in Table 4.6 show that nearly 
99.8% of innovation projects may be considered as either R&D or applied R&D, 
i.e. at the more ‗close to market‘ end of the spectrum. The last section of Table 
4.6 addressing innovation targets indicates whether the innovation projects are 
regarded as product innovations or process innovations. According to the Oslo 
Manual (OECD, 1996), product innovation is innovation which will result in 
technologically new products ‗whose technological characteristics or intended 
uses differ significantly from those of previously produced products’, or 
technologically improved products offering ‘ improved ………….performance or 
lower cost through use of higher-performance components or materials, or a 
complex product’. We therefore classify four of the groups in the innovation 
target section as product innovation. These include: 1. To develop brand new 
product‘; ‗2. To increase functions of existing product‘; ‗3. To increase efficiency 
of products‘; and ‗7. To decrease pollution‘. Activities directed at the other 
targets are considered to be process innovation. The data shows that more than 
                                            
12
  ‘Housing Benefits for Attracting Highly Skilled People’, [2003]31; and ‘Measures for Introducing 
National Highly Talented People’, [2003]41 
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70% of innovation projects involve product innovation. In particular, in 2007, the 
proportion of product innovation reaches 76.5%. This indicates that the majority 
of projects intend to invent or significantly improve products and this tendency 
has been increasing in recent years. However, as the variable ‗innovation‘, 
measures all kinds of innovation activities, both product innovation and process 
innovation are to be investigated in Chapter 5, which is another reason we may 
not replicate the above game theoretic model empirically. 
Table 4.7 Breakdowns of Innovation and Collaboration upon Ownership and Region 
 Innovation 
05 06 07 
 
Ownership 
Domestic Assets 32 (40.5%, 50%) 35 (44.3%, 56.5% ) 34 (39.5%, 52.3%) 
Assets of Hong Kong, Macao, 
Taiwan 
 
3 (3.8%, 50% ) 
 
3 (3.8%, 50%) 
 
4 (4.7%, 66.7%) 
Foreign Assets 3 (3.8%, 33.3%) 5 (6.3%, 45.5%) 5 (5.8%, 33.3%) 
Region Qingshanhu District 20 (25.3%, 54%) 25 (31.6%, 62.5%) 24 (27.9%, 60%) 
Other Districts 18 (22.8%, 42.8%) 18 (22.8%, 46.1%) 19 (22.1%, 41.3%) 
Total 38 (48.1%) 43 (54.4%) 43 (50%) 
                   Collaboration 
 05 06 07 
 
Ownership 
Domestic Assets 21 (26.6%, 32.8%) 23 (29.1%, 37.1%) 25(29.1%, 38.5%) 
Assets of Hong Kong, Macao, 
Taiwan 
 
2 (2.5%, 33.3%) 
 
3 (3.8%, 50%) 
 
3 (3.5%, 50%) 
Foreign Assets 2 (2.5%, 22.2%) 2 (2.5%, 18.2%) 4 (4.7%, 26.7%) 
Region Qingshanhu District 15 (19.0%, 40.5%) 18 (22.8%, 45%) 18(20.9%, 45%) 
Other Districts 10 (12.6%, 23.8%) 10 (12.6%, 25.6%) 14(16.3%, 30.4%) 
Total 25 (31.6%) 28(35.4%) 32(37.2%) 
 
The above data are all project based. In Table 4.7 we look at firms rather 
than projects and explore the pattern of innovation and collaboration across 
firms by looking into the ownership of innovative firms and their regional 
location. Similar to Table 4.6, Table 4.7 presents data upon both extent and 
proportions for the period from 2005 to 2007. Numbers in each cell are a count 
of the number of innovative (or collaborating) firms, whilst the two numbers in 
brackets indicate the proportion (i) of firms in the sample population, and (ii) in 
the sample with the same pattern, respectively. For example, ‗32 (40.5%, 50%)‘ 
in the first row first column means that 32 firms that are domestic assets 
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innovated, representing 40% of all firms in the sample and 50% of all domestic 
firms. 
Table 4.7 indicates that in general, nearly half of the firms undertake 
innovation, whilst more than 30% of firms undertake collaboration. These two 
figures jointly indicate that more than 60% of firms must choose collaboration 
when they innovate. Another general observation is that firms seem to have a 
growing preference for collaboration over time. Whereas 31.6% of firms choose 
collaboration in 2005, the figure decreased to 35.4% in 2006 and 37.2% in 
2007. Bearing in mind that the percentage of sample firms who innovate in 2007 
is only 50%, this indicates that the proportion of firms undertaking self-
innovation must have decreased in 2007 
In terms of ownership, Table 4.7 suggests that of the around 50% of all 
firms that innovate, about 40% of all firms are (i.e. eight tenths of those who 
innovate) are domestic assets. Of the 35% or so of all firms that collaborate, 
about 30% are domestic assets. The data indicate that firstly 80% of firms which 
choose to innovate or to collaborate are domestic assets. It also indicates that 
more than 70% of domestic firms choose collaboration as their innovation 
pattern. In particular, we notice that the percentage of domestic collaborative 
firms, increases from 26.6% in 2005 to 29.1% in 2007, suggesting that as time 
proceeds, more and more domestic firms choose collaboration. On the other 
hand, innovative firms that are Assets of Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan or foreign 
assets, although similar to each other, form only a small proportion of innovators 
and collaborators in the sample population. 
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However, we may not simply claim that firms that are domestic assets 
are more likely to innovate or to collaborate. This is because the low percentage 
of non-domestic innovator or collaborators in the sample may be caused by the 
low number of non-domestic firms in sample. By comparing with the second 
percentage in brackets, we find that although the percentage of innovative or 
collaborative firms from Hong Kong, Macao, or Taiwan in the total population is 
relatively low, the percentage of innovative or collaborative firms within the 
group containing firms from Hong Kong Macao, Taiwan is quite large. This 
indicates that both domestic assets and the assets of Hong Kong, Macao, 
Taiwan are highly likely to innovate or collaborate. In contrast, no matter 
whether we look at the percentage of firms in the sample population, or in the 
sample of foreign firms, the desire for innovation or collaboration in foreign firms 
is significantly low. This might be because most foreign firms located in Nan 
Chang are not headquarters, and they will normally focus more on marketing 
rather than R&D activities. 
Apart from ownership, we can also explore the innovation and 
collaboration distribution across all firms by districts. Since most of the 
technology intensive industries are located at Qingshanhu District, we divide our 
sample into two parts: firms located at Qingshanhu District and firms located at 
the seven other districts. Table 4.7 shows that there are about 24 or so 
innovative firms located in the Qingshanhu District (about 28% of all sample 
firms) and 18 or so innovative firms located in the other districts. Similarly about 
18 collaborating firms (about 23% of all sample firms) are located in the 
Qingshanhu District and about 10 or 14 in the other districts. These results 
indicate that more than 55% of firms who innovate are located at Qingshanhu 
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District, whilst more than 65% of firms who collaborate are located at 
Qingshanhu District. Also, it suggests that more than 72% of innovative firms in 
the Qingshanhu District choose collaboration as their innovation pattern. 
On the other hand, looking at   the proportion of innovative or 
collaborative firms in a specific region relative to all firms in that specific region 
(the second percentage in brackets), we observe that 54% of firms in the 
Qingshanhu District innovate, whilst only 41% of firms in other districts innovate. 
Similar phenomenon may also be observed re collaboration in that the 
proportion of firms locating at Qingshanhu District who collaborate is nearly one 
third higher than in in other districts. This result indicates that firms locating at 
Qingshanhu District are more likely to innovate or collaborate.  
4.4.3 Data Exploration on Other Variables 
As listed above, in our empirical analysis the main dependent variables are 
innovation (INNO), collaboration (COLL) and collaboration cost percentage (CP), 
whilst the independent variables are concerned with three issues, innovative 
ability including both innovation input (R&D) and innovation output (PAT), 
absorptive capacity represented by education (EDUC), and catching up capacity, 
which encompasses the technology level (TL) and the technology gap (TG). In 
addition, we also employ several control variables including the spillover effect 
(SE), transaction cost (MCON, OPR, CAST), perceived price (PP), a district 
dummy variable (DIS) and a registration dummy variable (REG). In this sub-
section, we firstly present descriptive statistics using pooled data (covering all 
three years) and then the balanced data (covering firms observed in all three 
years) for these explanatory variables. Then the sample is broken down by year 
and industry to provide further details. 
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The summary statistics in Table 4.8 illustrate the mean values for 
variables in different samples. All the independent variables and control 
variables are included. As indicated in Table 4.3, market size varies as some 
firms joined and some firms left the sample. We therefore explore mean values 
for both unbalanced and balanced samples, which include 244 observations 
and 192 observations respectively. The results shows that, for  example: nearly 
37% and 42% of employees have engineering qualifications or a higher degree 
in unbalanced and balanced sample; the mean value for the spillover effect, 
measured as the ratio of the firms‘ imitation expenditure relative to average 
imitation expenditure in the industry, is 0.28 in the unbalanced sample, and 0.34 
in the balanced sample, which is relatively small; the mean value for MCON is 
about 0.39 indicating generally high market concentration; and from the means 
of DIS and REG, we know that on average, 48% of firms are located in the 
Qingshanhu district and 78% of firms are recognised as domestic assets. 
Table 4.8 Means of Variables in Sample Data 
 Unbalanced Balanced 
 Mean Mean 
R&D 2.019 2.344 
PAT 3.672 4.505 
EDUC 0.367 0.422 
TL 58.68 65.83 
TG 516.9 535.7 
SE 0.279 0.335 
MCON 0.392 0.380 
OPR 0.0210 0.0242 
CAST 4.858 4.980 
PP 0.0713 0.0742 
DIS 0.480 0.474 
REG 0.783 0.781 
N 244 192 
 
There are seven industries that are not represented in our population 
sample as demonstrated in Table 4.4 and thus our industry breakdowns cover 
only the other 26 industries in the sample population and 21 industries in the 
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balanced sample. Table 4.9 presents descriptive statistics for a number of the 
independent variables by year and industry. The results from unbalanced data 
show that, in general, the sample covers more firms and more industries as 
time passes. We also observe considerable heterogeneity in the sample with 
firms in some industries being more innovatively active (R&D), or having a 
higher catching up capacity. 
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Table 4.9 Mean Value of Explanatory Variables by Industry and Time 
Industry R&D PAT EDUC TL TG   R&D PAT EDUC TL TG 
 
R&D PAT EDUC TL TG 
  
 
                                             Unbalanced   
 
 2005                                                                                                                   2006                                                                                                           2007 
13 0 0 0 0 498.6   1.574 1 0.333 46.89 768.2   1.136 0.5 0.157 16.65 633.8 
14 1.942 0 0.5 17.24 267.2   2.007 0 0.317 21.17 253   2.114 0.5 0.436 130.2 649.6 
15 1.226 3.333 0.1486 0 331.6   1.985 5 0.242 0 687.3   1.401 3 0.133 29.53 724.4 
17 0.8966 0 0.0521 13.22 171.1   0.8774 0.2 0.103 17.4 144.3   0.724 0.167 0.083 12.24 131.7 
18 0 0 0 0 430.2   0 0 0 0 252.8   0 0 0 0 874.1 
22 0 0 0 0 3293   0 0 0 0 3416   0 0 0 0 3031 
23 0.8618 3.25 0.1981 42.61 280.7   0.7867 2 0.139 38.94 268.3   0.67 2.75 0.151 10.88 713.6 
26 1.263 0 0.2485 33.89 299.7   1.427 0 0.275 22.22 334.9   1.422 0.333 0.486 46.12 312.4 
27 3.664 13 0.6385 191.2 386.3   3.587 8.125 0.669 144.7 449.9   3.668 16 0.674 119.5 455.8 
28 3.117 0 0.5256 8.384 765.1   3.063 0 0.624 6.8 817.6   2.978 0 1 22.61 631.5 
29 3.511 0 0.9909 14.73 665.1   3.633 0 0.955 32.57 735.4   3.668 0 0.659 52.95 8863 
31 0.8696 0 0.25 0 305.5   2.056 0 0.635 0 391   2.086 0 0.667 0 462.7 
32 4.796 1 0.466 103.9 385.7   4.572 1 0.48 65.9 486.7   4.819 1 0.535 156.3 551.9 
33 3.83 1.5 0.7583 49.66 400.2   4.123 1.5 0.591 90.37 422.1   2.797 0 0.469 92.46 870.2 
34 2.151 9.5 0.4243 22.93 551.9   2.518 10.33 0.625 15.66 483   0.78 0.2 0.314 9.272 419.9 
35 4.064 3.5 0.7481 14.42 367   4.083 2.5 0.769 22.67 379.5   4.156 2.5 0.872 19.24 422.8 
36 2.191 1.166 0.4163 19.73 133.7   2.219 1.166 0.366 26.35 149.4   2.207 0.75 0.356 31.53 166.1 
37 2.837 7.75 0.2812 162.7 465.6   2.911 10.25 0.294 142.7 695.8   2.357 9 0.247 139.1 663.8 
39 1.341 4.4 0.2164 39.6 408.1   1.949 6.875 0.463 49.18 416.8   2.689 9.25 0.362 266.6 480.3 
40 5.088 40 0.5169 66.96 252.2   4.303 11.5 0.497 53.65 227.6   5.197 28 0.553 88.5 204.5 
44 0.8642 0 0.33 0 589.1   0.942 1 0.229 0.3523 601.1   0.527 1 0.369 3.151 617.9 
16 4.554 0 0.7432 285.5 2371   4.699 6 0.667 231.4 509.7   4.017 7 0.516 49.66 915.4 
20             0 0 0 0 884.9   4.713 16 0.236 358.7 502 
46             4.565 2 0.849 469.3 1744   0 0 0 0 874.4 
42                         0 0 0 0 99.77 
45                         0 0 0 0 964.8 
Number of firms: 79     Number of firms: 79 
 
Number of firms: 86 
  Balanced 
13 0 0 0 0 498.6   1.574 1 0.333 46.89 768.2   1.514 0.667 0.21 22.2 761.7 
14 1.942 0 0.5 17.24 267.2   2.006 0 0.317 21.17 253   2.114 0.5 0.436 130.2 649.6 
15 1.838 5 0.2229 0 446.8   1.985 5 0.241 0 687.3   2.101 4.5 0.199 44.29 952.6 
17 1.1208 0 0.0652 16.52 169.3   1.096 0.25 0.129 21.75 149.6   1.085 0.25 0.124 18.36 145.4 
18 0 0 0 0 430.2   0 0 0 0 431.1   0 0 0 0 874.1 
22 0 0 0 0 3293   0 0 0 0 3416   0 0 0 0 3031 
23 0.8618 3.25 0.1981 42.61 280.7   0.7866 2 0.139 38.94 268.3   0.67 2.75 0.151 10.88 713.6 
26 2.525 0 0.497 67.79 279.4   2.378 0 0.458 37.04 291.4   1.421 0.333 0.486 46.12 312.4 
27 3.711 14.85 0.6583 199.6 391.1   3.626 9.285 0.693 147.1 450.3   4.191 18.28 0.77 136.5 486.1 
28 3.116 0 0.5256 8.384 765.1   3.062 0 0.624 6.8 817.6   2.977 0 1 22.61 631.5 
29 3.51 0 0.9909 14.73 665.1   3.633 0 0.955 32.57 735.4   3.668 0 0.659 52.95 8863 
31 1.739 0 0.5 0 345   1.515 0 0.48 0 415.8   1.518 0 0.5 0 414.3 
32 4.795 1 0.466 103.9 385.7   4.571 1 0.48 65.9 486.7   4.819 1 0.535 156.3 551.9 
33 3.83 1.5 0.7583 49.66 400.2   4.123 1.5 0.591 90.37 422.1   4.196 0 0.703 138.6 557.3 
34 4.301 19 0.8486 45.87 949.3   3.907 31 0.876 47 748.8   3.901 1 0.876 46.36 993.3 
35 4.063 3.5 0.7481 14.42 367   4.082 2.5 0.769 22.67 379.5   4.156 2.5 0.872 19.24 422.8 
36 2.191 1.166 0.4163 19.73 133.7   2.218 1.166 0.366 26.35 149.4   2.942 1 0.474 42.04 157.9 
37 5.674 15.5 0.5624 325.4 636.8   5.822 20.5 0.589 285.5 786.9   5.893 22.5 0.619 347.8 947.6 
39 1.915 6.285 0.2454 56.57 363.7   2.226 7.857 0.529 56.21 459.7   3.074 10.57 0.413 304.7 542.3 
40 5.088 40 0.5169 66.96 252.2   5.167 23 0.561 82.39 250   5.197 28 0.553 88.5 204.5 
44 0.8642 0 0.33 0 589.1   0.9419 1 0.229 0.3523 601.1   0.527 1 0.369 3.151 617.9 
Number of firms: 64   Number of firms: 64 
 
Number of firms: 64 
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In terms of the innovation output variable, represented by PAT (patent), 
we find that this reaches highest for firms in industries 40 (Manufacture of radio, 
television and communication equipment and apparatus), 37 (Manufacture of 
motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers and other transport equipment), 34 
(Manufacture of basic metals), 27 (Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal 
chemical and botanical products) and 39 (Manufacture of electrical machinery 
and apparatus n.e.c). To some degree this may be because these five 
industries have been recognised as pillar industries by the Jiang Xi government 
since 2003 (Dai et al, 2011), and firms in these industries might have further 
financial support for R&D and also benefit from preferential policies. But on the 
other hand, we found that in some industries, patent performance may not 
significantly increase with large amounts of R&D input, such as industry 33 
(Mining of non-ferrous metal ores) and 14 (Manufacture of food products). This 
result therefore suggests that judgements regarding the firms‘ innovative ability 
may actually vary with different measures. 
Results for the variable EDUC (education) reveals that a higher 
proportion of employees with higher degrees may be found in industry 16 
(Manufacture of tobacco products), 29 (Manufacture of rubber products) and 35 
(Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c). This suggests that firms in 
these industries may have higher absorptive capacity. However, as only one 
firm is reported in the dataset (which only covers large and medium enterprises) 
for both industries 16 and 29, the actual value for the proportion of employees 
with higher degrees in both industries could be much lower in reality 
On the other hand, from Table 4.9, we observe that variables TL and SE 
appear to take a zero value for a number of industries. This is partly because 
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the measures of technology level and spillover effect are closely related to R&D 
and imitation expenditure. Not every firm is involved in innovation or imitation 
and hence TL and SE in those firms are zero. Another reason may be the 
uneven distribution of innovative activity among firms. In some industries, only 
one firm spends a large amount of expenditure on imitation, whilst others do 
not. This means that spillover in this firm must be greater than in others. 
4.4.4 Variable Correlations 
To provide a general picture of the relationship between the three dependent 
variables and various independent variables, a table of partial correlations is 
provided (Table 4.10). Partial correlation (different from unconditional 
correlation) allows one to explore the influence of one particular independent 
variable on the dependent variable while holding all other variables constant. 
Partial correlation thus eliminates the impacts of other variables and only 
represents the individual influence of each independent variable. Another 
important point we should bear in mind is that since both collaboration and 
collaboration cost will only occur when firms innovate, any correlation between 
one variable and collaboration (or collaboration cost) must be conditional. To 
explain this, for instance, we may look at the partial correlation between SE 
(spillover effect) and CP (collaboration cost) in the unbalanced sample. The 
result from Table 4.10 suggests SE is positively correlated with CP, but is not 
significantly related with INNO (innovation). We cannot consequently claim that 
CP must increase when SE increases. Instead, we may suggest that when firms 
decide to innovate via collaboration, their collaboration cost percentage share 
may be elastic to a change in SE. 
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Table 4.10 Partial Correlation of Dependent Variables 
 Unbalanced  Balanced 
 INNO COLL CP  INNO COLL CP 
R_D 0.8031*** 0.0983 0.2445***  0.7713*** 0.0417 0.2496*** 
PAT -0.2136*** -0.0392 0.0166  -0.2109*** -0.037 0.004 
EDUC 0.5543*** 0.3816*** 0.1335**  0.5765*** 0.4087*** 0.1189 
TL -0.1425** 0.1209* -0.1343**  -0.1163 0.1227* -0.1309* 
TG 0.0084 0.1067 0.0573  0.017 0.0662 0.0448 
SE 0.0058 -0.0614 0.1536**  0.0193 -0.0652 0.138* 
MCON -0.0159 -0.04 -0.0662  -0.0144 -0.0556 -0.0751 
OPR -0.0993 0.1047 -0.0424  -0.0345 0.1544** -0.036 
CAST -0.0382 0.1292** 0.1005  -0.0489 0.1877** 0.1217 
PP 0.0667 -0.0246 -0.2086***  0.0719 0.0297 -0.2002*** 
DIS 0.0093 0.0915 -0.0575  -0.0051 0.0574 -0.0638 
REG 0.0544 0.113* 0.0414  0.0493 0.0621 0.0245 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
According to Table 4.10, two variables are commonly seen to be 
significantly correlated with the three dependent variables in most cases, 
‗education‘ (EDUC) and ‗technology level‘ (TL). In particular, the results show 
that ‗education‘ is positively related to innovation, collaboration and 
collaboration cost (except for the collaboration cost model in the balanced 
sample), suggesting that firms having more employees with higher degrees 
innovate more and collaborate more. They also seem to pay more of the cost 
when they collaborate. On the other hand, the ‗technology level‘ has a negative 
influence on innovation and collaboration cost, but is positively related to 
collaboration at the 10% significance level. This indicates that technological 
leaders are not necessarily the most innovative and that they pay less of 
collaboration costs (when they collaborate which they are more likely to do). 
Two other variables are significantly related to innovation. They are R&D, 
and ‗patent‘ (PAT), both of which are indicators for firms‘ innovative ability. But 
interestingly, whilst R&D is positively correlated with innovation, PAT is 
negatively related. Also, the results from Table 4.10 reveal that apart from 
‗education‘ (EDUC) and ‗technology level‘ (TL), collaboration is positively 
 219 
correlated to both ‗complementary assets‘ (CAST) and ‗registration‘ (REG) in 
the population sample (which means that firms that spend more on 
complementary assets or (and) domestic assets tend to collaborate more), 
whilst it is positively correlated with both CAST and OPR (operational personnel 
ratio) in the balanced sample, (suggesting that firms may be more likely  to 
collaborate when transaction costs from a monitor perspective or an 
enforcement perspective increase). Last but not least, we found that 
collaboration cost is positively correlated with ‗R&D‘, ‗education‘ (EDUC) (but 
not in the balanced sample) and the ‗spillover effect‘ (SE), but negatively 
correlated with ‗technology level‘ (TL) and ‗perceived price‘ (PP). 
Such results, of course, provide only an initial view of the patterns that 
are apparent in the date. Correlation analysis in particular assumes linear 
relationships and may be problematic when there are data selection issues. 
Therefore in the next Chapter more sophisticated approaches are employed to 
analyse these data by using a set of various econometric models.  
 
4.5 Conclusion and Indications 
Together with Chapter 5, in this chapter by using Chinese empirical data, we 
empirically explore under what circumstances firms prefer to innovate and/or 
collaborate, and how collaboration costs are shared. These data in particular 
discuss what empirical relationships may exist, demonstrate the nature of the 
data and conduct some initial investigations of what determinants may influence 
innovation and collaboration.  
As we have explained before, the theoretical approach developed in the 
previous chapter does not neatly transfer to the real world context. For example 
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in the game theory model, collaboration was defined as the collaboration 
between competing rival firms. The data for the Chinese region studied however 
indicated that most collaboration activities have been between firms and local 
government (Table 4.6). Given the institutional context to work with our data, 
the definition of collaboration in this and the next chapter has been expanded to 
incorporate collaborations with all players, including firms, institutions and 
government. Secondly, when we do observe collaborations between firms, 
those firms may not necessarily be competing. They may be rivals, or 
sometimes may be upstream or downstream of each other so we have to look 
at this wider picture rather than narrowing ourselves in a rigid mode. Thirdly, the 
game theoretic model concentrated upon product innovation while our data 
however shows that firms undertake both product and process innovation. We 
have thus decided to consider both types of technological change. The 
empirical analysis in this sense may not closely replicate the game theory 
modelling, but this is considered preferable to taking the wider real world lens 
rather than the narrow theoretical lens. 
This approach also means that there has been some shifting of 
definitions as we move from theory to empirics which has been discussed in 
detail before. One of the most important however is that we have found it useful 
to consider in the empirical work that innovation encompasses both self-
innovation and innovation through collaboration. While in the theoretical work 
innovation was considered to be just self-innovation (i.e. the introduction of new 
products without collaboration). 
This work merits recognition as the first to use micro level data on Large 
and Medium sized firms to investigate innovation and collaboration strategies of 
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firms in China (and in fact in any mid-income level developing country). The 
work itself has been constrained by the limitations given by the confidential 
nature of the data and the Statistics Law of the People‘s Republic of China. The 
dataset is composed of two surveys, four forms, covering 33 manufacturing 
industries from 2005 to 2007 located in Nan Chang, which is one of fastest 
growing cities in both Jiang Xi province and in China. The number of sample 
firms (also the population) increases from 79 in 2005 and 2006 to 86 in 2007. 
We found that the firms are mainly in chemical and electrical related industries 
(ISIC 26 to 44), where innovations also occur intensively.  
Following the game theory model, we define three dependent variables:   
‗innovation‘, ‗collaboration‘ and ‗collaboration cost‘. The game theoretic 
framework however is not particularly useful as a guide to defining and 
measuring those variables that may be considered as explanatory. Using recent 
relevant literatures (Castellacci, 2008; Blalock & Gertler, 2009), we thus 
approach the definition of such variables by exploring the innovative ability, 
absorptive capacity, and catching up capability of firms and define variables that 
measure these concepts. In addition and more closely related to the theory, we 
also take ‗transaction cost‘, and ‗perceived price‘ into account as control 
variables. 
The results that are generated are new and provide details on innovation 
and collaboration patterns in Chinese manufacturing industry that have not 
been reported before. We find that an increasing proportion of the sample 
(population of) firms has been innovating over time, rising from 48% to 50% in 
the sample period. We also observe that self-innovation decreases in 
importance over time (to 43%) with collaborative innovation increasing. Most 
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innovation projects are concerned with either ‗R&D‘, or ‗applied R&D‘, rather 
than fundamental or applied research whilst more than 70% of innovation could 
be counted as product innovation.  
The results from Table 4.9 suggest that the distribution of innovation 
activities varies significantly across industries. Firms in ‗pillar industries‘ (code 
40, 37, 27, 34, and 39) are more innovatively active, whilst firms in industry 16, 
29 and 35 seem to have greater absorptive capacity. 
Correlation analysis in Table 4.10 show that, of the three factors posited 
to affect innovation, collaboration and shares of collaboration costs, i.e. 
innovative ability, absorptive capacity, and catching up capability of firms, there 
is a correlation between at least some of the variables representing each of 
these factors for innovation and collaboration cost, but only absorptive capacity 
and catching up capacity are significantly correlated with collaboration. In more 
details, the results suggest that since the correlation coefficient of ‗education‘ is 
consistent and positive for nearly all dependent variables, firms with better 
educated employees tend to exhibit more innovation, are more likely to 
collaborate and bear a higher share of collaboration cost when they do 
undertake collaboration. In addition we found that increasing transaction cost 
may significantly stimulate collaboration, whilst increasing imitation or 
decreasing perceived price may significantly increase collaboration cost share. 
In the next Chapter, we will continue to analyse the sample data by employing 
econometric as opposed to statistical methods.  
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Appendix 
 
1. China Innovation Survey 
 
1.1. Innovation Project Form (Form B107-1) 
 
Firm Code: XXXXXX-X 
Firm Name(with Stamp): XXXXX 
 
Proj
ect 
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Na
me 
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e 
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ation 
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hing 
Date 
No. 
of 
Peo
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invo
lved 
in 
proj
ect 
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of 
invo
lved 
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king 
hour
s 
Inte
rnal 
proj
ect 
exp
ense 
this 
year 
 with 
engine
ering 
qualifi
cation 
withou
t 
engine
ering 
qualifi
cation 
but 
with 
higher 
degree  
    A     
B 
        
1 
        
2 
        
3 
        
4 
      
5 
      6       
7 
         8           
9 
    
10 
     
11 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
Director of Project: XXXX                                                                                                      Tel: 
XXXX                       Submitted Date: XXXXX 
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Category Classifications: 
(1). Innovation Nature Classification and Subcode 
Subcode Innovation Nature Classification Details 
1 National Project Including 863 projects, Xinghuo projects, 
Pandeng projects.. 
2 Local Project Including projects hold by local governments 
3 Entrusted Project by other firms  
4 Self-Project  
5 Project from abroad  
6 Others  
 
(2). Innovation Pattern Classification and Subcode 
Subcode Innovation Pattern Classification 
1 Collaboration with abroad institutions 
2 Collaboration with national universities 
3 Collaboration with national independent institutions 
4 Collaboration with registered foreign investments 
5 Collaboration with registered other investments 
6 Innovation by self-research department 
7 Collaboration with local government 
8 Others 
 
(3) Innovation Usage Classification and Subcode 
Subcode Innovation Usage Classification 
1 Fundamental research 
2 Applied research 
3 R&D 
4 Applied R&D 
 
(4) Innovation Target Classification and Subcode 
Subcode Innovation Target Details 
1 To develop brand new product To design or produce brand new products by 
adopting new technology or disciplines 
2 To increase functions of existing product  
3 To improve performance of product  
4 To increase productivity  
5 To decrease energy consumption  
6 To decrease raw materials consumption  
7 To decrease pollution  
8 Others  
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1.2. Innovation Activity Form (Form B107-2) 
 
Firm Code: XXXXXX-X 
Firm Name (with Stamp): XXXXX 
 
Name of Index Units Code Annual 
Spending 
A B C 1 
1. Information of Innovation Activity    
(1). People involved in Innovation Activity  01  
       Inc. people directly involved in projects  02  
               people involved in technological management and services  03  
       Inc. women  101  
       Inc. full time employees  04  
       Inc. people with engineering qualification  05  
              without engineering qualification but with higher degree  06  
       Inc. people involved in R&D  07  
(2).  Funding Collection Resource ¥1,000 08  
       Self funding ¥1,000 09  
       Loan from financial institution ¥1,000 10  
       Government ¥1,000 11  
       Public sectors ¥1,000 53  
       Abroad ¥1,000 12  
       Others ¥1,000 13  
(3). Funding Expenditure ¥1,000 14  
      Internal expenditure ¥1,000 15  
            Divided by usages:    
                 Service charge inc. salaries ¥1,000 16  
                 Raw materials ¥1,000 17  
                 Equipment purchase ¥1,000 18  
                 Others ¥1,000 19  
            Inc. R&D expenditure ¥1,000 20  
            Inc. Expenditure on new products ¥1,000 21  
      External expenditure by collaboration ¥1,000 22  
            Inc. Expenditure with universities and institutions ¥1,000 23  
                   Other firms ¥1,000 24  
2. Annual Information of All Innovation Projects    
    Number of innovation projects  25  
          Inc. projects of inventing new products  26  
          Inc. projects of R&D  27  
    Internal expenditure of all projects ¥1,000 28  
          Inc. expenditure on R&D ¥1,000 29  
3. Information of Self-Funded Research Institutions    
    Number of research institutions  30  
    People in research institutions  31  
          Inc. people with doctoral degrees  32  
                  with master degrees  33  
    Internal expenditure in self funded research institutions ¥1,000 34  
    Price of all equipment ¥1,000 35  
Name of Index Units Code Annual 
Spending 
4. Innovation Activity Output    
    Output value of new products ¥1,000 36  
    Revenue from new products ¥1,000 37  
           Inc. revenue from export ¥1,000 38  
    Number of applied patents  39  
           Inc. invention patent  40  
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    Number of owned patents  41  
5. Information and Means of Obtained Technology    
    Expenditure on improving existing technology ¥1,000 42  
    Expenditure on introducing technology from abroad ¥1,000 43  
    Expenditure on technological diffusion ¥1,000 44  
    Expenditure on purchase national technology ¥1,000 45  
6. Other Information    
    Number of engineers and technicians  46  
    Expenditure on capital construction relating innovation activity ¥1,000 47  
           Inc. expenditure on civil construction ¥1,000 48  
    Price of all equipment for production and operation ¥1,000 49  
           Inc. electronic controlled rack ¥1,000 50  
    Tax deduction for innovation activity ¥1,000 51  
P.S. Number of self-funded research institutions abroad  52  
 
Director of Project: XXXX                                            Tel: XXXX                       Submitted Date: 
XXXXX 
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1.3. Corporate Details Form 
 
Form No.601 
Form producer: National Bureau of Statistics of China 
 
 
 Firm Code:  A    
 Firm Name:     deleted 
 Legal Person:     deleted 
 Place of Firm Registered:    ,Administrative Code  B  ,Province  C  ,City  D  , District  E    
 Contact Details:  Tel:     ,Fax:    ,Email:    , Website:      
 Industry Classification: Major Products (Major Activity):   1. F;    2. G;    3. H   
    Industry Code:  I    
 Type of Registration:      J 
 
Domestic Assets: 
110.  National 
120.  Collective 
130.  Shareholding System 
141.  National Affiliated 
142.  Collective Affiliated 
143.  International Affiliated 
149.  Other Affiliated 
151.  National Proprietorship 
159.  Other Limited Liability Company 
160.  Joint Stock Limited Partnership 
171.  Private Proprietorship 
171.  Private Partnership 
173.  Private Limited Liability Company 
174.  Private Joint Stock Limited Partnership 
190.  Others 
 
Assets of Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan 
210.  Joint Venture with Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan 
220.  Cooperation with Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan 
230.  Proprietorship of Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan 
240.  Joint Stock Limited Partnership with Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan 
 
Foreign Assets: 
310.  International Joint Venture 
320.  International Cooperation 
330.  International Proprietorship 
340.  Joint Stock Limited Partnership of Foreign Investments 
 Firm Attribution:     K 
 
10.  Nation  
20.  Province  
40.  City  
50.  Prefecture 
61.  Street 
62.  Town 
63.  Country 
71.  Village  
90.  Others 
Time of Found (Year):  L 
Number of People Involved by the End of Year: M 
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Inc. Female:    N 
Firm Major Indicators 
Annual Revenue:      O 
Inc. Annual Revenue from Major Products(Major Activity):    P  
Value of Assets:     Q 
Firm Director:   
Tel: 
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2. Annual Corporate Financial Survey 
 
Firm (Organisation) Code: XXXX                          Form Designed by NBS 
Firm Name: XXXX                                                 Valid until: 2011 
 
Name of Index Units Code Annual Spending 
Stock ¥1,000 002  
Including Final Goods ¥1,000 003  
Value of Assets ¥1,000 009  
Annual Revenue from Major Products(Major Activity) ¥1,000 124  
Annual Cost from Major Products(Major Activity) ¥1,000 125  
Profit ¥1,000 136  
Number of People Involved  145  
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3. Details of Manufacturing Structure 
 
Division Description 
13 Manufacture of agricultural byproducts 
14 Manufacture of food products 
15 Manufacture of beverages 
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 
17 Manufacture of textiles 
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel 
19 Manufacture of leather and related products 
20 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; 
21 Manufacture of furniture 
22 Manufacture of paper and paper products 
23 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 
24 Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery 
25 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 
26 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
27 Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and botanical products 
28 Manufacture of man-made fibres 
29 Manufacture of rubber products 
30 Manufacture of plastics products 
31 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
32 Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat 
33 Mining of non-ferrous metal ores 
34 Manufacture of basic metals 
35 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
36 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 
37 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers and other transport equipment 
39 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 
40 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 
41 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 
42 Other manufacturing 
43 Recycling 
44 Electricity supply 
45 Gas supply 
46 Water supply 
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5 The Determinants of Collaboration in Innovation in Chinese 
Manufacturing Industry: An Empirical Analysis 
 
5.1  Introduction 
This chapter employs various econometric techniques to further investigate the 
determinants of innovation (including innovation via collaboration), collaboration 
and collaboration cost sharing in Chinese manufacturing. In Chapter 3, a 
theoretical model was use to explore what determinants may impact 
collaboration and collaboration cost. In chapter 4, the sources and summary 
statistics for the data to be used in this chapter have been explored in depth. 
Here we test various hypotheses as to the factors that influence firms‘ 
technological change decisions, including innovation, collaboration and 
collaboration cost respectively. In particular, for the first time in the literature, we 
empirically investigate the determinants of cost shares in technological 
collaborations. The econometric analysis provides some clear insight and 
consequently enables one to draw relevant implications for policy makers. 
A number of predictions relating to the determinants of collaboration and 
collaboration cost are generated from the game theory model in Chapter 3. 
However, as explained in Chapter 4, due to the nature of the Chinese economy, 
there are numerous reasons why we cannot simply move from those predictions 
to empirical testing. Thus, instead of testing the empirical validity of hypotheses 
derived from the game theory model, here we intend to propose a series of 
other related but also testable hypotheses which are either generated from 
existing literatures or implied from our theoretical model. 
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In section 5.2 we summarise the possible impacts of a number of 
variables on three different dependent variables discussed in the previous 
chapter and generate various testable hypotheses. Section 5.3 examines issues 
relating to any problems of selection bias in the empirical analysis. Using both 
balanced and unbalanced samples we show that there are no significant 
problems relating to selection bias. We hence proceed in Section 5.4 by 
estimating equations for each dependent variable separately. In particular, we 
employ a Probit model to regress the binary choice between innovation and 
collaboration, whilst we use OLS, fixed effect and random effect panel models 
to regress collaboration cost. Section 5.5 further investigates dependent 
variables by considering both timing and dynamic issues. The contribution of 
the estimates and limitations are explained in the final section of this chapter. 
5.2 Hypotheses and Empirical Research Questions 
The definition and measures of dependent and independent variables, taken 
from the previous chapter, are reproduced in Table 5.1.  
Table 5.1 Variables Table 
 Variables Definition Literature 
 
 
DV 
 
 
 
Innovation          INNO (i ,t) Innovation pattern 1-8  
Collaboration     COLL (i, t) Innovation pattern 1-8 except 6  
 
Cost percentage CP (i,t) 
Ratio of firm’s collaboration 
cost to the sum of  industry 
average collaboration cost and 
firm’s collaboration cost 
 
 
 
 
 
IDV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Innovative 
ability 
Innovation input: 
R&D (i, t) 
logarithm of the sum of ‘R&D 
expenditure’ and ‘expenditure 
on new products’  
Davidson & Segerstrom, 1998 
Fagerberg, 1987 
Castellacci, 2008 
Innovation output: 
Patent, PAT (i, t) 
sum of ‘Number of applied 
patents’ and ‘Number of owned 
patents’ 
Fagerberg & Verspagen, 2002 
Absorptive 
capacity 
Education 
EDUC (i,t) 
Ratio of people who involved in 
R&D activity with qualification 
or higher degree to entire 
innovative activity group 
Blalock & Gertler, 2009 
Castellacci, 2008 
Catching up 
capacity 
Technology level 
TL (i, t) 
R&D expenditures per 
researcher 
Ryu & Byeon, 2011 
Canova, 2004 
Technology gap  
TG (i, t) 
Investment ratio Klein & Lim, 1997 
Sjoholm, 1999 
Note: DV and IDV represent dependent variables and independent variables, respectively. 
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As stated above we are unable to move directly from the game theoretic 
model to estimation (for example, to do so would require that we were able to 
separate out action/reaction and persistent dominance markets from each other 
which we are unable to do). Instead, by looking at the patterns of innovation and 
collaboration in Chapter 4 and considering related literatures we specify three 
factors as our determinants of innovation and collaboration, which are 
innovative ability, absorptive capacity and catching up capacity. We choose 
these three factors partly because they are all closely related to technological 
growth, but more importantly, they cover both endogenous and exogenous 
impacts on innovation and collaboration. For instance, the former  two factors, 
including R&D, PAT (patent), and EDUC (education) are influences concerned 
with firms own ability, whilst the last factor, catching up capacity (including TL 
(technology level) and TG (technology gap))  emphasise more on the influence 
of the market. Most literatures support a positive relationship between these five 
determinants and innovation (collaboration) (last column in Table 5.1), but it is 
rare to see empirical works that tests them in a general way. Rather than 
discussing the individual impacts of these five independent variables on 
technology change, we therefore employ them as measures of the three trigger 
factors in a broad sense and focus on how they influence innovation, 
collaboration and collaboration cost.  
Thus, we illustrate six ad hoc hypotheses that are worthy of further 
investigation. These hypotheses may be stated as follows 
H1: A firm with high innovative ability is more likely to innovate. 
H2: A firm with high absorptive capacity is more likely to innovate  
H3: A firm with high catching capacity is more likely to innovate  
H4: A firm with high innovative ability is more likely to collaborate  
H5: A firm with high absorptive capacity is more likely to collaborate 
H6: A firm with high catching capacity is more likely to collaborate.  
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These six hypotheses fall naturally into two groups (Table 5.2). The first 
group (third column of Table 5.2) encompasses H1, H2 and H3 and investigates 
whether innovative ability, absorptive capacity or catching up capacity 
significantly influence innovation. The second group (fourth column of Table 
5.2) contains the other hypotheses and analysis on in what circumstance firms 
decide to collaborate, and thus provides insight into the determinants of 
collaboration.  
We proxy innovative ability though both innovation input, R&D, and 
innovation output, PAT (patent). We assume increasing either R&D, or PAT will 
increase firms‘ innovative ability, leading to a higher possibility of innovation and 
collaboration (H1 & H4). Measuring firms‘ absorptive capacity by EDUC 
(education level), we hypothesise that increasing EDUC must result in growth of 
innovation and collaboration (H2 & H4). Finally, as both TL (technology level) 
and TG (technology gap) are indicators of firms‘ catching up capacity, we 
expect a positive relationship between TL, TG and innovation or collaboration 
(H3 & H6).  
There is little empirical research relating to the cost sharing issues and 
thus we have little knowledge about the determinants of cost sharing when firms 
collaborate. The existing literature only provides little guidance on how to 
proceed. On the other hand, all the predictions relating to collaboration cost 
sharing generated from our game theory model are for the technological 
follower. Although this contributes to the existing literature, in empirical practice, 
it is difficult to identify which players are actually the low technology firms and 
which are the high-technology firms. We thus restrict our empirical analysis of 
collaboration costs to explore the impact of only those determinants which we 
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have argued influence innovation and collaboration decisions to see if they also 
play an important role in collaboration cost sharing decision. We thus use all 
five independent variables as regressors for each of the dependent variables. 
This is summarised in Table 5.2.  
 
Table 5.2 Empirical Hypotheses 
  INNO  COLL  CP  
  (Innovation) (Collaboration) (Collaboration cost) 
R&D Innovative ability H1:  + H4:  + ？ 
PAT      
EDUC Absorptive capacity H2:  + H5:  + ？ 
TL Catching up capacity H3:  + H6:  + ？ 
TG     
 
5.3 Pooled Selection Models and Estimations 
5.3.1 Econometric Models for Sample Selection 
There are two main empirical questions. The first one is the determinants of 
collaboration in innovation (COLL), whist the other is the determinants of the 
collaboration cost percentage (CP). Clearly however, only those firms that 
innovate may undertake collaborative activities. It is therefore necessary to 
consider that collaboration in innovation means that two events have occurred: 
firstly the firm has innovated (INNO) and secondly the firm has collaborated in 
this innovation. For any firm chosen at random, the absence of collaboration 
may mean either there was no innovation or that there was innovation but no 
collaboration. If we were to proceed by just looking at the incidence of 
collaboration in the whole sample of firms rather than just a sample of 
innovating firms then our estimates may tend to show bias in the estimates of 
what impacts upon collaborative activity and its costs. 
Appropriate ways to approach such issues econometrically depend upon 
whether the dependent variable is observable and whether it is exogenous. To 
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be more specific, if the collaboration decision is exogenous and observable, 
whist other independent variables are observable, then we have a censored 
variable estimation structure (even though in some cases, censored variables 
are not necessary). If collaboration is exogenous and observable, but the only 
condition of independent variables‘ observability is that the innovation decision 
must be observable, then what we need is a censored Tobit model. However, if 
the innovation decision depends upon some unobserved factors, then we need 
a selection model to first group our sample before analysing the determinants of 
collaboration cost percentage. We may then choose a Probit selection model for 
the first part of our data exploration13.  
The selection Tobit model, also called a type Ⅱ Tobit model (Amemiya, 
1985), was first used to explore the relationship between wage rates and rates 
of labour participation (Gonau, 1974), but is now well known as the Heckman 
(1979) correction procedure (which was initially developed for correcting for 
selectivity bias in linear regression with normal errors). The difference between 
the Heckman model and other Probit models is that the censored data which 
probably affect the observed dependent variable, are also endogenous. 
Therefore, the Heckman correction, as in Probit models, can not only deal with 
the binary information carried by latent variables, but also solve the bias 
problem during the selection process. The Heckman method via the Heckit has 
been widely used in much social science empirical analysis, in particular in 
agriculture and politics (Bratti et. al, 2004; Yen and Shonkwiler, 1999; 
                                            
13 Even though the Probit selection model is especially good at dealing with unobserved information by 
Probit models, it is still considered as one kind of Tobit models. 
237 
 
Schaffner, 2002; Mbata, 2001; Busch and Reinhardt, 2000; Grier et. al, 1994; 
Nie et.al, 2007).  
However, one concern is that the Heckman procedure explores the 
sample via pooled estimation, thereby not taking full advantage of the benefits 
of panel data. To solve this problem, some researchers suggest using multilevel 
modelling techniques as an alternative method to regress either selection 
models, or panel models (Rabe-Hesketh et al, 2005; 2006; Miranda & Rabe-
Hesketh, 2006). But research rarely investigates panel data selection models. 
Rabe-Hesketh (2002) advocates an idea that a panel data selection model may 
be estimated by one particular kind of multilevel model, labelled the Generalized 
Linear Latent And Mixed Models (GLLAMM) which defines the outcome model 
as nested in the selection model and both cross sectional models are again 
nested in time order. However, to the best of our knowledge, as the GLLAMM 
technique has not been actually fully applied in practice, adopting GLLAMM 
techniques to regress a panel selection model does not seem sufficiently 
convincing. We therefore proceed by using the conventional Heckman selection 
procedure to investigate any selection bias. 
Prior to undertaking empirical analysis, we first address the structure of 
the Heckman model and the differences between the two Heckman selection 
methods: the General Heckman model and Heckman Probit sample selection 
model. 
 
5.3.1.1 General Heckman models. 
 
In this section, we consider a sequence of random vectors,  niYX ii ,...,1),,(   
including one pair of models ),( 21 iii YYY   where iX  is a K vector of covariates, 
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whilst iY  represents the response regression models. In particular, we let 1iY  
indicate the outcome model for cost percentages (CP) and  2iY  for the 
observable collaboration decision (COLL). Then 
 
      1   when 21111  iii YXY                                   
      


 

otherwise
XYif
Y iii
,0
0 ,1 222
*
2
2

                                                                                                                                        
 
where i  is the coefficient vector for )2,1( jX ij . In particular, if 
*
2iY  is greater 
than zero, then the firm collaborates, otherwise, 2iY  equals to zero, and no 
collaboration happens. The observed decisions, 1iY , 2iY ,depend not only upon 
several explanatory variables, but also on unknown error terms, i1 , i2 . In 
particular, 1 , 2  are assume to obey the following two assumptions:  
 
),1,,0,0(~),,( 1212121  NXX ii ;                            
0)( 1 ijXE ; 0)( 2 ijXE                                
 
 
The above assumptions indicate that the error term in the selection 
model is iid but has a correlation 12  with the outcome model‘s error, which 
causes the bias. One uses selection models to avoid the impact brought about 
by such correlated errors. When 012  , there is no correlation between errors, 
which consequently indicates no bias addressed through selection. The cost 
percentage model then turns out to be a standard regression model, whilst the 
collaboration model is a standard Probit model. 
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5.3.1.2 Heckman Probit sample selection models 
 
Similar to the general Heckman models, Probit sample selection models also 
comprise two models. However, both of them are binary models with censored 
data.  
 


 
otherwise
YwhenXYifY iiii ,0
1 ,&0 ,1 3222
*
2
2
          


 

otherwise
XYif
Y iii
,0
0 ,1 333
*
3
3

 
 
The binary outcome 2iY  can only be observed when condition  13 iY  is 
met. Consider
, 2i
Y , 3iY  as the outcome equation and selection equation, 
respectively. Since the collaboration decision is made only if the firm innovates, 
the possibility of event of 2iY  (collaboration, COLL) is less than 3iY  (innovation
14, 
INNO). Thus, the previous estimation solution is no longer suitable for a 
bivariate Probit case15.  
 
The assumptions of the Probit selection models must thus follow: 
 
),1,1,0,0(~),,( 233232  NXX ii ;                         
0)( 2 ijXE ; 0)( 3 ijXE  i,j=1,2                         
 
Similar to the general Heckman models, in bivariate models, variables 
ijX  are independent with errors. In particular, if the error correlation 023  , it 
indicates that there is no selection bias between the collaboration Probit model 
and the innovation Probit model. 
                                            
14 Here we are referring to a broad sense of innovation, equivalent to ‘technology change’ in both 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
15 We use STATA syntax ‘heckprob’ instead of ‘heckman’ 
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There are two main approaches to estimate using the Heckman 
procedure. One is ML estimation in which one estimates the parameter vectors 
and error correlation model sets together by maximizing the log likelihood 
function, whilst the other approach is Two Step estimation (also known as the 
Heckit approach) where one calculates a selection correction term from the 
selection equation in the first step, and at the second stage, adds it into the 
outcome equation as an ‗omitted variable‘ (Heckman, 1979). In STATA, instead 
of using the general Heckman estimation, the default estimation options set for 
the Heckman Probit selection model is ML estimation, because the conventional 
method of two-step estimation in Probit selection models does not generate a 
consistent result. We therefore employ the ML estimator for both the Heckman 
selection model and the Heckman Probit selection model. 
 
5.3.2 Results and Discussions for Bivariate Models 
 
To analyse the collaboration cost percentage (CP), there are prior conditions on 
collaboration (COLL) and innovation (INNO) to be met. If there is no selection 
bias between collaboration and innovation, we may directly test the selection 
bias between collaboration cost and collaboration. But if there is selection bias 
between collaboration and innovation, then we must take this extra bias into 
account when we investigate selection bias between collaboration cost and 
collaboration. In that case, the selection of collaboration cost from collaboration 
may have a double bias effect. Thus, before moving to a selection bias 
investigation between collaboration cost and collaboration, we must firstly 
estimate the Binary Probit selection model sets (collaboration and innovation) to 
see if there is any bias arising from the selection process. Then we report an 
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analysis of general Heckman models with collaboration and collaboration cost 
percentages as dependent variables. 
In particular, we investigate selection bias not only by using the complete 
(unbalanced) sample containing all firms, but also using samples including only 
those firms observed for all the three sample years (the balanced sample). The 
benefit of doing this is, by comparing the selection bias models with both 
unbalanced and balanced samples, the conclusions on selection bias tend to be 
more robust. 
The results for the bivariate selection models of collaboration and 
innovation are presented in Table 5.3. Two models are investigated with 
different sample sizes. As we explained in Chapter 4 (Table 4.1 & Table 5.1), 
since firms investment in R&D may be coterminous with innovation, adding 
variables measuring R&D expenditures as determinants of innovation may be 
misleading. The problem is that adding the perfectly predicted variables into 
Probit models may dramatically decrease the measured impacts of other 
variables. However, this problem does not exist when we model COLL 
(collaboration). Because, different from innovation, R&D expenditures in 
projects do not necessarily result in collaboration. To explore unobserved 
determinants, we therefore exclude all variables containing R&D in the models 
relating to the dependent variable INNO (innovation) but keep such variables as 
independent variables in the estimation of collaboration and collaboration cost. 
Thus, the variables we may drop are R&D and TL (technology level) which are 
respectively measured by ‗logarithm of R&D expenditures and expenditures on 
new products‘ and ‗R&D expenditures per researcher‘. In addition, to make sure 
that heteroskedasticy does not in validate our models, all covariance matrices 
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are estimated using robust errors to control the possible problems caused by 
heteroskedasticty. As White (1980) suggested, these robust standard errors are 
consistent ‗even if the residuals are heteroscedastic‘ (Hoechle, 2007).  
 
Table 5.3 Results of a Selection Model of Collaboration and Innovation 
 Unbalanced Balanced 
COLL 
 
  
R&D -0.194 -0.182 
 (-1.25) (-1.17) 
PAT 0.00402 0.00410 
 (0.45) (0.46) 
EDUC 1.399** 1.385** 
 (2.26) (2.13) 
TL 0.000480 0.000479 
 (0.42) (0.42) 
TG 0.00165*** 0.00159*** 
 (3.36) (3.18) 
Constant -0.585 -0.585 
 (-0.75) (-0.74) 
INNO 
 
  
PAT 5.356*** 5.936*** 
 (13.92) (15.90) 
EDUC 5.008*** 5.005*** 
 (5.07) (3.85) 
TG 0.0000540 0.0000499 
 (0.64) (0.59) 
Constant -1.992*** -1.842*** 
 (-10.76) (-8.28) 
athrho 0.386 0.373 
 (0.90) (0.80) 
N 244 192 
Log likelihood -93.07 -81.94 
Wald Chi2 0.806 0.647 
Prob>Chi2 0.369 0.421 
Note: Robust standard errors are used to control heteroskedasticty 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
The results from Table 5.3 show that EDUC (education) and TG 
(technology gap) are significantly positively related to collaboration in both the 
unbalanced and balanced samples, whilst PAT (patent), and EDUC (education) 
are significantly positively related to innovation in both the unbalanced and 
balanced samples. This confirms positive relationships between absorptive 
capacity and innovation and collaboration. It also confirms a positive 
relationship between catching up capacity and collaboration and a positive 
relationship between innovative ability and innovation. This indicates that 
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increasing employees with a highly educated background is equally important to 
both innovation and collaboration. But increasing innovative ability is more 
important to innovation, whilst increasing catching up capacity is more important 
to collaboration. 
The last row of Table 5.3 represents the correlation between the errors of 
the outcome model and selection model, 12 , which would be the cause of 
selection bias. The null hypothesis of the Heckman selection models is that 
012  , meaning no correlation between the errors of two models. However, all 
the Chi square statistics reveal, for each of the Heckman Probit sample 
selection models, that one cannot reject the null hypothesis, as statistically, 
estimating the collaboration equation without allowing for the sample selection 
bias would not cause any bias in the estimates of that equation. We may 
therefore estimate the collaboration and innovation equations individually. 
 
Table 5.4 Results of a Selection Model of Collaboration Cost and Collaboration 
 Unbalanced Balanced 
CP 
 
  
R&D 0.0239 0.0210 
 (0.55) (0.50) 
PAT -0.00139 -0.00158 
 (-0.52) (-0.59) 
EDUC 0.337*** 0.300*** 
 (1.26) (1.06) 
TL 0.000254 0.000303 
 (1.06) (1.18) 
TG -0.0000214 -0.0000265 
 (-0.96) (-1.32) 
Constant 0.0281 0.0720 
 (0.08) (0.19) 
COLL 
 
  
R&D 0.291*** 0.255*** 
 (3.16) (2.62) 
PAT -0.00149 0.000263 
 (-0.14) (0.02) 
EDUC 2.302*** 2.292*** 
 (5.53) (5.24) 
TL 0.000575 0.000578 
 (0.62) (0.63) 
TG 0.000592*** 0.000545*** 
 (3.46) (3.10) 
Constant -2.646*** -2.495*** 
 (-9.46) (-8.19) 
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athrho -0.291 -0.306 
 (-0.68) (-0.69) 
lnsigma -1.091*** -1.066*** 
 (-14.02) (-12.78) 
N 244 192 
Log likelihood -102.1 -94.79 
Wald Chi2 0.465 0.481 
Prob>Chi2 0.495 0.488 
Note: Robust standard errors are used to control heteroskedasticty 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Similarly, employing general Heckman models, any selection bias 
between CP (collaboration cost percentage) and COLL (collaboration) is 
investigated using different sample sizes. Again, to control any 
heteroskedasticty problem, robust standard errors are computed. The results in 
Table 5.4 reveal that R&D, EDUC (education), and TG (technology gap) are 
significantly positively related to collaboration, whilst only EDUC is significantly 
positively related to collaboration cost. The high p value suggests that the 
assumption of no correlation of errors between the selection model and the 
outcome model cannot be rejected, indicating there is no selection bias 
between collaboration cost and collaboration. In the next section, we may 
therefore estimate models with dependent variables CP and COLL by using 
panel data and Probit methods respectively. 
 
5.4 Initial Analysis of Dependent Variables 
As shown in Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 as there are no sample selection bias 
issues to be observed between collaboration and innovation and between 
collaboration cost and collaboration, we can explore determinants for each of 
the dependent variables individually, setting aside the sample selection 
problem. On the other hand, due to the causality relationship between 
collaboration and innovation, and between collaboration cost and collaboration, 
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when we analyse innovation, collaboration or collaboration costs, we do not 
include other dependent variables as regressors. 
Since both variables COLL (collaboration) and INNO (innovation) have 
discrete binary outcomes, rather than employing a linear panel model, we need 
to employ a panel probit regression model. While, for dependent variable CP 
(collaboration cost), which is a continuous variable, we employ OLS model and 
both fixed effect and random effect panel data models.  
However, similar to section 5.3, prior to undertaking empirical analysis, 
we first address the structure of each model, which, in particular, will inform 
analysis of timing and dynamic issues later in the analysis.   
 
5.4.1 Econometric Models: Initial Analysis 
 
There are several forms of binary outcome (or dummy variable) panel models. 
The most commonly used approaches are the Logistic model and the Probit 
model, which both estimate the continuous possibility of an event occurring 
using sigmoid curves. The main difference between the Logistic model and the 
Probit model is that the former allows for a logistic distribution, whilst the Probit 
model allows for a normal distribution. As the normal curve approaches the axis 
more quickly than the logistic curve, the Logistic model has flatter tails. In 
general, the results of the two models are quite similar if sample sizes are large 
However, for smaller sample sizes, the Probit model tends to perform better. 
We thus employ the Probit approach to estimate models of the two binary 
dependent variables, COLL (collaboration) and INNO (innovation): 
 
)()0Pr()1Pr( ''  XXXY i   
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where )1,0(~ Ni ; (.)  is Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of standard 
normal distribution. 
The latent dependent variable Y can only be observed when its value is 
greater than zero. Standard assumptions are that the error term in the Probit 
model follows a normal distribution and is uncorrelated with all independent 
variables.  
On the other hand, for the non-binary response variable, CP 
(collaboration cost), we need to seek for other appropriate panel data models. 
In terms of the nature of the dataset, the panel only covers only three years, 
which is short and thus represents a case of a micro panel or short panel case. 
For most micro panel analysis, we observe that linear fixed effect models or 
random effect models are commonly used in the existing literature. For 
instance, Kalirajan (1991) examined the effect of new rice technology in 30 
farms locating in the Southern Indian district of Coimbatore from 1983 to 1986. 
Arnberg and Bjorner (2007) explored the degree of substitution between 
energy, labour and machine capital by employing four years fixed effect panel 
data in Denmark. Khalifah and Adam (2007) employed both fixed and random 
effect models with four years manufacturing data to detect productivity 
spillovers from FDI in Malaysia. By using three years‘ firm level data in Peru, 
Jackle and Li (2006) revealed the relationship between firm dynamics and 
institutional participation. We therefore also use fixed and random effect models 
to analyse CP in our micro panel. In particular, for a better comparison between 
fixed and random effect models, a pooled OLS estimation may also be adopted. 
Fixed effect models are designed to explore the unique time-invariant 
characteristic which is unobserved within an entity (firms, countries, persons) in 
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intercepts, by assuming identical slope and constant variance across entities. 
When those characteristics exist, they may cause bias to the predictors or the 
outcome variables. To observe the net effect caused by other independent 
variables, we therefore must control these time-invariant characteristics to force 
the model to fit its assumption. The structure of fixed effect model is thus: 
itiitit uXY  
'  
where i

 is the unknown intercept for each entity, whilst itu  is the error term.  
One thing that needs to borne in mind is that because the unobserved 
time-invariant characteristic captures individual effects, it means that the 
unknown intercept and errors should not be correlated with other individual 
characteristics. If the errors between different entities correlate, the fixed effect 
may not be appropriate. The random effect model, on the other hand, assumes 
the unobserved characteristics are random and uncorrelated with predictors and 
independent variables, assuming the same intercept and slope. That is to say, 
in random effect models, all itX  are treated as exogenous. The structure of the 
random effect model is: 
 
ititiitit uXY  
'
 
 
where itu  represents the errors between entities, whilst it  stands for the errors 
within entities.  
 
In fact, the main difference between the fixed effect model and random 
effect models is whether the unobserved characteristics are included in the 
intercept. If they are, this is a fixed effect model. If they are treated as part of the 
error term, the model is a random effect model. 
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5.4.2 Results and Discussions: Initial Analysis 
 
The results of estimating Probit models for the dependent variables INNO 
(innovation) and COLL (collaboration) are represented in Table 5.5 and 5.6. We 
estimate all models using the maximum likelihood approach. All models 
formulate a likelihood ratio test to test the hypotheses that several coefficients 
are simultaneously zero. We first regress models containing both independent 
and control variables. Then, we adopt a parsimonious procedure by dropping 
the least significant regressors, one by one, until all remaining variables are 
significant, or until dropping a variable significantly reduces the explanatory 
power of the regression. The advantage of using parsimonious model is that 
‘they prevent the researcher from consciously or subconsciously manipulating 
the model so that it over-fits the available facts’ (Gabaix & David, 2008).  
Model 1 marked as full model in Table 5.5 is the model including all 
independent variables and control variables, whilst model 2 is the parsimonious 
model. We use bootstrap standard errors with 50 times replications to control 
for heteroskedasticity16, whose performance is reported as effective in small 
samples (Godfrey, 1998; Fu et at, 2005). Also, to better explore despite the 
limitations of the sample size, all results listed in the initial analysis are 
generated from the unbalanced population. The likelihood ratio results suggest 
that all these Probit models are valid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
16
 All models using bootstrap standard errors in this chapter are based on bootstrap standard errors 
with defaulted 50 replications in STATA. 
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Table 5.5 Probit Model for Innovation 
 Full model  
1 
Parsimonious 
2 
PAT 6.576  
 (0.01)  
EDUC 7.006*** 10.57*** 
 (2.82) (3.80) 
TG -0.000499  
 (-0.53)  
SE 1.431  
 (0.77)  
MCON 0.0824  
 (0.04)  
OPR -3.771  
 (-0.39)  
CAST 0.335  
 (0.52)  
PP 9.481*  
 (1.78)  
DIS 0.171  
 (0.23)  
REG 0.525  
 (0.54)  
Constant -5.469 -3.363*** 
 (-1.50) (-3.63) 
N 244 244 
Log likelihood -21.91 -35.47 
LR Chi2 2.05 7.230 
Prob>Chi2 0.076 0.004 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors are used to control heteroskedasticty  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
These initial results for the innovation Probit model in Table 5.5, suggest 
that only EDUC (education) is strongly positively significantly related to 
innovation, confirming hypothesis H2, that absorptive capacity may stimulate 
innovation. All other independent variables are insignificant and are 
consequently dropped in the parsimonious model. However, we also observed 
a weak positively significant relationship between PP (perceived price) and 
innovation in the full model, suggesting that if the products are more welcomed 
by the market, a lower perceived (quality adjusted) price may be generated 
which may consequently restrain firms innovation. 
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Table 5.6 Probit Model for Collaboration 
 Full model 
3 
Parsimonious 
4 
R&D 0.344* 0.521*** 
 (1.83) (3.11) 
PAT -0.00892  
 (-0.49)  
EDUC 3.773*** 3.362*** 
 (3.70) (3.80) 
TL 0.00122  
 (0.92)  
TG 0.000676 0.000996** 
 (1.14) (2.08) 
SE -0.0818  
 (-0.53)  
MCON -0.765  
 (-0.75)  
OPR 10.05  
 (1.59)  
CAST 0.524  
 (1.27)  
PP -0.184  
 (-0.11)  
DIS 0.644  
 (1.22)  
REG 0.680  
 (1.05)  
Constant -7.136*** -4.161*** 
 (-3.17) (-4.53) 
N 244 244 
Log likelihood -65.90 -69.34 
LR Chi2 12.64 14.01 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors are used to control heteroskedasticty  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Similar to Table 5.5, model 3, see Table 5.6, is estimated including all 
independent variables and control variables, whilst model 4 is the parsimonious 
estimation with significant variables only. We found EDUC (education) and R&D 
in both models are positively significantly related to collaboration. This indicates 
that an increasing ratio of people with higher qualifications or more innovation 
inputs will encourage firms to collaborate more. It therefore confirms 
hypotheses H4 and H5 that increasing innovative ability or/and absorptive 
capacity may stimulate collaboration (although the effect of innovation output, 
PAT (patent), seems not significant). 
On the other hand, we also observe that TG (technology gap) is 
significant at the 5% significance level and is positive and significant in the 
parsimonious model. This confirms hypothesis H6, indicating that increasing 
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either the technology gap or the technology level may result in a higher catching 
up capacity and encourage firms to collaborate. This phenomenon however 
appears less significant in model 3. Again, a low p value for the LR test means 
that we cannot reject the validity of all models. 
 
Table 5.7 OLS, Fixed and Random Effect Model for Collaboration Cost 
 OLS Fixed effect Random effect 
 Full model 
5 
Parsimonious 
6 
Full model 
7 
Parsimonious 
8 
Full model 
9 
Parsimoniou
s 
10 
R&D 0.0648*** 0.0582*** 0.0465* 0.0577* 0.0668*** 0.0734*** 
 (3.04) (3.36) (1.93) (1.82) (4.42) (5.15) 
PAT 0.000423  -0.00740** -0.00728* -0.00303* -0.00297* 
 (0.17)  (-1.99) (-1.79) (-1.76) (-1.72) 
EDUC 0.148 0.158* 0.134  0.119* 0.115* 
 (1.55) (1.66) (1.38)  (1.79) (1.71) 
TL -0.000285*  -0.000220** -0.000250** -0.000268** -0.000202** 
 (-1.73)  (-2.15) (-2.23) (-2.42) (-2.04) 
TG 0.0000230  0.0000251*  0.0000246  
 (1.16)  (1.89)  (1.16)  
SE 0.0397  0.00830 0.0117* 0.0165  
 (1.19)  (1.11) (1.71) (1.35)  
MCON -0.0750  -0.0375  -0.0473  
 (-1.10)  (-0.26)  (-0.57)  
OPR -0.282  0.795 1.161* 0.420  
 (-0.55)  (1.57) (1.66) (0.97)  
CAST 0.0429 0.0437* -0.0935** -0.0950** 0.0183  
 (1.44) (1.68) (-2.09) (-2.05) (0.64)  
PP -0.515*** -0.518*** -0.128  -0.263** -0.218* 
 (-3.35) (-4.21) (-1.02)  (-2.10) (-1.88) 
DIS -0.0299  -0.423  -0.0680 -0.0679* 
 (-0.85)  (-1.51)  (-1.57) (-1.65) 
REG 0.0267    0.0198  
 (0.70)    (0.37)  
Constant -0.171 -0.185 0.712*** 0.524** -0.0469 0.0436 
 (-1.17) (-1.53) (2.64) (2.30) (-0.34) (1.35) 
N 244 244 244 244 244 244 
LL 6.911 1.636 202.3 191.3 45.90 43.18 
F test 12.82 34.39 2.02 2.49   
LR test     77.98 84.29 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0338 0.0276 0.0000 0.0000 
Test   7=9 8=10 7=9 8=10 
Hausman   40.56 14.42 40.56 14.42 
Prob>Chi2   0.0000 0.0024 0.0000 0.0024 
Note: LL represents Log Likelihood 
          Robust standard errors are used to control heteroskedasticty in OLS and Fixed effect approach 
Bootstrap standard errors are used to control heteroskedasticty in Random effect approach 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 5.7 provides the estimation result for CP (collaboration cost) using 
three different approaches - a pooled OLS model, a fixed effect model and a 
random effect model. As before, we present estimates using the full model and 
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the parsimonious model. The variable REG (registration) was omitted by 
STATA in fixed effect models because of collinearity.  
In terms of the significance of the independent variables (excluding 
controls), the results from the OLS model show that innovative ability has a 
positive and significant impact when innovative ability is measured by R&D in 
both model 5 and 6, whilst TL (technology level) is significant and negative in 
the full model but not in the parsimonious model while EDUC (education) is 
significant and positive in the parsimonious model but not in the full model. On 
the other hand, in terms of control variables, PP is significant (and negative) in 
both OLS models, whilst CAST (complementary assets) is significant (and 
positive) in model 6. 
In the fixed effect model, R&D, PAT (patent), TL (technology level) and 
CAST (complementary assets) are all significant in both the full and 
parsimonious models. In particular, the latter three variables influence 
collaboration cost negatively, showing that increasing either innovation output, 
technology level, or transaction cost for enforcement purposes may lead to a 
decrease in the cost percentage the firm bears. Moreover, we also observe 
collaboration cost may be positively related to TG in model 7, while SE 
(spillover effect) and OPR (operational personnel ratio) have positive and 
significant impacts in model 8. 
Similar to the fixed effect models, R&D, PAT (patent) and TL (technology 
level) are significant determinants of collaboration cost in the random effect 
models. In addition, however, we also found a slightly positive relationship 
between EDUC (education) and CP (collaboration cost), and a slightly negative 
relationship between PP (perceived price) and CP (collaboration cost) in both 
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models 9 and 10. Since we found that the perceived price always moves 
negatively with product acceptability in Chapter 4, this result reveals that either 
increasing absorptive capacity or product acceptability may result in firms 
paying a greater proportion of collaboration costs. Moreover, we found that DIS 
(district) has a significant and slightly negative impact on collaboration cost in 
model 10, suggesting that firms locating at Qingshanhu District (the high-tech 
district) may pay a smaller proportion when they collaborate, though this 
phenomenon was not observed in the full random effect model or the other 
models using different approaches. 
In STATA, the fixed effect and random effect approaches are tested in 
different ways. For the fixed effect models an F test is employed, whilst the 
random effect models are tested using a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test. 
However, no matter which test statistics are used, our result shows all models 
are valid. In particular, as Wooldridge (2002) suggested, we employed a 
Hausman test to choose between the fixed effect model and the random effect 
model. We tested both the full and parsimonious models i.e. we separately 
compared fixed and random effect models using either all independent 
variables and control variables, or, as in the parsimonious models, only 
significant variables. Therefore, model 7 is compared with model 9, whilst model 
8 is compared with model 10. The idea of the Hausman test is that the null 
hypothesis is that the random effect model is the preferred model with unique 
errors independent of the regressors. If they are exogenous, then we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis. Otherwise, we reject the null hypothesis and prefer 
the consistent fixed effect model. One problem is that the Hausman test 
assumes that the random effect model is always efficient. But when it is not, the 
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Hausman statistics may give an incorrect outcome (Cameron, 2007). We thus 
employ a bootstrap Hausman test to tackle this problem. 
The last row of Table 5.7 represents the result of this Hausman test. The 
small p value in the comparison in all models concludes that the fixed effect 
models (model 7 & 8) perform better.  
5.5 Further Analysis 
 
In this section, we further investigate the determination of innovation, 
collaboration and cost sharing by exploring timing and dynamic issues building 
on the initial analysis in section 5.4. Using Probit estimation, we first estimate 
models incorporating all of the independent and control variables with time 
dummy variables, and then compare them with parsimonious models. Due to 
the involvement of time, only firms with observations for all three sample years 
may be considered, which means we use a balanced sample, the general 
properties of which has been explored in Chapter 4. 
5.5.1 Further Investigation on Timing Issue 
To investigate whether the determinants of firms‘ innovative strategy varies with 
time, we estimate Probit models with time dummies for the binary dependent 
variables, COLL (collaboration) and INNO (innovation), whilst on the other 
hand, we build a two-way fixed effect model with time dummies for the 
continuous dependent variable CP (collaboration cost). Their structures are as 
follows: 
 
)0Pr()1Pr( '  itititit XXY   
itititit uXY  
'  
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where t  is the time dummy. Taking time dummy variables into account may 
allow us to consider both unobserved time-variant specific influences and entity-
variant specific influences. This idea is even more emphasised in the two-way 
fixed effect model (Baltagi et al, 2001). To avoid the dummy variable trap, we 
propose introducing only two time dummy variables - one for observations in 
year 2006 and one for year 2007. Table 5.8-5.10 are the estimation results for 
innovation, collaboration and collaboration cost, respectively. To control for 
potential heteroskedasticty, we employ bootstrap standard errors in all probit 
models and robust standard error in both OLS and two-way fixed effect models. 
Table 5.8 Probit model with Time Dummies for Innovation 
 Full model  
11 
Parsimonious 
12 
PAT 11.68  
 (0.00)  
EDUC 8.399*** 10.51*** 
 (1.51) (3.41) 
TG -0.0000550  
 (-0.04)  
SE 5.192  
 (0.00)  
MCON 0.948  
 (0.30)  
OPR 24.48 39.41* 
 (0.77) (1.92) 
CAST -0.248  
 (-0.19)  
PP 11.26  
 (1.24)  
DIS 0.182  
 (0.14)  
REG 0.993  
 (0.53)  
2006.Time -0.461 -0.422 
 (-0.42) (-0.49) 
2007.Time -0.811 -0.767 
 (-0.51) (-0.77) 
Constant -3.905 -3.438*** 
 (-0.70) (-3.46) 
N 192 192 
Log likelihood -16.26 -21.99 
LR Chi2 2.555 7.819 
Prob>Chi2 0.055 0.003 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors are used to control heteroskedasticty  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
We estimate using all the independent variables, control variables and 
time dummies in model 11, and then, following the parsimonious approach, we 
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use only the independent variables which are significant in model 12. In 
general, the results are similar to those in in Table 5.5. Only EDUC (education) 
is significant (and positive) in both the models, confirming H2, that increasing 
absorptive capacity may stimulate technology change. In addition, different from 
the Probit model without time dummies, we found that OPR (operational 
personnel ratio) is also significant and impacts positively on innovation in model 
12, indicating that increasing safeguards in transaction costs may also 
encourage innovation. However, on the other hand, since none of the time 
dummy variables is significant throughout all three models, we did not find any 
evidence that shows that time affects firms‘ innovative decisions.  
Similar results can be seen in the estimates of the Probit model of 
collaboration. EDUC (education) is positively related to collaboration. However, 
by comparing with Table 5.6, we found that, after allowing for time dummies, 
R&D in model 13 and TG (technology gap) in model 14 are no longer 
significant. Instead, we observe that CAST (complementary assets) impacts 
significantly and positively on COLL (collaboration) in the parsimonious model. 
Together with the positive and significant variable EDUC (education) and R&D, 
model 14 indicates that increasing either R&D expenditures, or employees with 
higher education backgrounds, or transaction cost from an enforcement 
purpose, may stimulate collaboration. On the other hand, again, as no time 
dummy is statistical significant, we do not observe any time effect on 
collaboration. 
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Table 5.9 Probit Model with Time Dummies for Collaboration 
 Full model 
13 
Parsimonious 
14 
R&D 0.260 0.396** 
 (1.30) (2.41) 
PAT -0.00822  
 (-0.46)  
EDUC 3.638*** 3.237*** 
 (3.68) (3.87) 
TL 0.000875  
 (0.67)  
TG 0.000399  
 (0.70)  
SE -0.0752  
 (-0.51)  
MCON -0.862  
 (-0.77)  
OPR 10.32  
 (1.51)  
CAST 0.729 0.701* 
 (1.59) (1.91) 
PP 0.619  
 (0.34)  
DIS 0.412  
 (0.80)  
REG 0.0732  
 (0.11)  
2006.Time -0.0989 -0.0269 
 (-0.25) (-0.07) 
2007.Time 0.277 0.446 
 (0.70) (1.21) 
Constant -7.168*** -6.799*** 
 (-3.09) (-3.28) 
N 192 192 
Log likelihood -59.75 -62.73 
LR Chi2 9.840 10.78 
Prob>Chi2 0.001 0.001 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors are used to control heteroskedasticty  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Table 5.10 Two-way Fixed Effect Model for Collaboration Cost 
 OLS Two-way fixed effect 
 Full model 
15 
Parsimonious 
16 
Full model 
17 
Parsimonious 
18 
R&D 0.0690*** 0.0894*** 0.0493* 0.0757** 
 (2.79) (10.35) (1.67) (2.17) 
PAT 0.000101  -0.00754** -0.00733* 
 (0.04)  (-2.16) (-1.87) 
EDUC 0.142  0.158  
 (1.32)  (1.55)  
TL -0.000266  -0.000217* -0.000225* 
 (-1.48)  (-1.77) (-1.92) 
TG 0.0000247  0.0000352** 0.0000236** 
 (1.04)  (2.23) (2.08) 
SE 0.0346  0.00790  
 (1.02)  (0.96)  
MCON -0.106  -0.0194  
 (-1.05)  (-0.11)  
OPR -0.234  0.760  
 (-0.38)  (1.19)  
CAST 0.0607  -0.112** -0.124** 
 (1.38)  (-2.14) (-2.14) 
PP -0.543*** -0.539*** -0.145  
 (-2.94) (-3.85) (-1.11)  
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DIS -0.0355  -0.422  
 (-0.82)  (-1.44)  
REG 0.0227    
 (0.48)    
2006.Time 0.00727 0.00360 0.00833 -0.00914 
 (0.16) (0.08) (0.32) (-0.32) 
2007.Time -0.0412 -0.0435 -0.0294 -0.0359 
 (-0.84) (-0.88) (-1.26) (-1.42) 
Constant -0.237 0.0410 0.807** 0.687** 
 (-1.12) (1.38) (2.53) (2.38) 
N 192 192 192 192 
rho   0.846 0.789 
F test 10.34 27.05 2.135 2.172 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0487 0.0237 
Note: Robust standard errors are used to control heteroskedasticty for both OLS and Two-way fixed effect 
approaches 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 5.10 contains the comparison between the OLS model of 
collaboration cost with time dummies and the two-way fixed effect model with 
time dummies. Similar to the standard fixed effect model in Table 5.7, REG 
(registration) was omitted in two-way fixed effect estimation because of multi-
collinearity. The results show that different implications may be drawn from the 
two approaches.  
In estimates 15 and 16, similar to OLS estimation in Table 5.7, R&D, and 
PP (perceived price) are significant in the full model and the parsimonious 
model. However, with the time dummies added, the variables EDUC 
(education), TL (technology gap) and CAST (complementary assets) are no 
longer significant in OLS estimation. In two-way fixed effect model, we found 
R&D, TG (technology gap), PAT (patent), TL (technology level), and CAST 
(complementary assets) all impact significantly on CP (collaboration cost) in 
both models 17 and 18. In particular, the first two independent variables 
influence collaboration cost positively, whilst the other three variables tend to 
influence the CP (collaboration cost) negatively. Also, neither the 2006 time 
dummy nor the 2007 time dummy are  significant , which indicates that no time 
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effects are to be detected. The F statistics indicates the null hypothesis that all 
the variables‘ coefficients equal to zero may be rejected. 
5.5.2 Further Investigation on Dynamics Issue 
 
In this sub-section, we attempt to detect whether dynamic issues play an 
important role in firms‘ technology change decisions. To achieve this goal, 
information relating to prior time periods must be included as regressors. 
However, since there are only three time periods in our dataset, two year lags 
will significantly reduce the number of observations, which will consequently 
dramatically decrease the credibility of the estimates. Following the suggestion 
of Jackle and Li (2006) who also employed three years micro panel to analyse 
the relationship between firm dynamics and institutional participation, we 
therefore construct a dynamic model by including a one year lagged dependent 
variable as a regressor. No other time variables are included in the dynamic 
models (they had not been significant previously anyway). On the other hand, 
evidence shows that identification of unit root in micro panel data requires at 
least four time periods, i.e. T>3, we may not test the stationarity of the balanced 
sample because of insufficient observations (Bond et al, 2005; Blander, 2012). 
Thus we have:  
)0Pr()1Pr( '1,   iittiitit XYXY   
itiittiit XYY   
'
1,  
 
The first equation listed above is the Probit model with a one year lagged 
dependent variable which we estimated by using an ML estimator. The second 
is a dynamic panel data model (DPD) with a one year lagged dependent 
variable which is estimated by the Blundell-Bond estimator, which is more 
efficient than Arellano-Bond estimator in a case of small sample (Bond, 2002). 
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To control for any heteroskedasticty, we employ bootstrap standard errors for all 
the Probit models and the GMM approach for the dynamic panel model, which 
also controls for endogeneity problems by using instrumental variables and 
autoregression problems via  lagged independent and control variables (Holtz-
Eakin et al, 1988).  
Table 5.11—5.13 report the regression results with lagged dependent 
variables included for innovation, collaboration and collaboration cost 
respectively. We first investigate the lagged dependent variable‘s impact 
together with independent variables and controls. Following the parsimonious 
approach, we then extract the significant independent variables and re-estimate 
by using only them with a lagged dependent variable. 
Table 5.11 Dynamic Probit Model for Innovation 
 Full model 
19 
Parsimonious 
20 
L.INNO 20.44** 12.22** 
 (1.14) (2.48) 
PAT 10.4  
 (2.82)  
EDUC 20.76*** 20.61*** 
 (1.18) (4.38) 
TG 0.00911  
 (0.88)  
SE 4.828  
 (0.00)  
MCON -26.65  
 (-0.90)  
OPR 150.3 107.3*** 
 (1.38) (2.84) 
CAST 2.247  
 (0.46)  
PP 1.142  
 (0.14)  
DIS -4.869  
 (-1.02)  
REG -4.281  
 (-0.60)  
Constant -20.56 -13.00*** 
 (-0.77) (-5.99) 
N 128 128 
Log likelihood -5.212 -9.948 
LR Chi2 1.788 2.724 
Prob>Chi2 0.091 0.049 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors are used to control heteroskedasticty  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
261 
 
Different from the initial analysis of the Probit model, the results in Table 
5.11 shows that EDUC (education) is significantly (positively) related to 
innovation for both estimates. We also observe that OPR (operational personnel 
ratio) in model 20 is significantly and positively related to innovation. More 
importantly, lagged INNO (innovation) is significant and positive in both the full 
model and the Parsimonious model, suggesting that firms that have previously 
innovated also tend to innovate in the present. 
 
Table 5.12 Dynamic Probit Model for Collaboration 
 Full model 
21 
Parsimonious 
22 
L.COLL 1.460** 1.450*** 
 (2.49) (3.02) 
R&D 0.242  
 (0.92)  
PAT 0.00701  
 (0.27)  
EDUC 3.486** 3.757*** 
 (2.13) (2.75) 
TL 0.00258 0.00389 
 (0.94) (1.61) 
TG 0.000516  
 (0.73)  
SE -0.511 -0.565 
 (-1.06) (-1.34) 
MCON -1.428  
 (-0.86)  
OPR 8.448 12.33* 
 (1.02) (1.66) 
CAST 0.460  
 (0.72)  
PP 3.861  
 (0.90)  
DIS -0.228  
 (-0.35)  
REG -0.747  
 (-0.87)  
Constant -5.346* -3.227*** 
 (-1.69) (-3.15) 
N 128 128 
Log likelihood -33.81 -36.53 
LR Chi2 1.752 1.922 
Prob>Chi2 0.093 0.083 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors are used to control heteroskedasticty  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
The very low p value on lagged COLL in Table 5.12 suggests similarly 
that firms that have collaborated in the past also collaborate in the present. 
Another variable that significantly influences the collaboration decision is EDUC, 
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indicating that higher absorptive capacity may stimulate collaboration. Last but 
not least, the variable OPR (the operational personnel ratio) is slightly positively 
significant in the parsimonious model. 
Table 5.13 Blundell–Bond Dynamic Panel Data Model for Collaboration Cost 
 Full model 
23 
Parsimonious 
24 
L.CP 0.380*** 0.409*** 
 (2.74) (2.84) 
R&D 0.0842** 0.0664* 
 (2.33) (1.90) 
PAT -0.00663** -0.00511** 
 (-2.36) (-2.20) 
EDUC 0.114 0.249** 
 (0.88) (2.03) 
TL -0.0000336 -0.000180 
 (-0.09) (-1.27) 
TG 0.0000224  
 (0.63)  
SE -0.0203  
 (-0.35)  
MCON 0.0866  
 (0.35)  
OPR -0.653  
 (-0.68)  
CAST -0.00542  
 (-0.06)  
PP -0.436* -0.255 
 (-1.86) (-1.42) 
DIS -0.0202  
 (-0.19)  
REG 0.146 0.325** 
 (1.09) (2.18) 
Constant -0.171 -0.102 
 (-0.36) (-1.31) 
N 128 128 
Wald Chi2 43.79 28.83 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 
Note: GMM standard errors are used to control heteroskedasticty  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 5.13 explores how firms‘ collaboration cost percentage varies 
when we take lagged CP into account. Sargan tests in both the models are 
insignificant, indicating that there are no over-identification problems. We notice 
that either increasing R&D or decreasing PAT (patent) may result in a higher 
collaboration cost percentage when firms collaborate. Also as EDUC is 
significant and positive in the parsimonious dynamic models, this implies that 
firms with more highly educated employees may pay a larger share of 
collaboration costs. We also see a negative relationship between PP (perceived 
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price) and CP in model 23, but a positive connection between REG 
(registration) and CP in model 24. The former relationship indicates that the 
more the product is welcomed by the market, the more is the cost paid by firms, 
whilst the latter result reveals that firms with domestic ownership may pay a 
higher cost percentage in collaboration. This may be partly because, comparing 
with foreign firms, efficiency in domestic firms is relatively low. The other reason 
might be an asymmetric distribution of technological capabilities (Kroll & 
Schiller, 2010). Rather than collaborating in R&D, the most common form of 
collaboration in local Chinese firms is adoption and adaption of new technology 
acquired from the collaboration partner (technology leader). As Webber (2005) 
stated, ‘R&D is used to refer to the production of additional generic products 
particularly for China’. Therefore the real role of the collaborator in Chinese 
local firms is as a copier and as a result takes more responsibility for costs. 
Both reasons may result in positive relationship between firms‘ domestic 
ownership and the collaboration cost percentage.  
5.6 Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the determinants of innovation, 
collaboration and collaboration cost via the analysis of data on innovation 
patterns in Chinese manufacturing industry initially explored in Chapter 4. This 
is the first academic attempt to undertake an empirical analysis of the 
determinants of collaboration and innovation using Manufacturing panel data in 
Nan Chang a mid-income region in a developing country.  
It is also, to the best of our knowledge, the first work to empirically 
explore cost sharing strategies in technological collaborations. Some past 
studies have focused on the theory of cost sharing strategy in collaboration 
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(Combs, 1992), whilst others have emphasised cost allocation in non-
technological collaborations (Bolton et al, 2005). Yet most studies looked at the 
determinants of gross collaboration cost, rather than the cost sharing issue. 
White and Steven (2005), for instance, illustrated a framework by investigating 
231 contractual alliances between architects and general contractors. Their 
results suggest that the total value of collaboration cost may be influenced by 
task complexity, interpartner diversity, opportunism threats, and perceived 
equity. Our analysis differs from all of these. Our research, in this sense, not 
only is the first exploration on the innovation patterns through a panel of 
Manufacturing data in Nan Chang, but also contributes collaboration cost 
hypotheses to fill the gap of existing literature. 
Since some of the basic assumptions of the game theory model 
developed above do not really match the nature of our test bed, rather than 
testing predictions generated directly from Chapter 3, we proposed a number of 
testable hypotheses generated from existing literatures and initial data 
exploration. We argue that three factors, innovative ability, absorptive capacity 
and catching up capacity, (in turn represented by R&D & PAT (patent), EDUC 
(education), and TL (technology level) & TG (technology gap) respectively) are 
positively related to the extent of innovation and collaboration.  
Since collaboration cost shares depend upon collaboration occurring 
which in turn depends upon innovation occurring, to avoid selection bias, we 
firstly employed a general Heckman selection model and a Heckman Probit 
sample selection model respectively to explore if there might be sample 
selection bias in our estimates. The results from Table 5.3—5.5 show that no 
such selection bias is apparent in the estimates of all models, and thus we have 
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proceeded by setting aside such problems and estimated models for each 
dependent variable individually. 
Secondly, we establish a set of pooled panel models for initial analysis. 
In particular, we employ Probit models for both binary choice variables, 
innovation and collaboration, whilst we use OLS and both fixed effect and 
random effect models for the continuous variable collaboration cost. Adopting a 
parsimonious approach, we first estimate full models incorporating all 
independent variables together with control variables and then drop the least 
significant regressors, one by one, (on the condition that explanatory power of 
the regression is not significantly reduced), to achieve a parsimonious model 
with the fewest  possible variables. To deal with heteroskedasticty, all standard 
errors are controlled by computation of bootstrap estimates in the Probit models 
and random effect models, or robust standard errors for OLS models and fixed 
effect models.  
The main result from the initial analysis is that EDUC (education) is 
significantly positively related to both innovation and collaboration, indicating a 
positive relationship between absorptive capacity and technology change 
decisions. In addition, increasing TG (technology gap) and R&D may also 
slightly encourage firms to collaborate. In terms of collaboration cost sharing 
determinants, on one hand, the results from the fixed effect models reveal that 
higher innovation input, or lower innovation output, technology level, and 
complementary assets, may stimulate collaboration cost. On the other hand, in 
addition to those factors found significant in the fixed effect model, the random 
effect model also suggests that higher absorptive capacity or higher product 
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acceptability may also encourage firms to carry a higher proportion of 
collaboration costs. 
Further investigation of timing issues and dynamics were then 
undertaken by adding time dummies for the years 2006 and 2007 into both the 
binary Probit models for innovation and collaboration, and the OLS and two-way 
fixed effect models for collaboration cost. As in the initial analysis, bootstrap and 
robust standard errors are introduced to deal with heteroskedasticty. The results 
from Table 5.8—5.10 show that there is no significant time effect observed. We 
therefore may conclude that any unobserved characteristics may be time-
invariant. To explore dynamic issues further we also considered a one time 
period auto regression (in the Probit model with bootstrap standard error and in 
the dynamic panel model with GMM standard errors). Due to the comparatively 
small size of our sample, we introduced just a simple one year lagged 
dependent variable as regressor in the models to explore if firms‘ past decisions 
affect their current decisions. The results in Table5.11—5.13 illustrate that for 
each of the three dependent variables past decisions matter i.e. Innovation (or 
collaboration, or a higher collaboration cost percentage) in the past, leads to 
innovation in the present (or collaboration, or a higher collaboration cost 
percentage). 
Table 5.14 lists the estimation results for each independent variable as 
the response to the hypotheses table (Table 5.2) illustrated in the beginning of 
this Chapter. For hypotheses H1 to H3, only EDUC (education) is positively 
significant to INNO (innovation). The rest of the independent variables are all 
insignificant in all the parsimonious models. This finding seems to violate the 
partial correlation results in Chapter 4 (Table 4.10), which suggests R&D, PAT 
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(patent), EDUC (education) and TL (technology level) all significantly impact on 
innovative decisions. However, since the variable R&D may not be truly 
exogenous, we actually exclude it from the models estimated here so that any  
impact of R&D on innovation still remains invisible. 
In contrast, we did not observe any close partial correlation between 
R&D and COLL (collaboration), or between TG and COLL in either the 
unbalanced sample or balanced sample in Chapter 4 (Table 4.10). But from the 
econometric analysis both are positively related to the decision to collaborate. 
This indicates that increasing R&D, or employees with a higher education 
background, or the technology gap between technological leader and follower, 
could stimulate firms to collaborate. 
In terms of the six hypotheses, on the basis of the sample data analysed, 
we may state that only H2, H4, H5, and H6 are not rejected   by the results of 
our models. However, although only absorptive capacity appears to be crucial 
for innovation, innovative ability, absorptive capacity and catching up capacity 
are all important to collaboration. This may explain why nearly 50% of the 
innovative projects are collaborative projects (Table 4.6 in Chapter 4). 
 
Table 5.14 Results of Testable Hypotheses 
 INNO 
   Not rejected Rejected 
R&D Innovative ability H1:  +    
PAT      
EDUC Absorptive capacity H2:  + 1 2 11 12 19 20  
TL Catching up capacity H3:  +   
TG     
  COLL  
          Not rejected  Rejected 
R&D Innovative ability H4:  + 3 4 14  
PAT     
EDUC Absorptive capacity H5:  + 3 4 13 14 21 22  
TL Catching up capacity    
TG  H6:  + 4  
 
The regression results summarised in Table 5.15 are intended to provide 
further detail upon the determinants of collaboration cost sharing. As this 
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appears to be the first time that the determinants of collaboration cost allocation 
have been explored empirically, we cannot generate any testable hypothesis 
from the prior literature. We hence rely upon the significant patterns that we 
have seen in the data rather than upon past theories or studies. These patterns 
have led us to propose that the collaboration cost percentage paid by firms: 
 
H7: may go with the proportion of cost paid in previous collaborations 
H8: may increase with R&D 
H9: may increase with the ratio of employees with higher education. 
H10: may increase with technology gap. 
H11: may decrease with transaction cost (from an enforcement perspective). 
H12: may decrease if the firm holds patents. 
H13: may decrease with the firm‘s technology level. 
H14: may decrease with the firm‘s perceived price. 
 
Whether these hypotheses are rejected or not rejected is summarised in Table 
5.15 
Table 5.15 Other Results upon Dependent Variables 
 CP 
  Not rejected Rejected 
Lagged CP + 23 24  
R&D + 5—10 15 18 23 24   
EDUC + 6 9 10 24  
TG + 7 17 18  
OPR + 8  
SE + 8  
REG -- 24  
CAST -- 7 8 18 6 
DIS -- 10  
PAT -- 7—10 17 18 23 24  
TL -- 5 7—10 17 18  
PP -- 5 6 9 10 15 16 23  
                            COLL 
  Not rejected Rejected 
Lagged COLL + 21 22  
OPR + 22  
CAST + 14  
  INNO  
  Not rejected Rejected 
Lagged INNO + 19 20  
OPR + 12 20  
PP + 1  
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Table 5.15 also summarises other results re COLL and INNO i.e.  
 
H15: Firms that have collaborated in the past may have more chance of 
collaborating in the present. 
      H16: Firms that have innovated in the past may have more chance of 
innovating in the present. 
H17: The likelihood of a firm innovating is positively related to transaction 
costs from a monitoring perspective. 
 
On one hand, H15 may be explained in terms of trust. Hill (1990) 
advocated that building trust and reputation between partners may sometimes 
make collaboration preferable to competition. Since one of determinants of trust 
would be related to past experience, the history of collaboration in the past must 
increase trust, which consequently encourages collaboration in the future 
(White, 2005). On the other hand, we found the result of H16 that more 
innovation in the past may lead to more innovation in the present contradicts 
with the ‗two-cycle model‘ which suggested that foreseen increase in research 
in the next period discourages research during the current period (Aghion & 
Howitt, 1992). This may happen as the escape effect in our test bed outweighs 
the Schumpeterian effect, so that firms try to keep innovating to obtain the 
‗abnormal payoff‘ earned by the technology leader (Aghion et al, 2005). 
To explain the deduction behind H17 that a positive relationship exists 
between transaction cost and innovation, we may look into the relationship 
between transaction cost and collaboration, because collaboration is an 
important component of innovation. As discussed in Chapter 2, Williamson 
(1985) and Hill (1990) advocate that the transaction cost on one hand must help 
firms to secure their collaborative return so that it may increase the success rate 
of collaboration, whilst on the other hand, it also increases the burden of cost, 
which decreases firms‘ net profit in the post collaboration period. Therefore, the 
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relationship between transaction cost and collaboration generally depends upon 
the joint effect of balancing opportunism reduction and cost saving. Our result 
from the set of econometric models indicates a slightly positive relationship 
between collaboration and transaction cost. For instance, model 22 confirms a 
significant and positive relationship between collaboration and OPR (transaction 
cost from the monitor perspective) whilst model 14 suggests a significant and 
positive relationship between collaboration and CAST (transaction cost from an 
enforcement perspective). These results jointly reflect that in our case, when 
transaction cost increases, the effect of opportunism reduction overweighs the 
effect of cost saving in collaboration. Thus we see a positive relationship 
between transaction cost and collaboration, which consequently results in a 
positive relationship between collaboration cost and innovation. We believe that 
if we were able to increase the sample size thereby allowing the use of more 
sophisticated models including more control variables, the positive relationship 
between transaction cost and collaboration may prove to be even more 
significant. 
Apart from hypotheses H15—H17, we did not find any impacts of other 
control variables on innovation or collaboration from the second and the third 
part of Table 5.15. Evidence shows no significant relationship has been found 
between DIS and innovation (collaboration), or REG and innovation 
(collaboration), indicating that, whether firms locate at Qingshanhu District 
(high-tech district) or whether the firm is domestically owned, do not influence 
innovation or collaboration decisions. This indicates that across firms in Nan 
Chang the pattern of innovation is equally distributed in different regions and 
across different ownership.  
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Particularly interestingly, we did not find a significant relationship 
between SE (spillover effect) and innovation or collaboration, suggesting that 
the chance of imitation does not affect innovation or collaboration. This result 
looks very similar to the prediction 15 and 16 derived from the game theory 
chapter (Table 3.10, Figure 3.21 to Figure 3.28). As we mentioned in Chapter 3, 
the reason may be partly because the net payoff from collaboration or 
innovation must far outweigh the gains from imitation. Therefore for firms who 
decide to choose innovation or collaboration, tighter or looser IPR does not 
dramatically influence their technological strategies. On the other hand, it may 
be because shortage of capacity restricts innovation or collaboration so that in 
practice, innovation or collaboration is not actually a choice for them. It might 
also be that other factors such as limited patent history, few employees with 
higher education background, a low technology level or being far behind the 
technological leader may all deter innovating or collaborating before SE even 
comes into play. 
Although we have found quite a rich set of results it should be noted that 
there are limitation in this analysis. The most obvious is the small size of data 
sample, although there are now techniques that help overcome this limitation 
(Jackle & Li, 2006). Even so, since data with less than four time periods do not 
allow us to run unit root test, we may not further explore the stationarity of our 
sample (Bond et al, 2005; Blander, 2012). One cannot predict what impact a 
larger sample would have but there is the possibility that more variables may be 
significant or a more detailed exploration may be undertaken (especially of 
dynamics). Apart from possible unobserved variables, as we discussed before, 
more sophisticated models which emphasise time series effects may become 
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feasible as may large sample techniques such as ARIMA models, and GARCH 
models.  
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6 Conclusions 
 
6.1 Overview 
This thesis was motivated in part by the relatively limited emphasis placed upon 
collaboration (as opposed to competition) in innovation in economics literatures. 
In particular, to the best of our knowledge, there has been little discussion of 
collaboration using game theoretic models which incorporate product innovation 
rather than process innovation, and consider both transaction cost theory and 
intellectual property rights protection. We believe that reality is better reflected 
in models which incorporate product innovation, and allow imitation and inter 
firm technological collaboration. In addition, to the best of our knowledge, there 
has been no discussion in the literature of the determinants of collaboration and 
collaboration cost allocation at firm level in China. These findings from the 
literature review jointly lead us to consider: under what circumstances firms will 
collaborate in a competitive market; what will be the cost sharing strategy when 
collaboration occurs; what can we discover of collaboration patterns in the 
Chinese manufacturing industry. 
To fulfil our research purpose, in Chapter 3, we develop a game theoretic 
model based on Vickers (1986) but (i) taking collaboration and imitation into 
account and (ii) also considering product innovation instead of process 
innovation. For the sake of simplicity, we first investigated collaboration when 
the firm faces a three-strategy set (collaboration, innovation, do nothing), and 
then a four-strategy set (collaboration, innovation, imitation, do nothing). In each 
case, by looking at the various possibilities and their different collaboration 
incentives, we generated a table and a decision map that summarises the best 
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equilibrium innovation strategy given different market characteristics and the 
conditions that will determine whether or not a firm will collaborate. In particular, 
we distinguish by different market types i.e. whether the market is a persistent 
dominance market or action reaction market.  
To investigate further the collaboration equilibrium, we used an example 
employing a utility function proposed by Shaked and Sutton (1990) with a 
modified perceived price function suggested by Matsubayashi (2007). In this 
model consumers obtain more utility from goods with higher technology but 
same price. Since the improved utility function contains both a product 
substitution index which reflects the technological differentiation of products, 
and perceived price, which in turn reflects the feedback from process 
technology embedded in products, the new utility function we employed covers 
both production cost and consumer preference. Besides, since the cost function 
for changing the technology associated with products includes a spillover index 
and transaction costs, it allows us to accurately calculate and compare the 
incentives of adopting different strategies. Compared to models used in 
previous studies we consider that this approach reflects the real world more 
effectively. 
To solve for the collaboration equilibrium in the illustrative examples, we 
calculated the Cournot equilibrium by backward induction, allowing the market 
leader to make decisions, taking into account the reactions of his rival. 
Consequently, the collaboration incentive, innovation incentive and imitation 
incentive can all be precisely stated. If firms collaborate, we assume the market 
reaches equilibrium only when firms‘ joint payoff is maximised. Under this 
condition, the findings suggest that the collaboration cost paid by the market 
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follower is determined by three sub-equations and may vary with market 
characteristics. To understand this better, we extended the collaboration 
condition tables and the collaboration cost condition tables by substituting the 
incentives of different strategies and generated various predictions as to how 
the possibility of collaboration and its corresponding cost change with different 
market characteristics. In addition, we also used a MATLAB animation 
programme to show to what extent  imitation affects collaboration opportunity 
and the collaboration cost paid by the technology follower (predictions 14—16 in 
Table 3.10). 
Looking at the impact of changing model parameters in both the 
collaboration cost equation and the collaboration incentive equation, a number 
of findings are drawn from the theoretical models. We classified the resulting 18 
predictions into three groups, which respectively concern ‗collaboration 
probability‘, ‗collaboration cost‘ and ‗other issues‘ (Table 3.10). In particular, the 
majority of the predictions in the first two groups relating to collaboration 
probabilities and collaboration cost are new to the existing literatures.  
Table 3.10 Generated Predictions 
Predictions Keynotes of each Prediction 
Predictions about the Probability of Collaboration 
3 In a three-strategy persistent dominance market, the probability of collaboration generally 
increases with the product substitution index, the initial technology level and the discount 
rate of price sensitiveness, but decreases with the technology gap. 
5 In a three-strategy action reaction market, the probability of collaboration generally 
increases with the initial technology level, but decreases with the technology gap, the 
product substitution index and the discount rate of price sensitiveness. 
13 In a four-strategy persistent dominance market, where the transaction cost is low, adding 
the option of imitation would decrease the probability of collaboration when the product 
substitution index is high or the initial technology level is low, where firms in both situations 
may prefer to imitate rather than collaborate. 
14 In a four-strategy persistent dominance market, where transaction cost is low, increasing 
the size of imitation will further decrease the collaboration opportunity when the product 
substitution index is high or the initial technology level is low. 
15 In a four-strategy persistent dominance market, where transaction cost is high, increasing 
the size of imitation will neither stimulate nor decrease the collaboration opportunity. 
16 In a four-strategy action reaction market, the probability of collaboration by firms does not 
differ from when imitation is feasible. 
4 Regardless of whether there are three or four strategies, in a persistent dominance market, 
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increasing transaction costs will stimulate collaboration until the transaction cost reaches a 
certain level. When transaction cost is over that level, the chance of collaboration will not be 
affected by further increases in transaction costs. 
6 Regardless of whether there are three or four strategies, in an action reaction market, 
increasing transaction cost neither encourages nor diminishes the probability of 
collaboration. 
Predictions about Collaboration Cost 
9 In a three-strategy persistent dominance market, the collaboration cost percentage paid by 
the lower technology firm generally increases with the discount rate of price sensitiveness, 
but decreases with increases in the technology gap, the product substitution index and the 
initial technology level. However in a market with highly similar products, the collaboration 
cost percentage paid by the lower technology firm increases with the product substitution 
index. 
10 Under a three-strategy persistent dominance market structure, if firms collaborate, the firm 
with the lower technology level must pay. As to the percentage he pays, this depends upon 
the nature and market structure of both firms. However, in rare cases, the percentage could 
exceed 100%. 
11 In a three-strategy action reaction market, the collaboration cost percentage paid by the 
lower technology firm generally increases with the technology gap and the initial technology 
level, but slightly decreases with increases in the product substitution index and the 
discount rate of price sensitiveness. 
12 In a three-strategy action reaction market, if firms collaborate, the firm with the lower 
technology level must pay more than 50% of the R&D cost. 
17 In a four-strategy persistent dominance market, (different from the three-strategy case), the 
collaboration cost portion paid by the lower technology firm will never exceed 100%. 
18 There are generally no significant differences between the collaboration cost equilibrium in 
the four-strategy case and the three-strategy case. However imitation may induce a lower 
collaboration cost share for firm L if there is a small technology gap. 
                                         Predictions about Other Issues 
1 Increases in the rival‘s product technology level and market size or decreases in the market 
structure coefficient, will decrease the firm‘s price, output and revenue. 
2 Increasing the firm‘s own technology level must increase its price level and revenue (which 
reflects the theory of creative destruction). 
7 Increasing the value of   may cause the market structure to change from persistent 
dominance to action-reaction. 
8 When   is small, neither firm will wish to collaborate even though they have the chance to 
do so. Firms will collaborate only when is above a certain level. 
 
Chapter 4 introduced the data. The data employed are derived from the 
China Innovation Survey and the Annual Corporate Financial Survey 
undertaken by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, covering Large and 
Medium sized enterprises in 33 industries in manufacturing. Restrictions on the 
use of panel data imposed by the Statistics Law of the Peoples‘ Republic of 
China, has limited the extent to which the data that are employed here have 
been used in the past. To the best of our knowledge, this thesis is the first to 
attempt to analyse collaboration strategy at firm level in China (and in fact in 
any mid-income level in a developing country). In particular, we chose to 
cooperate with the Nan Chang Statistics Department in order to have full 
access to the two confidential surveys above in Nan Chang from 2005 to 2007.  
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However, it is not easy to transform the game theoretic predictions into 
testable hypotheses for empirical work. One reason is that the Chinese market 
is not a market economy where firm ownership simply belongs to private 
individuals or shareholders. The data for the Chinese region studied reveals 
that most collaboration activities have been between firms and local 
government (Table 4.6). This indicates that in contrast to the assumption of the 
game theory model that collaboration only occurs between firms, collaboration 
observed from our data may also be associated with non-competing players, 
such as institutions, universities, or even local government. In addition, for 
example, it is not possible using the data: to separate out the high cost firm from 
the low cost firm; an action reaction market from a persistent dominance 
market; product innovation from process innovation; or three and four-strategy 
situations. 
Therefore, rather than try and directly test the game theory predictions 
empirically, we decided to establish several other hypotheses which are 
testable using the empirical data available. In particular, following Castellacci 
(2008) and Blalock & Gertler (2009), we defined three factors which may 
potentially influence collaboration or innovation, which are the innovative ability, 
absorptive capacity, and catching up capability of firms. These three 
independent concepts were then measured by five independent variables (R&D, 
patent, education, technology level, and technology gap) respectively. In 
addition, we also defined various control variables as suggested by existing 
literatures and initial analysis of the data. These included market concentration, 
the operational personnel ratio, complementary assets, perceived price, district, 
and registration. In particular, the first three control variables jointly represent 
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the effect of transaction cost from a negotiation perspective, monitoring 
perspective, and enforcement perspective, respectively. Via these three control 
variables, we therefore may explore the impact of transaction cost on different 
innovative strategies as well.  
In the empirical work we found it useful to define innovation as 
encompassing both self-innovation and innovation via collaboration. This differs 
from the definition of innovation in the game theory model where innovation is 
assumed as self-innovation only. 
We firstly summarised the economic environment in our sample area. 
Table 4.2 illustrates the comparison of main economic indicators, derived from 
local, provincial and national statistical yearbooks. The result shows that the 
sample region reflects a mid-income and moderately developed region with 
intensive growth potential. We then explore summary statistics relating to the 
indicators of innovation, collaboration and cost shares. We showed that nearly 
half of the firms in the sample chose innovation, whilst approximately 60% of 
the firms chose collaboration when they innovated. Also, in terms of ownership, 
we found that both domestic firms and assets of Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan 
are innovative or collaborative (Table 4.7). Moreover, since 55% of the firms 
which innovate are located at Qingshanhu District and more than 72% of the 
innovative firms at Qingshanhu District chose collaboration, the result indicates 
that firms at the high-tech zone in Nan Chang are more likely to innovate or 
collaborate. 
Next we looked at partial correlations between the three performance 
measures and the independent variables and control variables (see Tables 
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4.10). Besides, the partial correlations suggest a significant relationship 
between the three independent factors and the three dependent variables.  
Six hypotheses related to the three dependent variables (‗collaboration 
cost‘, ‗collaboration‘ and ‗innovation‘) and associated with the three identified 
factors (innovative ability, absorptive capacity, and catching up capability of 
firms) are tested more precisely in Chapter 5. Since the dependent variables, 
‗collaboration‘ and ‗innovation‘ are both binary variables, there may be a bias in 
the estimates if we estimate without taking the sample selection process into 
account. To solve this problem, we first employed the general Heckman 
selection model and a Heckman Probit sample selection model respectively to 
detect whether there is any selection bias between collaboration cost and 
collaboration, and between collaboration and innovation. Since the results from 
both models did not reject the null hypothesis which assumes no selection bias, 
we proceeded by investigating each dependent variable individually. 
In initial econometric analysis, we employed the Probit models for both 
innovation and collaboration, whilst OLS, a fixed effect model and a random 
effect model are employed for collaboration cost. In particular, by adopting a 
parsimonious approach, the estimate with fewest possible explanatory variables 
may be derived by dropping least significant variables from the full model 
containing all independent variables and control variables. In addition, time 
dummies and one period lagged dependent variables were added into individual 
models to investigate timing dynamic issues. In particular, we employed two-
way fixed effect models and dynamic panel data models for analysing timing 
and dynamics of collaboration cost shares. To deal with heteroskedasticty, 
bootstrap estimates were computed for the Probit models and random effect 
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models, whilst robust standard errors were calculated for OLS and fixed effect 
models (including the two-way fixed effect model), and the GMM standard error 
was investigated for the dynamic panel data model. 
The results from Table 5.14 show that all three factors are significant to 
collaboration, whilst only absorptive capacity is significant to innovation. In 
addition, results from Table 5.15 reveal that there is no timing effect for all 
dependent variables, indicating all unobserved effect might be time-invariant. 
Also, we found that all one period lagged dependent variables have positive 
significant impacts on the relevant dependent variables, suggesting that the 
innovative (or collaborative) strategies adopted in the past may positively 
influence the innovative (or collaborative) strategies adopted in the present. All 
the significant hypotheses not rejected by the econometric models may be 
gathered together as follows: 
H2: A firm with high absorptive capacity is more likely to innovate  
H4: A firm with high innovative ability is more likely to collaborate  
H5: A firm with high absorptive capacity is more likely to collaborate 
H6: A firm with high catching capacity is more likely to collaborate.  
H15: Firms that have collaborated in the past may have more chance of 
collaborating in the present. 
H16: Firms that have innovated in the past may have more chance of innovating 
in the present. 
H17: The likelihood of a firm innovating is positively related to transaction costs 
from a monitoring perspective. 
 
Although the existing literature does not offer any testable hypotheses re 
collaboration cost, because, to the best our knowledge, this is the first attempt 
to explore empirically the cost sharing strategy in technological collaborations, 
we have explored whether the factors that affect innovation and collaboration 
also affect collaboration costs shares. After observing the patterns in the data 
we consider that we cannot reject the following hypotheses, that collaboration 
cost shares: 
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H7:  increase with the proportion of costs paid in previous collaborations. 
H8:  increase with R&D. 
H9:  increase with the ratio of employees with higher education. 
H10: increase with the technology gap. 
H11: decrease with transaction cost (from an enforcement perspective). 
H12: decrease if the firm holds patents. 
H13: decrease with the firm‘s technology level. 
H14: decrease with the firm‘s perceived price. 
 
6.2 Implications 
6.2.1 Implications from Results 
 
This section is concerned with the implications of the thesis results and may be 
divided into three categories: theoretical implications, empirical implications and 
methodology implications. The first and second implications are mainly 
concerned with the connections between existing literatures and the main 
findings coming from our game theory model, and the econometric models, 
respectively, whilst the last, methodology implications, is about learning from 
the MATLAB programming used in this thesis. 
 
Theoretical implications 
 
The predictions of the game theory model summarised in Table 3.10 are 
generally concerned with two significant findings. The first is that collaboration 
opportunity and the collaboration cost paid by the technological follower may 
vary with market types and various market characteristics, including the extent 
of product substitution, the technology level, the technology gap, transaction 
costs, and the discount rate of price sensitiveness. The second is that the 
impact of alternative strategies (e.g. imitation) on collaboration and collaboration 
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cost are not univariate. The effect may vary with the other market 
characteristics mentioned above. 
Some of the impacts of market characteristics on collaboration which we 
derive from our theory have been found in previous studies. For instance, a 
negative relationship between product substitution and collaboration is 
generated by Yi (2007) who believes that more imitation must result in less 
collaboration and less R&D input but faster imitation, making it difficult for firms 
to differentiate themselves. However, Tan (2007) disagrees with this point of 
view, and suggests that when the product substitution index is relatively small, 
the possibility of collaboration may increase. Predictions 3 and 5 in our theory 
however, clarify these contradictory debates by supporting Yi (2007) and Tan 
(2007) for different market types. 
A similar phenomenon may be found in the relationship between 
transaction cost and collaboration. Williamson (1985) and Hill (1990) argue that 
transaction costs reduce the opportunism embedded in the technology 
transaction process. Since a trade-off exists between the cost increment and 
opportunism reduction, there is a large amount of debate in the literature about 
the relationship between collaboration and transaction cost. Some believe the 
effect of higher transactions costs may outweigh the effect of opportunism 
reduction, indicating a negative relationship between collaboration and 
transaction cost (Brockhoff, 1992), whilst others may support the very opposite 
view (Heide & John, 1990). By introducing a transaction cost parameter in the 
utility function inspired by Shaked and Sutton (1990) and Matsubayashi (2007), 
our model, however explains this complex relationship upon different situations 
and different market types (Predictions 4 and 6). The results show that other 
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various market characteristics may also influence the relationship between 
transaction cost and collaboration in a persistent dominance market. 
Both these examples suggest that it may not be appropriate to conclude 
whether firms would collaborate or not by simply judging partial relationships 
between one particular market characteristic and collaboration. Similarly, the 
other finding from the game theory model suggests that the impact of the 
alternative strategy, imitation on collaboration is also not univariate. This 
implication supports the idea that the joint venture decision may depend upon 
spillover size, as proposed by Greenlee & Cassiman (1999) (although they 
concentrate on process innovation rather than product innovation). 
 
Empirical implications 
 
 
We observe a positive relationship between R&D and collaboration in the 
empirical results, which confirms the hypothesis that innovative ability positively 
affects collaborative decisions. This provides evidence for Motta (1992) who 
argues for a positive impact on cooperative agreements. It also supports the 
research outcome proposed by Zhang et al. (2007) who investigated the 
positive relationship between R&D intensity and international joint ventures 
(IJV). However, our empirical results do not seem to support a positive 
relationship between R&D and innovation. This is because as our measure of 
innovation indicates as any firm (or innovation project) must involve some R&D 
input, R&D may not truly be exogenous. We have therefore dropped this 
variable as an independent variable when we explore innovative ability in 
empirical models relating to innovation. It does not, however, necessarily mean 
that R&D has no significant impact on innovation. 
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The result of the game theory also points out a negative relationship 
between technology gap and collaboration. However, surprisingly, this 
prediction is not fully supported in the empirical studies, which reveal a positive 
relationship. As suggested by Verspagen (1991), this ambiguous relationship 
may be partly because on the one hand, larger technology gaps may stimulate 
firms to collaborate, whilst on the other hand, larger technology gaps may 
decrease the possibility of catching up. The relationship between technology 
gap and collaboration consequently depends upon the joint effect. Therefore, 
for large and medium firms at Nan Chang, the motivation of profit seeking from 
an increasing technology gap may outweigh the worries of being left behind. 
The other reason that may cause this result is, in contrast to the measures of 
the technology gap in empirical studies, the definition of technology gap in 
game theory assumes that collaboration can only occur between firms whereas 
we see many different types of collaboration. This assumption also affects the 
results re other relationships between technology gap and collaboration. 
As the indicator of absorptive capacity, education appears strongly 
significant as a determinant of both innovative and collaborative decisions, 
providing evidence in support of the models proposed by Castellacci (2008) and 
Blalock & Gertler (2009). This is because, regardless of the pattern of 
technology change, increasing employees‘ education level may fundamentally 
increase the absorptive capacity, which is beneficial for technology diffusion. On 
the other hand, according to Klein and Lim (1997), compared with the 
importance of researchers, the positive impact of R&D is quite limited. To some 
extent, that may explain why innovative ability does not appear as a significant 
determinant of innovation. 
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Methodology implications 
 
 
There are two reasons why we employed MATLAB programmes in the game 
theoretic chapter. One is to solve the complex equilibrium of collaboration 
opportunity and collaboration cost, whilst the other is to explore the dynamic 
impact of imitation on collaboration and collaboration cost. To the best of our 
knowledge, only limited research has employed MATLAB programming in game 
theory modelling. The implications derived from our MATLAB programme 
proves that the animation programme itself could effectively solve for the game 
equilibrium and help us observe the impact of market characteristics on 
collaboration and collaboration cost. 
 
6.2.2 Implications for Future Research 
 
Similar to the previous sections, our implications for future research may be 
divided into three categories: theoretical implications, empirical implications and 
methodology implications. 
As we found that collaboration and imitation may play an important role 
in a firm‘s innovation decisions, the first theoretical implication is that future 
research may focus more on multi-choice cooperative games rather than multi-
stage competitive games. Since collaboration may effectively share the 
collaboration cost and technological dominant payoff between players, the 
decision equilibrium in a cooperative market may be significantly different from 
equilibrium in a non-cooperative market. However, our game theory model was 
inspired by Vickers (1986), who distinguishes the market only by either 
persistent dominance or action reaction. These concepts seem relatively 
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restrained if we want to expand the cooperative game by adding more players, 
more stages or even more choices. In the handbook about cooperative game 
theory by Branzei et al (2005), they address several models for Crisp, Fuzzy, 
and multi-choice games. The first model is that players are free to choose if 
they cooperate with all other players, whilst the second one allows a player to 
choose cooperation in many different levels. The multi-choice model is the 
intermediate structure that allows players to participate in cooperation at limited 
levels with finite partners. However, since the general multi-choice model has 
not been employed on the investigation of technological collaboration issues, 
adding other strategic choices by using multi-choice cooperative games, such 
as outsourcing, may be considered as one possibility in the future. 
The second theoretical implication from our game theory is that we may 
expend the structures of utility or cost function by adding more variables. In our 
model, variables such as the product substitution index, the initial technology 
level, the technology gap, and the discount rate of price sensitiveness are 
respectively investigated re both collaboration opportunity and collaboration 
cost issues. Other possibilities which may affect collaboration or collaboration 
cost are however excluded. Segerstrom (1991) considers innovation 
determinants by looking at different R&D types, whilst Girma et al (2008) 
investigate the relationship between innovation and foreign direct investment. 
Such potential variables relating to innovation activity could thus be considered 
as part of a potential future research agenda. 
The empirical findings may also have policy implications at firm and 
national policy levels by showing the determinants of innovation, collaboration, 
and collaboration cost. For instance, since all of innovative ability, absorptive 
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capacity, and catching up capacity play an important role in collaboration, 
policies that aim to increase either R&D, education benefits, firms‘ technology 
levels or technology gaps by introducing more competition, may stimulate firms 
to collaborate. In addition, the limited data obtained only reflects the situation in 
China. Future research encompassing other regions and countries may thus 
also be welcome. 
As we employed MATLAB programmes to automatically solve the 
collaboration decision equations, using MATLAB simulations to generate game 
equilibria may be considered as the methodology implication of our work. In our 
game theory models, regardless of the market types, there are three different 
sub-equations for collaboration for the firms in three-strategy sets and four sub-
equations for collaboration for the firms in the four-strategy sets. The number of 
decision equations could dramatically increase if we introduced more strategic 
choices or more players into models. This indicates that the process of 
equilibrium calculation may become extremely complex. In particular, in a 
dynamic market with various changeable market characteristics, obtaining the 
solution to equation sets may seem impossible. This is one main reason why so 
many cooperative games are still only at the theoretical level. Therefore, as we 
experienced in Chapter 3, to bring more complex conceptual models into 
practice, using MATLAB programmes might be one possible solution. 
 
6.3 Contributions 
In general, the contributions of this study may be divided into three categories: 
theory contributions which are mainly contributions to economic theory; 
empirical contributions which concern whether the results match or differ from 
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the predictions in existing literatures; and the methodology contributions which 
concern the novelty of the methodology used in our models. 
 
Theory contributions 
 
 
The thesis contributes to the relevant literatures in several branches of 
economics including game theory, transaction cost theory and intellectual 
property rights theory. 
Firstly, the thesis extends our understanding of the impacts of 
collaboration possibilities in dynamic game theory. There is already a rich array 
of research involving game theoretic models of concerning the relationship 
between innovation and imitation which may be found in the existing literatures; 
however, our game theory model is the first attempt to bring both collaboration 
and imitation into a dynamic market with product innovation. Different from 
Vickers (1986), we concentrate more on product innovation and the 
collaboration opportunities associated with the impacts of imitation and other 
market characteristics on the equilibrium outcomes. Most existing work only 
covers some of these points. For instance, Greenlee & Cassiman (1999) who 
investigated a model of whether research joint ventures and collusion occur 
under different levels of spillover effect, explored the relationship between 
imitation and collaboration, but ignored the impacts of various market 
characteristics, such as technology gap and technology level. Others, such as 
Motta (1992) by presenting a partial equilibrium model with vertical product 
differentiation, explored the impact of cooperative agreements on R&D but 
ignored the option of imitation.   
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Another important contribution to the existing game theory literature, may 
be the patterns and determinants of collaboration cost. There is very limited 
research focusing on technological collaboration cost sharing issues, in 
particular, there is no game theory model covering the collaboration cost 
sharing decision for technology followers. Most of the existing game theory 
literature allows that collaboration cost is one motivator of collaborative firms, 
but seldom discusses the determinants of collaboration cost. Although the 
implications from costly contracts theory proposed by Grossman and Hart 
(1986) suggest that purchasing residual rights may help firms control abnormal 
profits from integration which consequently influences the outcomes of profit 
allocation, it does not mention what factors may actually influence cost 
allocation when firms collaborate technologically. Therefore, how to allocate 
cost during collaboration and what the optimal collaboration cost sharing 
strategy is for low technology firms still remains unknown. The answers to these 
two questions are particularly important for firms in developing countries, such 
as China. Our model in Chapter 3 however filled this gap. By using MATLAB 
figures, we explicitly explored how collaboration cost varies with different market 
types and market characteristics. 
The third contribution of our works to game theory is that by employing 
Cournot equilibrium, we concentrated on the impact of collaboration from a 
general perspective. Different from Vickers (1986) who employed Bertrand 
competition to explore how markets tend to impact upon firms‘ innovative 
decisions, our model allows us to stand back and investigates how firms‘ 
collaborative decisions differ with different markets. Therefore the Vickers 
model concentrates more on market level strategies, whilst our game theory 
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model focuses more on individual firm level strategies. In particular, by showing 
firms‘ decision maps, we are able to observe how firms‘ innovative 
(collaborative) decisions alter as market type changes. 
Our work also enriches the understanding of transaction cost theory. The 
results from the game theory reveal that the elasticity of collaboration 
opportunity with respect to transaction cost in a persistent dominance market is 
much greater than in an action reaction market. In addition, the empirical results 
in Table 5.15 indicate a positive significant relationship between transaction 
cost and collaboration (innovation). In particular, evidence shows that 
transaction costs from a monitoring perspective and enforcement perspective 
are especially effective in increasing collaboration. Therefore, both the game 
theory model and the empirical results enrich our understanding of transaction 
cost theory. 
Finally, our thesis contributes to results re intellectual property rights 
(IPR) theory by revealing the dynamic impacts of imitation on collaboration and 
collaboration cost. When firms‘ exclusive IPR can be expropriated or the market 
explodes significantly, the markets may allow imitation. By designing a MATLAB 
animation programme in the game theory model, we clearly show how imitation 
affects the collaboration opportunity and collaboration cost percentage 
respectively. Apart from the methodological contribution of this animation, these 
two issues have not previously been investigated by either Vickers (1986) or 
other researchers. The results show that when IPR is looser, more imitation 
does not necessarily decrease the chance of collaboration. The outcome thus 
may depend upon transaction cost level in markets and different market types. 
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This consequently reveals that the relationship between IPR and collaboration 
may not be univariate.  
 
Empirical contribution 
 
 
The empirical contribution mainly comes from the empirical work using Chinese 
manufacturing data in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.  
Firstly, we have contributed, by using Nan Chang‘s firm level data 
derived from the China Innovation Survey and the Annual Corporate Financial 
Survey from 2005 to 2007, being the first to investigate technological 
collaboration in a mid-income level developing country. Due to the confidential 
nature of the data and the Statistics Law of the People‘s Republic of China, the 
work is the first to explore and present patterns of innovation and collaboration. 
As well as the general picture of the patterns and determinants of collaboration 
and innovation in Jiang Xi province, we were also able to detect and investigate 
the distribution of collaboration and innovation by observing the breakdown by 
different industries and time periods. In particular, in the initial analysis in 
Chapter 4, regional impacts and ownership impacts are investigated.  
Another contribution is that, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
work to empirically explore cost sharing strategies in technological 
collaborations. Different from White and Steven (2005) who investigated the 
gross value of collaboration cost or Bolton et al (2005) who detect cost sharing 
strategies in non-technological collaborations, we emphasised cost sharing 
between partners when technological collaboration occurs. Various hypotheses 
are proposed after observing the results of the econometric models, suggesting 
that collaboration cost may increase with R&D, the ratio of employees with a 
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higher education background, the technology gap, and the previous 
collaboration cost percentage, but may decrease with transaction costs, the 
number of patents held by firms, the technology level and the firms‘ perceived 
price. These major findings on collaboration cost therefore differ greatly from 
previous researches and may be considered as new. 
The third practice contribution is that we confirmed some predictions 
gathered from the existing empirical literatures. As suggested by Klecun-
Dabrowska (2002), a good contribution may not only focus on providing 
alternative knowledge, but may also ‗reflect or match the world as it exists‘. 
Therefore, evidence confirming the hypotheses from existing literatures may 
also be considered as a contribution. In Chapter 5, a positive relationship 
between six hypotheses relating to three factors and innovation (collaboration) 
are proposed. By using various econometric techniques, we found four of them 
confirmed from our results. To be more detailed, we confirmed the hypotheses 
proposed by Castellacci (2008) that both innovative ability and absorptive 
capacity may positively affect firms‘ innovative or collaborative decisions. On the 
other hand, since we observed a positive and significant relationship between 
catching up capacity and collaboration, we partly confirmed the hypotheses 
proposed by Blalock and Gertler (2009) that innovation and collaboration within 
firms may vary with their catching up capacity.  
 
Methodology contribution 
 
 
The methodology contribution mainly comes from the MATLAB programming in 
Chapter 3. We employed MATLAB programmes for two purposes. One is to 
show how collaboration opportunity varies with market characteristics, whilst the 
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other is to show how collaboration cost varies with market characteristics. We 
had two particular reasons to use the MATLAB programmes. One is that it 
allows us to observe the general relationship between market characteristics 
and collaboration cost. Since the collaboration cost may depend upon three 
different sub-equations, this would make our analysis excessively complicated if 
we discussed the three sub-equations separately. Moreover, as the first and 
second order of differentiation for some parameters are not constantly positive 
or negative, it is almost impossible to conclude on each parameter‘s potential 
impact. Using MATLAB simulation allows the programme to pick up the logical 
solution of each sub-equation when we input the specific value of parameters.  
The other reason is that rather than revealing 2-D partial relationships 
between one particular characteristic and collaboration opportunity (or 
collaboration cost), MATLAB programmes could show the 3-D simultaneous 
impacts of various characteristics in a dynamic environment. In particular, by 
using animation programmes, it clearly shows how collaboration cost varies with 
the size of imitation. Since the size of imitation grows from the theoretical 
minimum to the theoretical maximum, it is not likely to miss any abnormal status 
when imitation reaches a certain value. Therefore the methodology will greatly 
enhance the consistency of simulation results. Different from other readily 
available game theory packages, in MATLAB both programmes are here 
introduced to the literature for the first time. 
 
6.4 Limitations 
To explore under what circumstance firms collaborate and what determinants 
affect collaboration cost, we firstly employed game theory to explore these two 
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questions for different market types. We also used various econometric models 
to explore these two questions in the Chinese manufacturing context. However, 
as with all modelling there are limitations. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, for the game theory model, the limitations 
are mainly covered by three points which are abbreviated as follows: 
1. The strategy sets we assume only contain innovation, collaboration, 
imitation and do nothing. There are certainly other options which might be 
chosen in reality, such as licensing, or outsourcing. 
 
2. Our assumption in the game theory model does not allow for risk and 
uncertainty. However, firms can only try to launch new technology but cannot 
guarantee success. This point might be reviewed and improved in future 
research by using game theory with uncertainty 
 
3. The game we illustrated is a two-player, two-stage, product innovation 
game between firms. More players and more stages or players with other 
ownership may be added in the future. 
 
The main limitation of our empirical studies is the small size of the data 
sample. With three time periods, we may not explore stationarity using unit root 
tests (Bond et al, 2005; Blander, 2012). More variables might be found to be 
significant using different empirical techniques, such as the ARIMA model or the 
GARCH model, which may be employed with a larger sample and longer time 
periods. 
 
  
295 
 
Bibliography 
 
Abraham, E., & Fombrun, C. J. (1994). Macrocultures: Determinants and 
Consequences. Academy of Management Review, 19(4), 728-755. 
Adobor, H. (2006). Inter-firm Collaboration: Configurations and Dynamics. 
Competitiveness Review, 16(2), 122-134. 
Aghion, P., Bloom, N., Blundell, R., Griffith, R., & Howitt, P. (2005). Competition 
and Innovation: an Inverted-U Relationship. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 120(2), 701-728. 
Aghion, P., Dewatripont, M., & Rey, P. (1997). Corporate Governance, 
Competition Policy and Industrial Policy. European Economic Review, 
41(3-5(April)), 797-805. 
Aghion, P., Harris, C., Howitt, P., & Vickers, J. (2001). Competition, Imitation 
and Growth with Step-by-Step Innovation. Review of Economics Studies, 
68(3), 467-492. 
Amemiya, T. (1985). Advanced Econometrics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Anderson, J. C., & Narus, J. A. (1990). A Model of Distributor Firm and 
Manufacturer Firm Working Partnerships. Journal of Marketing, 54(1), 
42-58. 
Anderson, P., & Kaplan, M. (2004). Patterns of capability acquisition in 
electronic commerce. Journal of Strategic Marketing, 12(2), 97-109. 
Ansoff, H. I. (1984). Implanting  Strategic Management. New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall Englewood Cliffs. 
Arendt, J. N., & Holm, A. (2006). Probit Models with Binary Endogenous 
Regressors, CAM Working Papers 2006-06: University of Copenhagen, 
Department of Economics, Centre for Applied Microeconometrics. 
Arnberg, S., & Bjorner, T. B. (2007). Substitution between Energy, Capital and 
Labour within Industrial Companies: A Micro Panel Data Analysis, 
Resource and Energy Economics. Resource and Energy Economics, 
29(2), 122-136.  
Arrow, K. J. (1962). The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing. Review of 
Economics Studies, 29(3), 155-173. 
Arvanitis, S., & Hollenstein, H. (1996). Industrial Innovation in Switzerland: A 
model-based Analysis with Survey Data. In A. Kleinknecht (Ed.), 
Determinants of Innovation: The Message from New Indicators (pp. 13-
62). London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 
AxeIrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books. 
Baltagi, B., Song, S., & Jung, B. (2001). The Unbalanced Nested Error 
Component Regression Model. Journal of Econometrics, 101(2), 357-
381.  
Bao, H., & Xu, Z. (2005). The Relationship between Patent, Innovation and 
Economy Growth. The Party Studies in Zhejiang Province, 21 (5), 76-81. 
Baumol, W. (1997). Horizontal Collusion and Innovation. The Economic Journal, 
102(410), 129-137. 
Baumol, W. (2005). Education for Innovation: Entrereneurial Breakthroughs 
versus Corporate Incremental Imrovements. In A. B. Jaffe & J. Lerner & 
S. Stern(Ed.), Innovation Policy and the Economy, Vol. 5(pp.33-56). 
296 
 
NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 
jaff05-1 
Bellais, R., & Guichard, R. (2006). Defense Innovation, Technology Transfers 
and Public Policy. Defence and Peace Economics, 17(3), 273-286. 
Berge-Gil, A. (2010). Cooperation-based Innovators and Peripheral 
Cooperators: An Empirical Analysis of Their Characteristics and 
Behavior. Technovation, 30(3), 185-206. 
Bjorner, T. B., & Jensen, H. H. (2002). Energy Taxes, Voluntary Agreements 
and Investment Subsidies— A Micro-panel analysis of the effect on 
Danish Industrial Companies' Energy Demand. Resource and Energy 
Economics, 24(3), 229-249. 
Blander, R. D., & Dhaene, G. (2012). Unit Root Tests for Panel Data with AR(1) 
Errors and Small T. The Econometrics Journal, 15(1), 101-124. 
Blumenthal, T. (1976). Japan's Technological Strategy. Journal of Development 
Economics, 3(3), 245-255. 
Bockhoff, K. (1992). R&D Cooperation between Firms-A Perceived Transaction 
Cost Perspective. Management Science, 38(4), 514-524. 
Bolton, G. E., Katok, E., & Ockenfels, A. (2005). Cooperation among Strangers 
with Limited Information About Reputation. Journal of Public Economics, 
89(8), 1457-1468.  
Bond, S., Nauges, C., & Windmeijer, F. (2005). Unit Roots: Identification and 
Testing in Micro Panels. CeMMAP working papers CWP07/05. Centre for 
Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.   
Bond, S. R. (2002). Dynamic Panel Data Models: A Guide to Micro Data 
Methods and Practice. Portuguese Economic Journal, 1(2), 141-162. 
Branzei, R., Dimitrov, D., & Tijs, S. (2005). Models in Cooperative Game 
Theory: Crisp, Fuzzy, and Multi Choice Games (1st ed.). Beilin, New 
York: Springer. 
Bratti, M., Mcknight, A., Naylor, R., & Smith, J. (2004). Higher Education 
Outcomes, Graduate Employment and University Performance 
Indicators. Royal Statistical Society, 167(3), 475-496. 
Brod, A., & Schivakumar, R. (1997). R&D Cooperation and the Joint 
Exploitation of R&D. Canadian Journal of Economics, 30(3), 673-684. 
Bronder, C., & Pritzl, R. (1992). Developing Strategic Alliances: A Conceptual 
Framework for Successful Cooperation. European Management Journal, 
10(4), 412-421. 
Brouwer, E., & Kleinknecht, A. (1996). Determinants of Innovation: A 
Microeconometric Analysis of Three Alternative Innovation Output 
Indicators. In A. Kleinknecht (Ed.), Determinants of Innovation: The 
Message from New Indicators (pp. 99-124). London: Macmillan Press 
Ltd. 
Brown, A. K. (1997). Collaboration and the Complex World of Literary Rights. 
American Indian Quarterly, 21(4), 595-603. 
Bruono, A. F., & Bowditch, J. L. (1989). The Human Side of Mergers and 
Acquisitions: Managing Collisions Between People, Cultures, and 
Organizations. San Francisco: Jossey-Bss. 
Buckley, P. J., & Casson, M. (1996). An Economic Model of International Joint 
Venture Strategy. Journal of International Business Studies, 27(4), 849-
876. 
297 
 
Busch, M. L., & Reinhardt, E. (2000). Geography, International Trade, and 
Political Mobilization in U.S. Industries. American Journal of Political 
Science, 44(4), 703-719. 
Caballero, R. J., & Jaffe, A. B. (1993). How High are the Giants' Shoulders: an 
Empirical Assessment of Knowledge Spill Overs and Creative 
Destruction in a Model of Economic Growth. NBER Macroeconomics 
Annual, 8(8), 15-73. 
Cameron, C. (2007). Panel Data Methods for Microeconometrics Using Stata. 
Paper presented at the West Coast Stata Users' Group Meetings 2007 
13, Stata Users Group.  
Cappellari, L., & Jenkins, S. P. (2003). Multivariate Probit Regression Using 
Simulated Maximum Likelihood. Stata Journal, 3(3), 278-294. 
Carayannis, E. G. (1994). The Strategic Management of Technological 
Learning: Transnational Decision Making Frameworks and Their 
Empirical Effectiveness. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New 
York. 
Carayannis, E. G., Alexander, J., & Loannidis, A. (2000). Leveraging 
Knowledge, Learning, and Innovation in Forming Strategic Government-
University-Industry (GUI) R&D Partnerships in the US, Germany, and 
France. Technovation, 20(9), 477-488. 
Cassiman, B., Guardo, M., Chiara, D., & Valentini, G. (2009). Organising R&D 
Projects to Profit from Innovation: Insights from Co-opetition. Long 
Range Planning, 42(2), 216-233. 
Cassiman, B., & Veugelers, R. (2002). R&D Cooperation and Spillovers: Some 
Empirical Evidence from Belgium. The American Economy Review, 
92(4), 1169-1184. 
Cassiman, B., & Veugelers, R. (2006). In Search of Complementarity in 
Innovation Strategy: Internal R&D and External Knowledge Acquisition. 
Management Science, 52(1), 68-82. 
Chen, G., Zheng, S., & Sang, G. (1999). Evaluation and Comparison on 
Technology between Joint Adventures and Other Enterprises. Science 
Research Management, 20(6), 32-38. 
Chen, M. (2007). Game Studies of Determinants of Collaboration. Market 
Modernization, 30(6), 32-34. 
Chen, M. S., Chang, H. J., Huang, C. W., & Liao, C. N. (2006). Channel 
Coordination and Transaction Cost. Industrial Marketing Management, 
35(2), 178-190.  
Chen, T. T. (2003). The Studies of Mechanism of Spill Over Effect by FDI on 
Chinese Manufacturing. World Economic Papers, 9(3), 28-40. 
Cheng, L., & Tao, Z. (1999). The Impact of Public Pollicies on Innovation and 
Imitation: The Role of R&D Technology. International Economic Review, 
40(1), 187-207. 
Chesbrough, H. W. (2003). Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating 
and Profiting from Technology. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Circular of Catalog for High-technology. 2003. Apr. 28, 2010, from 
http://www.sts.org.cn/sjkl/gjscy/data2009/data09.html 
Coe, D. T., & Helpman, E. (1995). International R&D spill overs. European 
Economic Review, 39(5), 859-887. 
298 
 
Cohen, W., & Levinthal, D. (1990). Abosorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on 
Learning and Innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1), 128-
152. 
Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press. 
Combs, K. L. (1992). Cost Sharing vs. Multiple Research Projects in 
Cooperative R&D. Economics Letters, 39(3), 353-357. 
Contractor, F. J. (1985). A Generalized Theorem for Joint-Venture and 
Licensing Negotiations. Journal of International Business Studies, 16(2), 
23-50. 
Crepon, B., Duguet, E., & Kabla, I. (1996). Schumpeterian Conjectures: A 
Moderate Support from Various Innovation Measures. In A. Kleinknecht 
(Ed.), Determinants of Innovation (pp. 63-98). London: Macmillan Press 
Ltd. 
Dai, Z. M., Guo, L., & Shi, Q. (2011). Analysis on Industry Association and 
Industrial Innovation System: A Case of Leading Industries in Jiang Xi. 
Technology Economics, 30(4), 14-20.  
D'Aspremont, C., & Jacquemin, A. (1988). Cooperative and Noncooperative 
R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers. American Economic Review, 78(5), 
1133-1137. 
Dasgupta, P. (1982). The Theory of Technological Competition. Paper 
presented at the London School of Economics ICERD Discussion Paper.  
Davidson, C., & Segerstrom, P. (1998). R&D Subsidies and Economic Growth. 
The Rand Journal of Economics, 29(3), 548-577. 
Dow, G. K. (1985). Internal Bargaining and Strategic Innovation in the Theory of 
the Firm. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 6(3), 301-320.  
Dubin, J. A., & Rivers, D. (1989). Selection Bias in Linear Regression, Logit and 
Probit Models. Sociological Methods and Research, 18(2-3), 360-390. 
Ergun, O., Kuyzu, C., & Savelsbergh, M. W. P. (2007). Shipper Collaboration. 
Computers & Operations Research, 34(6), 1551-1560.  
Faems, D., Looy, B. V., & Debackere, K. (2005). Interorganizational 
Collaboration and Innovation: Toward a Portfolio Approach. The Journal 
of Product Innovation Management, 22(3), 238-250. 
Feng, L., & Chen, H. (2004). Studies on Chinese International Joint Ventures 
under Globalisation. Journal of Chongqing University of Posts and 
Telecommunications, 17(3), 54-56. 
Fiedler, M., & Welpe, I. M. (2010). Antecedents of Cooperative 
Commercialisation Strategies of Nanotechnology Firms. Research 
Policy, 39(3), 400-410. 
Fishe, R. P. H., Trost, R. P., & Lurie, P. M. (1981). Labor Force Earnings and 
College Choice of Young Women: An Eximation of Selectivity Bias and 
Comparative Advantage. Economics of Education Review, 1(2), 169-191. 
Ford, D. (1980). The Development of Buyer-seller Relationships in Industrial 
Markets. European Journal of Marketing, 14(5-6), 339-353. 
Franko, L. G. (1989). Global Corporate Competition: Who's Winning, Who's 
Losing, and the R&D Factor as a Reason Why. Stragetic Management 
Journal, 10(5), 449-474. 
Fu, W. J., Carroll, R. J., & Wang, S. J. (2005). Estimating Misclassification Error 
with Small Samples via Bootstrap Cross-validation. Bioinformatics, 21(9), 
1979-1986.  
299 
 
Fuller-Love, N., & Cooper, J. (1996). Competition or Cooperation? Strategic 
Information Management in the National Health Service: A Case Study of 
the Ceredigion NHS Trust. International Journal of Information 
Management, 16(3), 219-232. 
Gabaix, X., & David, I. L. (2008). The Seven Properties of Good Models. In A. 
Caplin & A. Schotter (Eds.), The Foundations of Positive and Normative 
Economics : A Handbook. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gallini, N. T., & Winter, R. A. (1985). Licensing in the Theory of Innovation. 
Rand Journal of Economics, 16(2),237-252. 
Gans, J. S., Hsu, D. H., & Stern, S. (2002). When Does Start-up Innovation 
Spur the Gale of Creative Destruction? Rand Journal of Economics, 
33(4), 571-586. 
Gans, J. S., & Stern, S. (2003). The product Market and the Market for 'idears': 
Commercialization Strategies for Technology Entrepreneurs. Research 
Policy, 32(2), 333-350. 
Gao, C., & Pan, Z. (2007). Game Analysis of Collaboration Configuration in 
High-Tech Firms. Science & Technology Progress and Policy 24(3), 65-
67. 
Geringer, J. M., & Herbert, L. (1991). Measuring Performance of International 
Joint Ventures. Journal of International Business Studies, 22(2), 249-
264. 
Giannakas, K., & Fulton, M. (2005). Process innovation Activity in a Mixed 
Oligopoly: The role of Cooperatives. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 87(2), 406-422. 
Gilbert, R., & Newbery, D. (1982). Pre-emptive Patenting and the Persistence of 
Monopoly. American Economic Review, 72(3), 514-526. 
Girma, S., & Gong, Y. (2008). Putting People First? Chinese State-owned 
Enterprises Adjustment to Globalisation. International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 26(2), 573-585. 
Girma, S., Gong, Y., & Görg, H. (2006). Can You Teach Old Dragons New 
Tricks? FDI and Innovation Activity in Chinese State-Owned Enterprises. 
IZA Discussion Paper No. 2267: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). 
Girma, S., Gong, Y., & Görg, H. (2008). Foreign Direct Investment, Access to 
Finance, and Innovation Activity in Chinese Enterprises. World Bank 
Economic Review, 22(2), 367-382. 
Girma, S., Gong, Y., & Görg, H. (2009). What Determines Innovation Activity in 
Chinese State- owned Enterprises? The Role of Foreign Direct 
Investment. World Development, 37(4), 866-873. 
Girma, S., Görg, H., & Pisu, M. (2008). Exporting, Linkages and Productivity 
Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment. Canadian Journal of 
Economics, 41(1), 320-340. 
Glaister.K.W, & Buckley, P. J. (1992). Strategic Motives for International 
Alliance Formation. Journal of Management Studies, 33(3), 301-332. 
Godfrey, L. G. (1998). Tests of Non-nested Regression Models Some Results 
on Small Sample Behaviour and the Bootstrap. Journal of Econometrics, 
84(1), 59-74.  
Gonau, R. (1974). Wage Comparisons- A Selectivity Bias. Journal of Political 
Economy, 82(6), 1119-1143. 
300 
 
Greenlee, P., & Cassiman, B. (1999). Product Market Objectives and the 
Formation of Research Joint Ventures. Managerial and Decision 
Economics, 20(3), 115-130. 
Grier, K. B., Munger, M. C., & Roberts, B. E. (1994). The Determinants of 
Industry Political Activity, 1978-1986. The American Political Science 
Review, 88(4), 911-926. 
Grimes-Casey, H. G., Seager, T. P., Theis, T. L., & Powers, S. E. (2007). A 
Game Theory Framework for Cooperative Management of Refillable and 
Disposable Bottle of Lifecycles. Journal of Cleaner Production, 15(17), 
1618-1627.  
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1986). The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of 
Vertical and Lateral Integration. Journal of Political Economy, 94(4), 691-719 
Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (1991a). Innovation and Growth in the Global 
Economy. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (1991b). Quality Ladders and Product Cycles. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(2), 557-586. 
Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (1991c). Quality Ladders in the Theory of 
Growth. Review of Economics Studies, 58(1), 43-61. 
Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (1994). Endogenous Innovation in the Theory 
of Growth. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(1), 23-44. 
Guan, J. C., Yam, R. C. M., & Mok, C. K. (2005). Collaboration Between 
Industry and Research Institutes/ Universities on Industrial Innovation in 
Beijing, China. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 17(3), 
339-353. 
Guo, W., & Zhang, S. (2008). Analysis on Technology Spill over Effect of 
Multinational Company's Technology Transfer to the Investment of 
Chinese Car Industry. Journal of Zhengzhou Institution of Aeronautical 
Industry Management, 26(2), 61-64. 
Hackbarth, G., & Kettinger, J. (2000). Building an E-Business strategy. 
Information Systems Management, 17(3), 1-16. 
Hall, B. H. (2010). Open Innovation & Intellectural Propert Rights. Economy, 
Culture & History Japan Spotlight, 29(1), 18-19. 
Hall, B. H., & Rosenberg, N. (Eds.). (2010). Handbook of the Economics of 
Innovation. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Hamel, G., & Prahalad, C. K. (1994). Competing for the Future. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Harrigan, R. K. (1988). Joint venture and competitive strategy. Strategic 
Management Journal, 155(3), 141-158. 
Heckman, J. J. (1979). Sample selection bias as a specification error. 
Economitrica, 47(1), 153-161. 
Heide, J. B., & G., J. (1990). Alliances in Industrial Purchasing: The 
Determinants of Joint Action in Buyer-supplier Relationships. Journal of 
Marketing Research, 27(1), 24-36. 
Helpman, E. (1993). Innovation, limitation, and Intellectual Property Rights. 
Econometrica, 61(6), 1247-1280. 
Hennart, J. F., & Reddy, S. (1997). The Choice Between Mergers/Acquisitions 
and Joint Ventures: the Case of Japanese Investors in the United States. 
Stragetic Management Journal, 18(1), 1-12. 
Hill, C. W. L. (1990). Cooperation, Opportunism, and the Invisible Hand: 
Implications for Transaction Cost Theory. Academy of Management 
Review, 15(3), 500-513. 
301 
 
Hoechle, D. (2007). Robust Standard Errors for Panel Regressions with Cross-
Sectional Dependence. The Stata Journal, 7(3), 281-312.  
Holtz-Eakin, D., Newey, W., & Rosen, H. S. (1988). Estimating Vector 
Autoregressions with Panel Data. Econometrica, 56(6), 1371-1395.  
Hotelling, H. (1929). Stability in Competition. Economic Journal, 39(153), 41-57. 
Hult, G. T., & Ferrell, O. C. (1997). Global Organizational Learning Capacity in 
Purchasing: Construct and Measurement. Journal of Business Research, 
40(2), 97-111. 
Hung, S. C., & Chu, Y. Y. (2006). Stimulating New Industries from Emerging 
Technologies: Challenges for the Public Sector. Technovation, 26(1), 
104-110. 
Industry Classification and Code. 2002.   Retrieved Apr. 28, 2010, from 
http://www.sts.org.cn/tjyw/tjzl/zbjdm/hydm2003.html 
Jackle, A. E., & Li, C. A. (2006). Firm Dynamics and Institutional Participation: A 
Case Study on Informality of Micro Enterprises in Peru. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 54(3), 557-578.  
Jarillo, J. C. (1988). On Strategic Networks. Stragetic Management Journal, 
9(1), 31-41. 
Jaslow, C. A. (1983). Practical Considerations in Drafting a Joint Venture 
Agreement with China. The American Journal of Comparative Law, 
31(2), 209-249. 
Jiao, S. (2007). Game Analysis of Technological Collaboration. Science and 
Technology Management Research, 5(1), 119-122. 
Johnson, G., Scholes, K., & Whittington, R. (2008). Exploring Corporate 
Strategy, 8th Edition. Essex: FT Prentice Hall. 
Jones, R. A., Pearse, P. H., & Scott, A. D. (1980). Conditions for Cooperation 
on Joint Projects by Independent Jurisdictions. The Canadian Journal of 
Economics, 13(2), 231-249. 
Kajewska, M. A., Kopfer, H., Laporte, G., Ropke, S., & Zaccour, G. (2008). 
Horizontal Cooperation among Freight Carriers: Request Allocation and 
Profit Sharing. The Journal of the Operational Research Society, 59(11), 
1483-1491. 
Kajtala, V., Maler, K. G., & Tulkens, H. (1995). The Acid Rain Game as a 
Resource Allocation Process with an Application to the International 
Cooperation among Finland, Russia and Estonia. The Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics, 97(2), 325-243.  
Kalirajan, K. P. (1991). The Importance of Efficient Use in the Adoption of 
Technology: A Micro Panel Data Analysis. The Journal of Productivity 
Analysis, 2(2), 113-126.  
Kapos, D., & Strimaitis, R. (2006). Why Collaboration is Crucial. Managing 
Intellectual Property, 165(1), 31-33. 
Khalifah, N. A., & Adam, R. (2009). Productivity Spillovers from FDI in 
Malaysian Manufacturing: Evidence from Micro-panel Data. Asian 
Economic Journal, 23(2), 143-167. 
Klay, W. E. (1991). Strategic Management and Evaluation: Rivals, Partners, or 
Just Fellow Travellers? Evaluation and program Planning, 14(4), 281-
289. 
Klecun-Dabrowska, E. (2002). Telethealth and Information Society: A Critical 
Study of Emerging Concepts in Policy and Practice. Doctor of 
Philosophy, London School of Economics and Political Science, London.    
302 
 
Kleinknecht, A. (1996). New indicators and Determinants of Innovation: An 
Introduction. In A. Kleinknecht (Ed.), Determinants of Innovation: The 
Message from New Indicators (pp. 1-12). London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 
Kogut, B. (1988). Joint Ventures: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives. 
Strategic Management Journal, 9(4), 319-332. 
Koke, J., & Renneboog, L. (2005). Do Corporate Control and Product Market 
Competition Lead to Stronger Productivity Growth? Evidence from 
Market-oriented and Blockholder-based Governance Regimes. Journal of 
Law and Economics, 48(2), 475-516. 
Krucken, G., Meier, F., & Muller, A. (2007). Information, Cooperation, and the 
Blurring of Boundaries Technology Transfer in German and American 
Discourses. Higher Education, 53(6), 675-696. 
Lamb, R. B. (Ed.). (1984). Competitive Strategic Management. New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs. 
Larson, B. A., & Anderson, M. (August 1994). Technology Transfer, Licensing 
Contracts, and Incentives for Further Innovation. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 76(3), 547-556. 
Laurent, A. (1983). The Cultural Diversity of Western Conceptions of 
Management. International Studies of Management and Organization, 
13(1-2), 75-96. 
Laursen, K., & Salter, A. (2006). Open for Innovation: The Role of Openness in 
Explaining Innovation Performance among UK Manufacturing firms. 
Strategic Management Journal, 27(2), 131-150. 
Lee, T., & Wilde, L. (1980). Market Structure and Innovation: A Reformulation. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 94(2), 429-436. 
Leonard-Barton, D. (1995). Wellsprings of Knowledge: Building and Sustaining 
the Sources of Innovation. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Li, H. (2001). Coordination and Innovation of International Joint Ventures. 
Journal of Yunnan Finance & Economics University, 15(1), 72-77. 
Li, J. (2010). Global R&D Alliances in China: Collaboration with Universities and 
Research Institutes. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 
57(1), 78-87. 
Liu, H., & Shi, K. (2007). Game Analysis between the Independent Innovation 
and Follow. Science & Technology Management 15(2), 68-70. 
Lopes, L. F., & Godinho, M. M. (2005). Services Innnovation and Economics 
Performance: An analysis at the firm level, DRUID Working Papers 05-
08: DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial 
Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business 
Studies. 
Love, J. H., & Roper, S. (1999). The Determinants of Innovation: R&D, 
Technology Transfer and Networking Effects. Review of Industrial 
Organization, 15(1), 43-64. 
Love, J. H., & Roper, S. (2004). The Organisation of Innovation: Collaboration, 
Cooperation and Multifunctional Groups in UK and German 
Manufacturing. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 28(3), 379-395. 
Lubatkin, M., & Floyd, S. (1997). In Search of a European Model of Strategic 
Management. European Management Journal, 15(6), 612-624. 
Lucas, R. E. J. (1988). One the Mechanics of Economic Development. Journal 
of Monetary Economics, 22(1), 3-42. 
303 
 
Luo, Y. (1997). Partner Selection and Venturing Success: The Case of Joint 
Ventures with Firms in the People's Republic of China. Oranization 
Science, 8(6), 648-662. 
Macqinty, M. (2007). International Environmental Agreements, among 
Asymmetric Nations. Oxford Economic Papers, 59(1), 45-62.  
Maddala, G. S. (1983). Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in 
Econometrics(Econometric Society Monographs). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Madhok, A., & Tallman, S. B. (1998). Resources, Transactions and Rents: 
Managing  Value Through Interfirm Callaborative Relationships. 
Oranization Science, 9(3), 326-339.  
Man, A.-P. d., & Duysters, G. (2005). Collaboration and Innovation: a Review of 
the Effects of Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances on Innovation. 
Technovation, 25(1), 1377-1387. 
Mansfield, E. (1985). How Rapidly Does New Industrial Technology Leak Out? 
The Journal of Industrial Economics, 34(2), 217-223. 
Mansfield, E., Schwartz, M., & Wagner, S. (1981). Imitation Costs and Patents: 
An Empirical Study. Journal of Economics, 91(364), 907-918. 
Matsubayashi, N. (2007). Price and Quality Competition: The Effect of 
Differentiation and Vertical Integration. European Journal of Operational 
Research, 180(2), 907-921. 
Mbata, J. N. (2001). Determinants of Animal Traction Adoption in Traditional 
Agriculture: an Application of the Multivariate Probit Procedure to the 
Case of Lesotho. Development Southern Africa, 18(3), 309-325. 
Mehta, R., Polsa, P., Mazur, J., Fan, X., & Diubinsky, A. J. (2006). Strategic 
Alliance in International Distribution Channels. Journal of Business 
Research, 59(10-11), 1094-1104. 
Miranda, A., & Rabe-Hesketh, S. (2006). Maximum Likelihood Estimation of 
Endogenous Switching and Sample Selection Models for Binary, Ordinal, 
and Count Variables. The Stata Journal, 3(6), 285-308. 
Mol, M. (2005). Does Being R&D Intensive Still Discourage Outsourcing? . 
Research Policy, 34(4), 571-582. 
Motta, M. (1992). Cooperative R&D and Vertical Product Differentiation. 
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 10(4), 643-661. 
Nan Chang's GDP Value in 2007, 2008.   Retrieved May 03, 2010, from 
http://www.jxgdw.com/jxgd/news/jszg/userobject1ai766153.html 
Nan Chang statistical information net.   Retrieved Sep. 30, 2009, from 
http://www.nctj.gov.cn/News.shtml?p5=1588 
Narula, R. (2004). R&D Collaboration by SMEs: New Opportunities and 
Limitations in the Face of Globalisation. Technovation, 24(2), 153-161. 
Nelson, R., & Phelps, E. (1966). Investments in Humans, Technological 
Diffusion, and Economic Growth. American Economic Review, 56(2), 69-
75.  
Nicoletti, C., & Peracchi, F. (July, 2001). Two-step estimation of binary 
response models with sample selection, EU Improving Human Potential 
Programme Working Paper: Faculty of Economics, Tor Vergata 
University, Rome, Italy. 
Nie, H., Tan, S., & Wang, Y. (2007). Innovation, Firm Size and Market 
Competition: From the Evidence of Firm-Level Panel Data in China, 
304 
 
Working Paper Series, No. 200712001: School of Economics, Renmin 
University of China. 
Nueno, P., & Oosterveld, J. (1988). Managing Technology Alliances. Long 
Range Planning, 21(3), 11-17. 
Oye, K. A. (1986). Cooperation under Anarchy. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Parkhe, A. (1991). Interfirm Diversity, Organizational Learning, and Longevity in 
Global Strategic Alliances. Journal of International Business Studies, 
22(4), 579-601. 
Parkhe, A. (1993). Strategic Alliance Structuring: A Game theoretic and 
Transaction Cost Examination of Interfirm Cooperation. Academy of 
Management Journal, 36(4), 794-829. 
Patrakosol, B., & Olson, D. L. (2007). How Interfirm Collaboration Benefits IT 
Innovation. Information and Management, 44(1), 53-62. 
Pearce, R. J. (1997). Toward Understanding Joint Venture Performance and 
Survival: A Bargaining and Influence Approach to Transaction Cost 
Theory. The Academy of Management Review, 22(1), 203-225. 
Peng, B., & Li, T. (2008). Study on the Innovative Game and Strategy of 
Undertaking Type Enterprise. Sci-Technology and Management, 10(1), 
34-36. 
Pennings, J. M., & Harianto, F. (1992). Technological Networking and 
Innovation Implementation. Organization Science, 3(3), 356-382. 
Pepall, L. (1997). Imitative Competition and Product Innovation in a Duopoly 
Model. Economica, 64(254), 265-279. 
Ping, X. (2007). Analysis of FDI Spill Over Effect on Chinese local firms. World 
Economy papers, 8(1), 3-13. 
Pisano, G. P. (1990). The R&D Boundaries of the Firm: An Empirical Analysis. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1), 153-176. 
Polenske, K. R. (2004). Competition, Collaboration and Cooperation: An 
Uneasy Triangle in Networks of Firms and Regions. Regional Studies, 
38(9), 1029-1043. 
Porter, M. E. (1990). The Competitive Advantage of Nations. New York: Free 
Press. 
Rabe-Hesketh, S. (2002). Multilevel Selection Models Using Gllamm. Paper 
presented at the Dutch-German Stata Users' Group Meetings 2002 1, 
Stata Users Group.  
Rabe-Hesketh, S., & Skrondal, A. (2006). Multilevel Modelling of Complex 
Survey Data. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society : Series A (Statistics 
in Society), 169(4), 805-827.  
Rabe-Hesketh, S., Skrondal, A., & Pickles, A. (2005). Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation of Limited and Discrete Dependent Variable Models with 
Nested Random Effects. Journal of Econometrics, 128(2), 301-323.  
Reinganum, J. F. (1985). Innovation and Industry Evolution. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 100(1), 81-99. 
Rimoldi, A. (2002). Collaboration is the Key. Design News, 59(7).15-25 
Rodrik, D. (2006). What's So Special about China's Exports? China & World 
Economy, 14(5), 1-19. 
Rosenkranz, S. (1995). Innovation and Cooperation under Vertical Product 
Differentiation. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 13(1), 1-
22. 
305 
 
Samuelson, P. (1987). Innovation and Competition: Conflicts over Interllectual 
Property Rights in New Technologies. Human Values, 12(1), 6-21. 
Schaffner, J. A. (2002). Heteroskedastic Sample Selection and Developing-
Country Wage Equations. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 
84(2), 269-280. 
Scherer, F. M. (1980). Industrial Market Structure and Economics Performance. 
Chicago: Rand-Mcnally Publishing Co. 
Schmookler, J. (1966). Invention and Economic Growth. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Schroder, S. C. (2005). Collaboration Rules. Harvard Business Review, 83(11), 
160-162. 
Schumpeter, J. (1934). The Theory of Economic Development. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
Seade, J. (1980). On the Effects of Entry. Economitrica, 48(2), 479-488. 
Segerstrom, P. S. (1991). Innovation, Imitation, and Economic Growth. Journal 
of Political Economy, 99(4), 807-827. 
Siegel, K., & Tuckel, P. (1985). The Utilization of Evaluation Research: A Case  
Analysis. Evaluation Review, 9(3), 307-328. 
Shaked, A., & Sutton, J. (1982). Relaxing price competition through product 
differentiation. Review of Economics Studies, 49(1), 3-13. 
Shaked, A., & Sutton, J. (1984). Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect 
Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. Economitrica, 52(6), 1151-1164. 
Shaked, A., & Sutton, J. (1987). Product differentiation and industrial structure. 
Journal of Industrial Economics, 36(2), 131-146. 
Shaked, A., & Sutton, J. (1990). Multiproduct Firms and Market Structure. Rand 
Journal of Economics, 21(1), 45-62. 
Shonkwiler, J. S., & Yen, T. S. (1999). Two-Step Estimation of a Censored 
System of Equations. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 81(4), 
972-982. 
Smith, A., & Aldrich, H. E. (1991). The Role of Trust in the Transaction Cost 
Economics Framework. 
Snidal, D. (1986). The GameTtheory of International Politics. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Solow, R. M. (1956). A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70(1), 65-94. 
Stoneman, P. (Ed.). (1995). Handbook of the economics of innovation and 
technological change. London: Blackwell. 
Stoneman, P. (2007). Does the Use of New Technology Encourage Further 
Use, mimeo, Univrersity of Warwick, June. 
Sun, J., & Cui, L. (2007). Analysis on the Factors, Market Structure and 
Dynamical Gambling Process of Enterprise Technology Innovation. 
Science & Technology Progress and Policy, 24(8), 97-101. 
Tan, F. (2007). Game Theory Analysis of Collaboration and Self Innovation with 
Spill Over Effect. Corporation Forum (Qiyejia Tiandi), 10(1), 116-117. 
Teece, D. J. (1986). Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for 
Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy. Research Policy, 
15(6), 285-305. 
Teece, D. J. (1988). Capturing Value from Technological Innovation: 
Integration, Strategic Partnering, and Licensing Decisions. Interfaces, 
18(3), 46-61. 
306 
 
Tian, J. (2003). Cointegration Analysis Between GDP and the Input of Scientific 
Research. Journal of Nanchang College of Water Conservancy and 
Hydroelectric Power, 22(3), 10-13. 
Tilton, J. E. (1971). International Diffusion of Technology: The Case of 
Semiconductors. Washington: Brookings Institution. 
Tu, C., & Yi, W. (2008). Analysis of China's Self-innovation Capability Crossed 
Regions. Science and Technology Management Research, 1(1), 39-42. 
Verspagen, B. (1991). A New Empirical Approach to Catching up or Falling 
Behind. Structure Change and Economic Dynamics, 2(2), 488-509.  
Vickers, J. S. (1986). The Evolution of Market Structure When There is a 
Sequence of Innovations. Journal of Industrial Economics, 35(1), 1-12. 
Vossen, R. W., & Nooteboom, B. (1996). Firm Size and Participation in R&D. In 
A. Kleinknecht (Ed.), Determinants of Innovation:The Message from New 
Indicators (pp. 155-168). London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 
Wang, J., Fan, Z., Jiang, Y., & Hu, G. (2005). Resource Sharing Decision Model 
Based on Stackelberg Game in Collaborative Knowledge Creations. 
Chinese Journal of Management Science, 13(3), 84-88. 
Webber, D. E. (2005). China's Approach to Innovative Pharmaceutical R&D: A 
Review. In G. Festel, U. Oels, A. Kreimeyer & M. v. Zedtwitz (Eds.), The 
Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industry in China---Opportunities and 
Threats for Foreign Companies (pp. 121-132). Berlin, Heidelberg: 
Springer. 
White, H. (1980). A Heteroskedasticity-consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator 
and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity. Econometrica, 48(4), 817-838.  
White, S. (2005). Cooperation Costs, Governance Choice and Alliance 
Evolution. Journal of Management Studies, 42(7), 1383-1412.  
White, S., & Lui, S. S. (2005). Distinguishing Costs of Cooperation and Control 
in Alliances. Strategic Management Journal, 26(10), 913-923.  
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust 
Implications. New York: The Free Press. 
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: 
The Free Press. 
Womack, J. P., Jones, D. T., & Ross, D. (1991). The Machine that Changed the 
World. New York: Harper Perennial. 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel 
Data. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Xu, E., & Zhang, H. (2008). The Impact of State Shares on Corporate 
Innovation Strategy and Performance in China. Asia Pacific J Manage, 
25(1), 473-287. 
Yergin, D., & Stanislaw, J. (2002). The Commanding Heights: The Battle 
Between Government and the Marketplace That is Remaking the World. 
New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc. 
Yi, Y. (2007). The Optimal Strategy of Market Organisation in High-tech 
Industry. Market Forum (Shichang Luntan), 12(45), 64-65. 
Yoshino, M. Y., & Rangan, U. S. (1995). Strategic Alliances: An Entrepreneurial 
Approach to Globalization’. Boston: Harvard Business Press. 
Ziegelbauer, K., & Farquhar, R. (2004). Strategic Alliance Management: 
Lessons Learned from the Bayer-Millennium Collaboration. Drug 
Discovery Today, 9(20), 864-868. 
307 
 
Zhang, H. (2008). The Impact of FDI on the Independent Innovation Capacity of 
Chinese Home Manufacturing. International Trade Studies, 1(1), 72-81. 
Zhang, Y., Li, H., Hitt, M. A., & Cui, G. (2007). R&D Intensity and International 
Joint Venture Performance in an Emerging Market: Moderating Effects of 
Market Focus and Ownership Structure. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 38(1), 944-960. 
Zitzewitz, E. W. (2003). Competition and Long-run Productivity Growth in the 
UK and US Tobacco Industries, 1879-1939. The journal of industrial 
economics, 51(1), 1-33. 
web source.   Retrieved 27th Sep., 2011, from 
http://www.cybercrime.gov/ipmanual/01ipma.html 
web source.   Retrieved 27, Sep., 201 Defence and Peace Economics 1, from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intellectual_property_in_the_People%27s_Re
public_of_China 
web source.   Retrieved Dec 05th, 2011, from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_management 
web source.   Retrieved Feb. 28th, 2012, from  
              http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-08/23/content_25614.htm 
 
 
 
 
  
